90-373

No. ____

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
AUG 31 1990
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

KPMG PEAT MARWICK,

Petitioner,

—v.—

W. DAVID HOLLOWAY, *et al.*,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Of Counsel:

Leonard P. Novello
General Counsel
Anthony J. Costantini
Associate General Counsel
KPMG PEAT MARWICK
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10153

*Dean I. Ringel
David Wagner
Adam Liptak
CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL
(a partnership including
professional corporations)
80 Pine Street
New York, New York 10005
(212) 701-3000

Deryl L. Gotcher
Roy C. Breedlove
Graydon Dean Luthey, Jr.
JONES, GIVENS, GOTCHER
& BOGAN
A Professional Corporation
3800 First National Tower
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

*Counsel of Record

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED

Are passbook savings account and thrift certificates, issued by state chartered institutions and subject to state and Federal Reserve Board regulation, "securities" as that term is used in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Securities Acts")?

In considering that question:

a. May a court wholly exclude consideration of state regulation with respect to passbook savings account and thrift certificates issued by state chartered institutions in determining whether such instruments are "securities" under the Securities Acts as interpreted by this Court in *Marine Bank* v. *Weaver*, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), and *Reves* v. *Ernst & Young*, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990) (in light of which latter decision the prior judgment in this matter was vacated by this Court for further consideration)?

b. May passbook savings accounts and certificates of deposit (or the equivalent "thrift certificates"), as terms known to and used by the Congress which enacted the Securities Acts, be deemed securities under those Acts, notwithstanding Congress's determination not to include these terms within the Acts' definitions?

c. May passbook savings accounts, thrift certificates and a promissory note with maturities of nine months or less be deemed securities under the Securities Exchange Act notwithstanding the exception therein for "any note . . . which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months," a question explicitly not reached by this Court in *Reves*?

PARTIES BELOW

Petitioner KPMG Peat Marwick ("Peat Marwick"), then known as Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., was named as a defendant below along with Sunbelt Bank & Trust Company, formerly Republic Bank & Trust Co., a State Bank Association; Wesley R. McKinney, individually; Phillips Breckinridge, Administrator of the Estate of Glenn F. Prichard, Deceased; RBI of Oklahoma, Inc., a Delaware corporation; R.R. Bastian, III; Hal W. Oswalt; Harold J. Born; William J. Doyle, Jr.; Horace H. Porter, M.D.; William W. Ramsey; Edward B. Wilcox; Altus E. Wilder, III; G. Larry Young; Orville J. Bertalot; Ted C. Bodley; Keith E. McNeal; Edward L. Taylor; Charles G. Wray; Ansil Ludwick, Jr.; Paul W. Anderson, Jr.; G. Richard Degen; Brown J. Akin, Jr.; Robert C. Bates; Richard G. Bell; Bob C. Lamirand; Douglas W. Dixon; Rodney Miller; Dan W. Allred; Timothy J. Sullivan; Dwight A. Pilgram; Roger H. Laubach; James D. Essig; Martha J. Cravens; Wilma F. Wood; Charles Schusterman; Richard Williford; and Republic Bancorporation, Inc., also known as Sunbelt Bancorporation, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation.

Plaintiffs below, as representatives of a purported class of plaintiffs, were W. David Holloway, M.D.; Lisa Holloway; Charles Woodard; Linda Woodard; Maxine Black, individually and as Trustee for James T. Black and Shellie Black; Porter-Strait Instrument Co., Inc., an Oklahoma corporation; Jeremy K. Bush; Shirley Bush; United Resources Building Company, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation; Hugh Hollowell; Marshall H. Udden; Mary F. Udden; Howard R. Cadwell; Doris G. Cadwell; William L. Akers; Norita L. Akers; Cal Acree; Betty K. Acree; Robert John Walpole; Bobbee C. Ray, individually and as Trustee for James F. Haning, II and Angela Jean Haning Revocable Trust and Victoria Nininger; Joy A. Donovan, as Trustee for James M. Donovan and John A. Donovan; R.H. Arnold; Marvelle McDaniel; Martha Hester Arnold; Claudette Howe; Fred E. Miller; Vera Miller; Beverly Joyce Miller; Ann McCloud; Joyce McClure; Charlotte A. Broad, individually and as

Trustee for Russell M. Gawf and Megan D. Gawf; John E. Broad; John W. Broad and Dewayne Broad.

Pursuant to Rule 29.1 of the Rules of this Court, KPMG Peat Marwick informs the Court that it is a partnership with no ownership interest held by members of the public.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
QUESTION PRESENTED	i
PARTIES BELOW	ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	vii
OPINIONS BELOW	2
JURISDICTION	2
STATUTES INVOLVED	3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	3
The Institutions and Instruments at Issue	3
Applicable Regulation	6
1. *State Regulation*	6
2. *Federal Regulation*	8
The Proceedings Below	9
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT	14
I. The Importance of the Issues Presented	14
II. The Tenth Circuit's Holding That State Regulation Is Wholly Irrelevant to Determining the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to the Instruments at Issue Here Is in Direct Conflict with Decisions in the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits and the Intent of Congress and Presents Important Questions with Respect to the Regulation of State-Chartered Financial Institutions	17

PAGE

III. The Tenth Circuit's Decision Departs from This Court's Decisions in That It Failed to Consider That Neither the Language of the Securities Acts' Definitions Nor Their Legislative History Supports Treating Certificates of Deposit or Passbook Accounts as Securities .. 21

IV. This Case Provides the Opportunity to Resolve Questions as to the Status of Notes of Less Than Nine Months Duration Left Open by This Court in *Reves* 25

CONCLUSION 28

APPENDIX

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, April 10, 1990 (on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States) 1a

Order of the Supreme Court of the United States, March 5, 1990 ..... 9a

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, July 11, 1989 ..... 10a

Amended Order and Judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, March 3, 1987 ..... 40a

Order of the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, February 6, 1987 ..... 43a

Order of the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, January 2, 1987 ..... 45a

Order of the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, September 23, 1985 ..... 51a

PAGE

Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, June 5, 1990 ..... 80a

Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, April 11, 1990..... 83a

Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988) 86a

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988)..... 86a

Glass-Steagall Act § 21(a), 12 U.S.C. § 378(a) (1988) 87a

Example from the Record Below of a Passbook Savings Certificate..... 90a

Example from the Record Below of a Thrift Certificate..... 94a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases PAGE

American Bankers Ass'n v. *SEC*, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 24n

Blue Chip Stamps v. *Manor Drug Stores*, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) 21

Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System v. *Investment Company Institute*, 450 U.S. 46 (1981) . 24

Brockton Savings Bank v. *Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.*, 577 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Mass. 1983) 19

Burrus, Cootes and Burrus v. *MacKethan*, 537 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir.), *withdrawn as moot*, 545 F.2d 1388 (4th Cir. 1976), *cert. denied*, 434 U.S. 826 (1977) .. 23n

Callejo v. *Bancomer, S.A.*, 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985)..... 19

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co. v. *Fingland*, 615 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1980) 22n-23n

Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. *Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.*, 756 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1985). 19n

Landreth Timber Co. v. *Landreth*, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).....21, 22

Marine Bank v. *Weaver*, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) .....*passim*

National State Bank v. *Smith*, 591 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1979)..... 6n

Oklahoma Bankers Ass'n v. *Federal Reserve Board*, 766 F.2d 1446 (10th Cir. 1985) 5, 6

In re Republic Trust & Savings Co., 59 Bankr. 606 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986)..... 5n

PAGE

Reves v. *Ernst & Young*, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990) .....*passim*

Tafflin v. *Levitt*, 865 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1989), *aff'd on unrelated issue*, 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990) 19

United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. *Forman*, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) 18

West v. *Multibanco Comermex, S.A.*, 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 482 U.S. 906 (1987) 19

Wolf v. *Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A.*, 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984), *cert. denied*, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985) 19

Zabriskie v. *Lewis*, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974)....13, 26

Administrative Decisions

Citicorp, 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 921 (1983)..... 5

Republic Bancorporation, Inc., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 66 (1980) 5

Congressional Materials

Depositor Treatment in Bankruptcy Proceedings of Uninsured Financial Institutions: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)..... 5-6

Federal Securities Act: Hearing on H.R. 4314 Before Housing Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 23n-24n

H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 22

PAGE

Rules and Regulations

Federal Reserve Board Regulations
12 C.F.R. § 225.5(b) (1990) 8n
12 C.F.R. § 225.6(b) (1990) 18n-19n
12 C.F.R. § 225.32 (1990) 18n-19n

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 54(b) 11

Okla. Banking Dep't Rules and Regulations
Rule 18(A) (1984-85) 7n

Statutes

Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841 *et seq.* (1988), as amended 8
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988) 8, 18n-19n
12 U.S.C § 1844(c) (1988) 8n
12 U.S.C. § 1844(e)(1) (1988) 18n-19n

Bankruptcy Code
11 U.S.C. Ch. 11 (1988) 9

Glass-Steagall Act
§ 21, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988) 15, 20
§ 21(a), 12 U.S.C. § 378(a) (1988) 3, 23

Judicial Code
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1988) 2
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988) 11

PAGE

Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 6 (West 1984) 6
tit. 6, § 104 (West 1984) 6n
tit. 6, § 204 (West 1984) 6n
tit. 6, § 209(A) (West 1984) 7n
tit. 6, § 209(B) (West 1984) 7n
tit. 6, § 210 (West 1984) 6n
tit. 6, § 218 (West 1984) 6n
tit. 6, § 220 (West 1984) 6n
tit. 6, § 303.1 (West 1984) 7n
tit. 6, § 402 (West 1984) 6n
tit. 6, § 405 (West 1984) 6n
tit. 6, § 410(B) (West 1984) 6n
tit. 6, § 702 *et seq.* (West 1984) 6n
tit. 6, § 1001(1) (West 1984)..... 7n
tit. 6, § 1001(8) (West 1984)..... 7n
tit. 6, § 1008 (West 1984) 7n
tit. 71, § 305 (West 1987) 7n
tit. 71, § 405 (West 1987) 8n
tit. 71, § 406 (West 1987) 8n

Securities Act of 1933
§ 1 *et seq.*, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a *et seq.* (1988) .....*passim*
§ 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988) 3, 14

Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§§ 1 *et seq.*, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a *et seq.* (1988) .....*passim*
§ 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988) 3, 14, 25-27

PAGE

Other Authorities

Jacobs, *The Meaning of "Security" Under Rule 10b-5*, N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 211 (1984) 23n

New York Times, Dec. 1, 1933, p. 30, col. 8..... 23n

Results of General Accounting Office Survey to Identify Uninsured Financial Institutions That Accept Deposits from the Public (April 1988).....6, 15n-16n

Trustee's Report of Investigation, *In re Republic Finance Corp.* (No. 84-01460) (Bankr. N.D. Okla.) 8n, 9n

U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States* (1975) 23n

U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1988* (108th ed. 1988)..... 7n

U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1990* (110th ed. 1990)..... 4n

U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision, *Asset and Liability Trends* (Nov. 1989)..... 16n

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No. _____

KPMG PEAT MARWICK,

Petitioner,

—v.—

W. DAVID HOLLOWAY, *et al.*,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner KPMG Peat Marwick ("Peat Marwick") respectfully prays that a writ of *certiorari* issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, entered in the above-entitled proceeding on April 11, 1990. The action was before the Tenth Circuit on remand from this Court which, on March 5, 1990, had granted Peat Marwick's previous petition for *certiorari*, vacated the Tenth Circuit's earlier judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of *Reves* v. *Ernst & Young*, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990). The Tenth Circuit, without affording the parties an opportunity to address the issues raised by this Court's order, issued a supplemental opinion in which it "adhere[d] to" and "reaffirm[ed]" its previous judgment in this action. Peat Marwick timely filed a Petition for Rehearing, with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, which was denied without opinion by order filed June 5, 1990.

In so ruling the Tenth Circuit (1) reaffirmed its initial holding, expressly recognized by it to be in conflict with the decisions of other circuits, that "no amount of state regulation" would be relevant in assessing whether particular instruments were securities under the federal securities laws and this Court's prior decisions; (2) declined to address the significance of the Congressional failure to include passbook accounts or certificates of deposit in the listing of securities under the Securities Acts despite Congress's use of these very terms in other legislation passed at the same time; and (3) in its supplemental opinion, failed entirely to give effect to the literal language of the Securities Exchange Act's exclusion of notes with maturities of less than "nine months." The questions presented by these holdings provide a basis for the review sought here.

OPINIONS BELOW

The supplemental opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is reported at 900 F.2d 1485 and is set forth in the Appendix to this Petition at 1a. The Tenth Circuit's initial opinion (July 11, 1989) is reported at 879 F.2d 772 and is set forth in the Appendix ("App.") at 10a.

The memorandum decisions of the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma (Eubanks, J.) have not been reported. They are set forth in the Appendix at 40a, 43a, 45a and 51a.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court to review the judgment of the Tenth Circuit entered April 11, 1990 is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1988), as amended; the Petition is being timely filed within 90 days of the Tenth Circuit's June 5, 1990 denial of Peat Marwick's Petition for Rehearing, with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The texts of Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988), Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988), and Glass-Steagall Act § 21(a), 12 U.S.C. § 378(a) (1988), are set forth in the Appendix at 86a, 86a, and 87a, respectively.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This petition arises from the determination by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit that certain passbook savings account and thrift certificates of financial institutions chartered and regulated by the State of Oklahoma (and regulated as well for most of the relevant period by the Federal Reserve Board) are "securities" for the purposes of the federal securities laws. The Tenth Circuit's rulings, premised on reasoning it expressly acknowledged to be in conflict with that of other circuits, provided a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction as well as a federal cause of action in these civil suits brought by the owners of the certificates for damages stemming from the business failure of the institutions in question.

The Institutions and Instruments at Issue

The litigation underlying this petition has, as its principal subject matter, two types of instruments—"passbook savings certificates" and "thrift certificates".[1] As the district court in this case noted, "[t]hese instruments were very similar to certificates of deposit except they were not issued by a bank . . . ." (App. 44a) The instruments were issued by two institutions: Republic Financial Corporation ("Republic Finance") and Republic Trust and Savings ("Republic Trust"). These institutions, along with several others, were

1 A third instrument, a single 91-day promissory note issued by Republic Bancorporation, Inc., is discussed at Point IV below.

part of a single financial group. Until June of 1984, Republic Bancorporation, Inc. ("Republic Holding") was the bank holding company parent of Republic Trust and Republic Finance as well as of Republic Bank and Trust Company (a state-chartered, FDIC-insured bank).[2]

Republic Trust and Republic Finance both accepted deposits of currency in return for which they provided either passbook savings account certificates or one of several kinds of thrift certificates.[3] Each certificate for a passbook savings account listed a specific registered owner and address on its face. The institution acknowledged the indebtedness and agreed to pay interest at a rate fixed pursuant to uniform rules regulating the account. An account was effectively non-negotiable and provided the holder no ownership control rights with respect to the institution. The passbook savings certificates provided that, subject to stated limitations relating to total cash flow and permitting the imposition of a 30-day notice requirement, "withdrawals from and deposits to this account may be made at any time in person, by mail or by electronic funds transfer where available." (App. 91a at ¶ 3)

The thrift certificates had fixed maturities varying from three months to three years,[4] paid interest at a rate stated or described in the certificate and resembled bank certificates of

---

2 According to the Federal Reserve Board, there were 6,503 such holding companies as of December 31, 1987, operating 9,316 banks with 41,362 branches and total deposits of $1,785,400,000,000. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1990* 495 (110th ed. 1990).

3 Examples of a passbook savings certificate and thrift certificate are included in the Appendix to this petition at 90a (passbook savings certificate) and 94a (thrift certificate). Record citations in this petition ("R. _____") will take the form used below. The passbook savings certificate is found at R.H. 63; the thrift certificate was appended as Plaintiff's Exhibit 00002 to the Amended Complaint.

4 Two kinds of thrift certificates at issue in this case had stated maturities of less than nine months: "Three-Month Money Market Thrift Certificates" and "Six-Month Money Market Thrift Certificates." It is not clear in the record what percentage of the instruments at issue these short-term thrift certificates represent, in absolute numbers or in dollar volume. Of the 25 thrift certificates plaintiffs chose to append to their complaint, 14 had maturities of less than nine months.

deposit, both as a matter of form and in that they were non-brokered and effectively non-negotiable. All of this information, as well as information about the institution, was set forth on the face of the certificates or in offering circulars (Republic Trust) or in prospectuses (Republic Finance). Depositors received no ownership interest in the institutions and no right to share in the profits or governance of the institutions.

Although a single offering circular of the several in the record stated that the certificates offered were "not deposits," regulators, courts and plaintiffs themselves treated the passbook savings account and thrift certificates issued by Republic Trust and Republic Finance and similar institutions as representing deposits. The plaintiffs referred to them as deposits in their Complaint. *See, e.g.*, ¶¶ 3.1, 3.2, 4.1. The District Court considered them to be deposits. App. 44a, 47a ("These instruments are very similar to certificates of deposit except they were not issued by a bank"; "Plaintiffs are suing on certificates of deposit (called 'thrift certificates') and passbook savings accounts"). The Federal Reserve Board considered them to be deposits. *Republic Bancorporation, Inc.*, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 66, 67 (1980); *Citicorp*, 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 921 (1983). The Oklahoma Bankers Association expressly considered these types of instrument to be deposits, and the Tenth Circuit accepted this characterization of such instruments in another case. *Oklahoma Bankers Ass'n* v. *Federal Reserve Board*, 766 F.2d 1446, 1449-50 (10th Cir. 1985).[5] *See also Depositor Treatment in Bankruptcy Proceedings of Uninsured Financial Institutions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of*

---

5 The Tenth Circuit briefly considered this question in the context of the specific instruments at issue here in its first opinion in this action and came to a different conclusion. *See* 879 F.2d at 777 & n.4; App. 17a & n.4 (Republic Trust was not a bank and therefore Republic Trust instruments were not deposits; "no reason to treat [Republic Financial] instruments differently"). That opinion relied on the inapposite case of *In re Republic Trust & Savings Co.*, 59 Bankr. 606, 612-13 (Bankr. N.D Okla. 1986), a decision which established only that Republic Trust is not a "bank" for the specialized purposes of the Bankruptcy Code because it did not accept *demand* deposits (as opposed to deposits such as those here subject to withdrawal on contractually specified conditions).

the House Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong. 2d. Sess. (1988) at 1 (inquiry into "losses to depositors" of Republic Trust and Republic Finance); *Results of General Accounting Office Survey to Identify Uninsured Financial Institutions That Accept Deposits From the Public* (April 1988) at 1, 17-18 (identifying, *inter alia*, Republic Trust and Republic Finance as "financial institutions that accept deposit-like notes from the public").

Applicable Regulation

1. *State Regulation*

Republic Trust was chartered as a state-regulated trust company on August 22, 1963 pursuant to the Oklahoma Banking Code. Republic Holding acquired the trust company in 1974. As a trust company subsidiary of a bank holding company, Republic Trust thereafter was subject to regulation by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (*see* discussion at pp. 8-9, *infra*) and also to regulation by the Oklahoma State Banking Department (the "State Banking Department").

"The powers granted to trust companies by Oklahoma law are substantially similar to the powers granted banks." *Oklahoma Bankers Ass'n* v. *Federal Reserve Board*, *supra*, 766 F.2d at 1450.[6] Trust companies' charters are issued by the State Banking Department, and their activities are governed by the Oklahoma Banking Code, Okla. Stat. tit. 6.[7] The Banking Code also requires that banks and trust companies

---

6 Oklahoma is not alone in this regard. "[I]n most states . . . trust companies are authorized to and ordinarily do conduct the general banking business of receiving deposits and making loans . . . ." *National State Bank* v. *Smith*, 591 F.2d 223, 231 (3d Cir. 1979).

7 Banks and trust companies have similar powers under the Oklahoma Banking Code, and no distinction is drawn between the State Banking Department's power to regulate banks and trust companies with respect to, *inter alia*, registration requirements, stock transfers, the organization of corporate functions, asset valuation, insurance, dividend payments and the removal of officers, directors or employees. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 6, § 402; § 104; § 218; §§ 702 *et seq.*; § 204; § 220; § 405; § 410(B); § 210 (West 1984).

maintain set levels of capital and surplus, submit to periodic inspections, and prepare periodic reports.[8] Trust companies also are subject to restrictions as to investments, and their powers to receive general deposits, make loans and advertise.[9] The offering circulars noted specifically that the State Banking Department did not pass on the "investment merit of [the] certificates."

Republic Finance, an Oklahoma business corporation, was a non-bank finance company,[10] and, as an affiliate of a bank holding company, was also regulated by the Federal Reserve. In addition, the Oklahoma Department of Securities exercised regulatory authority over certain aspects of its operations, requiring, for example, that registration statements be filed and approved with respect to Republic Finance's passbook savings account and thrift certificates.[11] In accordance with the requirements of the Oklahoma Department of Securities, the Republic Finance prospectuses referred to the certificates as "securities". The Department was empowered to conduct examinations of Republic Finance, and had the power

---

8 *Id.*, § 303.1; § 209(A); § 209(B) (West 1984). The Deputy Commissioner (now Commissioner) of the Oklahoma State Banking Department testified that inspections were conducted by FDIC trained examiners in accordance with FDIC standards and classification systems. Deposition testimony of Wayne Osborn at 17-18, 63. (R.O. 17-18, 63)

9 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 6, §§ 1008; 1001(1); 1001(8) (West 1984). Throughout the period in which the instruments in question were made available the relevant regulation provided: "State-chartered banks and trust companies are prohibited from engaging in false, deceptive or misleading advertising, and from publishing or representing by any device whatsoever statements tending to deceive or mislead the public." Rule 18(A), Okla. Banking Dep't and Board Rules and Regulations (1984-85). In 1986, after the failure of the institutions involved in this litigation and many other Oklahoma based financial institutions, the State Banking Department amended its rules to prohibit any reference in advertising to the Department lest the reader take such reference to imply greater supervision than the Department, in fact, provided.

10 In 1985, 1,738 finance companies were in existence nationwide. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1988* (108th ed. 1988).

11 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, § 305 (West 1987).

to seek a receiver of its assets if necessary to protect the public interest.[12]

2. *Federal Regulation*

Because Republic Holding was a bank holding company, its entire corporate family was subject to regulation by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841 *et seq.* (1988), as amended. That Act limits the ownership by bank holding companies of non-bank subsidiaries to specified types of entities, including those which, like Republic Trust and Republic Finance, are "so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).

The Bank Holding Company Act requires that each holding company submit reports to the Board at least annually. The Board is required to conduct examinations and inspections of bank holding companies and their subsidiaries, and must prepare reports of its examinations and inspections.[13] The Federal Reserve rigorously inspected Republic Holding and its subsidiaries Republic Trust and Republic Finance throughout the period of its regulatory oversight.[14] The Oklahoma State Banking Department worked *jointly* with the federal officers in inspecting Republic Trust and the Oklahoma Securities Department was in frequent communication with

---

12 *Id.*, § 405; § 406 (West 1987). The Department in fact carried on an extensive, bank-type regulation of Republic Finance beginning in 1979, regularly reviewing its loan portfolio, marketing material and cash flow, issuing reports assessing Republic Finance's financial condition, and ordering remedial action (including, finally, an order prohibiting Republic Finance from receiving further deposits).

13 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (1988); 12 C.F.R. § 225.5(b) (1990).

14 The Federal Reserve Board conducted extensive annual examinations of the Republic companies in 1980-84. Trustee's Report of Investigation, *In re Republic Finance Corp.* (No. 84-01460) (Bankr. N.D. Okla.) at 13-15.

the Federal Reserve with respect to Republic Finance. As a result of these inspections, a variety of changes were put into effect through memoranda of understanding and then cease and desist orders and injunctions authorized by statute.[15] Federal Reserve regulation of Republic Trust and Republic Finance ended in June 1984 when Republic Holding divested itself of those companies. A new holding entity, not subject to Federal Reserve regulation and oversight, assumed control of Republic Trust and Republic Finance.

Republic Trust and Republic Finance were not members of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") or the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") and therefore were not subject to the regulation of either of these entities.

The Proceedings Below

On September 24, 1984, Republic Trust and Republic Finance filed separate, simultaneous voluntary petitions for relief under 11 U.S.C. Chapter 11 (1988) in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. Plaintiffs-respondents commenced a purported class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. Their amended complaint, filed December 10, 1984, alleges federal securities law violations and common law fraud arising out of the issuance of the instruments discussed above and seeks damages in excess of $70,000,000.[16]

---

15 For example, cease and desist orders, issued on October 26, 1983 pursuant to the Federal Reserve Board's regulatory powers, directed Republic Finance and Republic Trust as well as Republic Holding to take specific actions as to reserves and loan policies. In 1984 the Federal Reserve began the imposition of daily fines against officers and directors of Republic Holding for failure to comply with the terms of the 1983 cease and desist order. Trustee's Report of Investigation, *In re Republic Finance Corp.* (No. 84-01460) (Bankr. N.D. Okla.) at 6, 14.

16 The action was brought on behalf of an alleged class of owners of Republic Trust, Republic Finance and Republic Holding instruments. Class

Federal subject matter jurisdiction is premised on the securities law claims and, as to various state claims, on pendent jurisdiction dependent on the securities claims. Peat Marwick, the auditor of the financial statements of several of the Republic companies, was named as a defendant.

The defendants moved in the District Court to dismiss the complaint and, in the alternative, for summary judgment on the grounds that, among other things, plaintiffs had failed to plead the elements of a federal securities law claim because the instruments were not securities and hence that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The District Court ordered the parties to complete discovery on the sole question of whether the regulatory structure surrounding the institutions was sufficient to preclude the application of the securities laws to their instruments under *Marine Bank* v. *Weaver*, 455 U.S. 551 (1982). (App. 79a)

Following extensive discovery and supplemental briefing on the subject of regulation, the District Court held, by order dated January 2, 1987, that the Republic Trust instruments were not securities, but that the Republic Finance instruments were securities. (App. 45a) After analyzing the relevant state and federal regulatory systems, the Court held that (1) purchasers of the Republic Trust instruments were "abundantly protected by the Oklahoma Banking Department's regula-

---

certification was held in abeyance pending the outcome of defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The amended complaint identifies the instruments held by named plaintiffs and, to the extent they are dated, they show a significant majority of the certificates of both Republic Trust and Republic Finance to have been dated prior to the June 1984 divestiture, *i.e.*, at a time when Federal Reserve Board regulation as well as state regulation was in place. No dates are alleged as to the passbook accounts. As noted above (note 4), a majority of the certificates appended to the complaint had maturities of less than nine months.

On September 17, 1984, Republic Holding issued a single 91-day promissory note with a face amount of $84,319.73. Plaintiffs allege that this note represents a reissuance of a bank certificate of deposit of Republic Holding's bank subsidiary. The court of appeals remanded as to this instrument for lack of evidence. (900 F.2d at 1489; 879 F.2d at 788; App. 8a, 38a) This is the only instrument of Republic Holding considered by the courts below and is discussed at Point IV below.

tion" because the Department's examination of Republic Trust was "very similar to the examination of banks and that the regulation was designed to protect purchasers of thrift certificates and passbook savings accounts" from insolvency (App. 49a) and (2) purchasers of the Republic Finance instruments were not abundantly protected because the Oklahoma Securities Commission's regulation was designed to provide adequate disclosure and not protection from the risk of Republic Finance's insolvency. The District Court found that "FDIC insurance, or the lack thereof, is not the critical factor in determining the [required] abundance of protection." (App. 46a)

In a supplemental order dated February 6, 1987 (App. 43a), the District Court, treating the Republic Finance instruments as notes and applying the Tenth Circuit's investment/commercial test, reaffirmed that the instruments were securities because:

> "Considering the context of these instruments, the court finds these are investment securities rather than commercial promissory notes." (App. 44a (citation omitted))

On March 3, 1987, the District Court issued an Amended Order and Judgment that: (1) entered final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) on subject matter jurisdiction against those plaintiffs who held Republic Trust instruments, dismissing their claims; (2) entered partial summary judgment on the question of subject matter jurisdiction against the defendants with respect to the Republic Finance plaintiffs; and (3) certified for interlocutory appeal the question of whether the Republic Finance instruments were securities pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988). (App. 40a)

Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed. By order filed July 11, 1989, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that both the Republic Finance and Republic Trust instruments were securities. (879 F.2d 772; App. 10a) In considering whether purchasers of the thrift certificates and passbook savings accounts in question were

"abundantly protected" for *Marine Bank* purposes, the Tenth Circuit held that

> "only federal regulation may be considered in the 'context' analysis [of *Marine Bank*.] [N]o amount of state regulation is sufficient to satisfy the *Marine Bank* standard." (879 F.2d at 787; App. 36a)

The court explicitly acknowledged that its decision in this respect was in conflict with those of other circuits. (879 F.2d at 785, n.11; App. 33a, n.11) Relying therefore only on the Federal Reserve regulation under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Court of Appeals found that regulatory system inadequate to preclude application of the federal securities laws if they otherwise applied.

Separately, it applied the so-called commercial/investment dichotomy test, one of several tests then in use among the courts of appeals to determine if notes or debt instruments are securities. The Tenth Circuit found the instruments in question to be investments and thus securities under this test.

Peat Marwick filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on September 29, 1989 (No. 89-532). While the petition was pending, this Court decided *Reves* v. *Ernst & Young*, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990). On March 5, 1990, this Court granted Peat Marwick's petition, vacated the judgment below and remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit for further consideration in light of *Reves*. This Court's mandate was issued on April 4, 1990.

On April 11, 1990, without affording the parties an opportunity to brief the issues raised by the remand, the Tenth Circuit filed a supplemental order and opinion "adher[ing] to the judgment [previously] entered" and "reaffirm[ing that] judgment." (900 F.2d at 1487, 1489; App. 3a, 8a) The Tenth Circuit specifically reaffirmed its previous holding that state regulation may never be considered for the purposes of *Marine Bank* v. *Weaver*, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), and now *Reves*:

> "We therefore reaffirm our holding in *Holloway* that under the supremacy clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, our focus must be on *federal* regulation; state regulatory schemes cannot displace the Acts." (900 F.2d at 1488; App. 7a (emphasis in original))

The Tenth Circuit also held that because "most, though not all, of the facts we analyzed under the [commercial/investment test] factors are incorporated into the *Reves* factors . . . our ultimate decision in *Holloway* remains unchanged under *Reves*." (900 F.2d at 1488; App. 5a-6a (footnote omitted)) The Tenth Circuit noted only one "major analytical difference" between its initial opinion and *Reves*: "*Reves* alters our original *Holloway* analysis in that we now view the existence of another regulatory scheme which significantly reduces the risk of the instrument as one of four factors used to determine whether the instrument is or should be categorized as a nonsecurity" rather than, as required by *Marine Bank*, an independently dispositive factor. (900 F.2d at 1488, n.1; App. 6a, n.1)

Finally, the Tenth Circuit "reaffirm[ed]" its "holdings in *Zabriskie* [v. *Lewis*, 507 F.2d 546, 550-51 (10th Cir. 1974)] and [its initial opinion in] *Holloway* that the section 7c(a)(10) exception for short-term notes is limited to prime quality negotiable commercial paper of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general public." (900 F.2d at 1489; App. 7a-8a)

Peat Marwick timely filed a petition for Rehearing, with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc. This was denied without opinion by an order filed June 5, 1990.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

The Importance of the Issues Presented

This Court has but once addressed the question of whether certificates of deposit ("CDs") are securities for the purposes of the Securities Acts (*Marine Bank* v. *Weaver*, *supra*). It has never considered passbook account certificates. Such instruments remain among the most common forms of public savings. The regulation of such instruments, in whatever institution they are maintained, is a matter of extraordinary importance to the law—and to the public at large.

The court below on two occasions held that the passbook savings account and thrift certificates described above are "securities" for the purposes of the Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988) (the "Securities Acts"). The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion by means of an approach—the rejection of state banking and related regulation as wholly irrelevant—which it expressly acknowledged to be in direct conflict with decisions in other circuits. (*See* 879 F.2d at 785, n.11; App. 33a, n.11.) This conflict in the circuits with respect to an important definitional issue of jurisdictional significance under the federal securities laws itself warrants review.

But the importance of the issues presented transcends the fact of a crucial conflict among the circuits as to jurisdictional definitions. The Tenth Circuit's analysis explicitly and entirely excludes all consideration of state regulation, no matter how comprehensive, from the analysis mandated by this Court's decisions in *Marine Bank* and *Reves*. It does so on a theory of federal "supremacy" over state law that is as wooden as it is irrelevant to evaluation of the adequacy of regulation in a field traditionally involving federal-state coordination and cooperation exemplified by the integrated federal-state regulatory efforts here. Thus, whether similar instruments, issued by similar institutions, will be deemed

securities turns, in the Tenth Circuit's view, entirely on whether the principal regulator of the institution is a federal or state agency, rather than on the substance of the protective regulation.

This distinction cannot be squared with Congressional intent. The same Congress that enacted the Securities Acts and bifurcated the regulation of financial institutions and securities explicitly sanctioned a system of state *or* federal "regulation and periodic examinations" for banking and financial institutions (including, by name, state-chartered "trust companies"). 12 U.S.C. § 378. These alternative examination systems, whether state or federal, were deemed adequate by Congress and so meet the *Marine Bank* standard.

Such banking statutes have further significance. The Congress which enacted the elaborate definitions of a security into law in the 1933 and 1934 Acts was familiar with common terms such as "passbook account" and "certificate of deposit." Indeed, it used those very words in the banking statutes it enacted in the same session, after the 1933 Act and *before* the '34 Act. Its omission of those terms in the securities laws was part of a broader and deliberate separation of banking and securities legislation. The Tenth Circuit's decision raises serious competing jurisdictional claims among securities and banking regulators as to authority over instruments of state-chartered entities.

The practical consequences of the Tenth Circuit's hostility to state regulation are profound both for securities regulation and for federal jurisdiction and judicial administration. There are hundreds of state-chartered institutions regulated primarily by States. They hold billions of dollars in general or trust deposits.[17] Each such institution and its depositors are poten-

17 In 1988, in connection with hearings prompted in part by the failure of the Republic companies, the General Accounting Office conducted a telephone survey of various regulatory entities in an effort to determine the number of institutions uninsured by *either* federal or state insurance funds. Such

tially affected by this holding or by holdings in other circuits that might choose to follow the Tenth Circuit's lead.

Review of the decision below would also allow this Court to clarify the impact of the *Reves* decision on that rendered by it in *Marine Bank*. As interpreted by the Tenth Circuit, *Reves* is to be read as replacing the previously established test (which focused exclusively on the existence or nonexistence of alternative regulatory protection) with a balance of four factors of unknown relative significance. If the Tenth Circuit's view is correct, an area of the law once viewed as settled—that of the treatment of federally regulated and insured bank certificates of deposit under the Securities Acts—must again be considered susceptible to modification and elaboration as such bank CDs are reassessed in light of the varying weight to be afforded the four *Reves* factors in a particular context. It is not at all clear that the Tenth Circuit would reach the same result as that reached in *Marine Bank* under its reading of *Reves*. The Tenth Circuit's reading of *Reves* on remand from this Court raises issues previously thought resolved.

This case also presents this Court with an opportunity to decide the question expressly left open in *Reves*, that of the proper interpretation to be accorded the exception in the Securities Exchange Act for notes with maturities of nine months or less, since a large number of the instruments here

---

institutions would necessarily not be subject to the sort of federal regulation (by the FDIC) which was at issue in *Marine Bank* and which the Tenth Circuit seemed to look to as the only adequate type of federal regulation. The GAO survey reflected deposits of more than $2.5 billion in institutions without *either* federal or state insurance maintained in approximately 100 domestic institutions. A larger number of *foreign* bank branches with uninsured deposits (of unspecified total) were also listed. The survey, of course, did not include state-insured institutions subject to state but not federal regulation. *Results of GAO Survey to Identify Uninsured Financial Institutions That Accept Deposits From The Public* (April 1988). The most recent edition of *Asset and Liability Trends*, published in November 1989 by the Office of Thrift Supervision, Department of Treasury, also reports that as of year-end 1988, 131 state-chartered savings institutions with more than $1.6 billion in assets were in existence without federal insurance and hence not subject to FDIC (or FSLIC) regulation. *Asset and Liability Trends* Table 9, at 43.

involve maturities of stated terms of less than nine months. Review here would provide needed clarification of a vexing issue.

For these reasons, explored more fully below, it is respectfully submitted that the Tenth Circuit's decision presents important questions of federal law and warrants review by this Court.

II.

The Tenth Circuit's Holding That State Regulation Is Wholly Irrelevant to Determining the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to the Instruments at Issue Here Is in Direct Conflict with Decisions in the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits and the Intent of Congress and Presents Important Questions with Respect to the Regulation of State-Chartered Financial Institutions

This Court's decision in *Marine Bank* did not analyze the CDs in question by reference to any of the various tests then in use in the federal courts (including the "family resemblance" test ultimately adopted in *Reves*) to determine if a given instrument is a security. Rather, relying on the Securities Acts' "unless the context otherwise requires" language, *see* 455 U.S. at 556, the Court formulated a standard for distinguishing depository instruments from securities. Noting that the CD in *Marine Bank* "was issued by a federally regulated bank which is subject to the comprehensive set of regulations governing the banking industry," the Court held that "[i]t is unnecessary to subject issuers of bank certificates of deposit to liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under the federal banking laws." 455 U.S. at 558-59 (footnote omitted). The *Reves* Court, citing *Marine Bank*, rearticulated this standard as "whether some factor such as the existence of *another* regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary." 110 S. Ct. at 952 (emphasis added).

This approach is consistent with the larger purposes of the Securities Acts. Where sufficient regulation is already in place, federal securities legislation is not required. *See United Housing Foundation, Inc.* v. *Forman*, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975): "The primary purpose of the [Securities] Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in *a largely unregulated securities market*." (Emphasis added.) No one could characterize the institutions at issue in *Marine Bank*—or here—as operating in an unregulated environment.

In *Marine Bank* the Court noted in particular that "[d]eposits in federally regulated banks are protected by the reserve, reporting, and inspection requirements of the federal banking laws; advertising relating to the interest paid on deposits is also regulated." 455 U.S. at 558 (footnote omitted). These same interests were served by the state and federal regulatory systems surrounding the institutions in this case. And the broader principle represented by those interests—*Reves*' "risk-reducing factor," 110 S. Ct. at 953—is similarly served by these regulatory systems. The Tenth Circuit's analysis gave little weight to federal regulation[18]

---

18 The substantial federal regulation in place by itself, let alone in combination with the state regulation ignored by the Tenth Circuit, more than suffices to bring the instruments here within the reach of *Marine Bank*. Insurance aside, regulation by the Federal Reserve Board under the Bank Holding Company Act extended to each of the categories of regulation this Court deemed significant in *Marine Bank*, *i.e.*, "reserve requirements," "reporting requirements," "inspection requirements" and "advertising." *Compare Marine Bank*, *supra*, 455 U.S. at 558 n.8, *with* discussion of federal regulations, *supra* pp. 8-9.

Indeed, the Federal Reserve implicitly determined that the instruments were *not* securities. During the Board's six-year period of oversight of Republic Holding, Republic Trust and Republic Finance, it never suggested that the passbook savings account and thrift certificates of Republic Trust and Republic Finance were securities. If the Federal Reserve had reached such a conclusion, it would have been required to order Republic Holding to stop the issuance of such instruments or to divest Republic Trust and Republic Finance, since an affiliate's issuance of securities as its primary means to finance operations is not considered "related to banking or . . . a proper incident thereto" under the Bank Holding Company Act or the

and, most strikingly, rejected entirely any consideration of state regulation.

Each of the other federal courts of appeals that has considered the matter has held (in conflict with the Tenth Circuit in this case) that the comprehensive regulation referred to in *Marine Bank* is *not* limited to federal regulation and that non-brokered[19] depository instruments issued by financial institutions subject to substantial state or other governmental regulation are not subject to the Securities Acts. *Taffiin* v. *Levitt*, 865 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1989), *aff'd on unrelated issue*, 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990) (CDs of Maryland savings and loan association not "securities" given comprehensive state regulatory system); *West* v. *Multibanco Comermex, S.A.*, 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 482 U.S. 906 (1987) (Mexican bank CDs not "securities" in light of Mexican governmental regulation); *Callejo* v. *Bancomer, S.A.*, 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); *Wolf* v. *Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A.*, 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984), *cert. denied*, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985) (same); *see also Brockton Savings Bank* v. *Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.*, 577 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Mass. 1983) (bank jumbo CD not a "security").

The Tenth Circuit, in contrast, held unequivocally in its first decision in this case that "no amount of state regulation is sufficient to satisfy the *Marine Bank* standard" and "reaffirm[ed]" this holding in its supplemental opinion, stating that "state regulation . . . should not be a factor governing application of the remedial federal securities laws." (879 F.2d at 787; 900 F.2d at 1488; App. 36a, 7a) It reached this con-

---

Board's regulations. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(c)(8), 1844(e)(1) (1988) and 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.6(b) and 225.32 (1990).

The Question Presented is intended to preserve the federal regulation argument and, should certiorari be granted, both state and federal regulation will be argued as a basis for reversal.

19 In *Gary Plastic Packaging Corp.* v. *Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.*, 756 F.2d 230, 240 (2d Cir. 1985), the court held that a "CD program" consisting of a package of CDs assembled by a broker and offering added benefits provided by the broker may be a security. The broker, of course, was not subject to regulation by any banking authorities.

clusion by means of a Supremacy Clause analysis not argued to it by any of the parties. By repeatedly framing the question to be whether state regulation may ever "displace" the federal securities laws instead of focusing on whether Congress intended that the federal securities laws reach the institutions or instruments in question, the court turned the analyses of *Marine Bank* and *Reves* on their heads. The decision below, coupled with the conflicting Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuit decisions cited above, leads to the disturbing result that the very same instrument may be considered a security or not purely on the Circuit in which its purchaser resides.

This conflict among the circuits is all the more troubling because there is no mystery as to which regulatory schemes the Congress that enacted the Securities Acts considered adequate to render application of the Securities Acts unnecessary. Congress described the relevant regulatory schemes in the very legislation in which it bifurcated the regulation of securities and of financial institutions.

In Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988), Congress prohibited institutions (*specifically including trust companies*) which accept deposits or issue depository instruments of any sort from issuing securities or otherwise engaging in the securities business. Second, it identified those institutions which may lawfully accept deposits by reference to the existence of regulatory systems. In this regard, Congress described the particular regulatory schemes which, if applicable to the institutions in question, were deemed adequate by it to permit an institution to accept deposits: under Section 21, either federal *or* state regulation and examination is *independently* sufficient. The question thus presented is how this explicit Congressional determination of the adequacy of state regulation can be wholly ignored—as the Tenth Circuit has ruled it must be.

The Tenth Circuit's decision, of course, also raises concerns not merely of duplication, but also of potential conflict created by tension between the traditional needs for confidentiality on the part of financial institutions and the impetus of the securities laws towards full disclosure. The initial opinion

below recognized these differing goals without considering the potential impact of conflicting regulation. (*See* 879 F.2d at 786; App. at 34a, where the Tenth Circuit comments on the contrast between the disclosure goals of the securities laws and the "confidential, nonpublic nature of many of the lending and investment activities of financial institutions.") The contrasting regulatory aims suggest one reason that Congress chose to steer clear of financial institution regulation under the securities laws. The Tenth Circuit's decision is insensitive to that concern.

The burden the decision below would place on the federal courts also raises an important issue concerning Congressional intent and the proper resolution of the definitional issue. The expansion of federal subject matter jurisdiction has been a source of concern to this Court in this area. *Blue Chip Stamps* v. *Manor Drug Stores*, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975). Expanding federal jurisdiction to encompass the claims here is unwarranted and threatens a significant expansion of federal litigation.

Taken together, these factors make plain that the Tenth Circuit's approach to the institutions at issue and its interpretation of *Marine Bank* raise important questions that warrant review.

III.

The Tenth Circuit's Decision Departs from This Court's Decisions in That It Failed to Consider That Neither the Language of the Securities Acts' Definitions Nor Their Legislative History Supports Treating Certificates of Deposit or Passbook Accounts as Securities

This Court has observed that in construing the Securities Acts' definition of the term "security," " '[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.' " *Landreth Timber Co.* v. *Landreth*, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985), *quoting Blue Chip Stamps* v. *Manor*

Drug Stores, *supra*, 421 U.S. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring). Of course, to the extent this Court's decision in *Marine Bank* excluded the instrument from inclusion in the Acts altogether, the Tenth Circuit need not have considered the language itself. But in light of the fact that the Tenth Circuit rejected the applicability of *Marine Bank*, application of this Court's direction required that the more basic question of statutory language be considered by the lower court. The Tenth Circuit did not honor this requirement.

Congress's avowed purpose in enacting the definitional sections of the '33 and '34 Acts was to define "security" "in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within that definition the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall *within the ordinary concept of a security*," H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933) (emphasis added). Mindful of Congress's remedial purpose, this Court has through the years been careful to include within the definition both the numerous instruments specifically listed "whose names alone carry well-settled meaning," *Landreth Timber Co.* v. *Landreth*, *supra*, 471 U.S. at 686, and "unusual instruments that [do] not fit squarely within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the definition," *id.* at 690 n.4. These have often been novel instruments that did not exist or were not so widely used as to leap to the mind of the Congressional draftsman in 1933.

Certificates of deposit and passbook accounts are not identified as securities and yet were so well known to the drafters of the Securities Act that their exclusion cannot have been an oversight.[20] Their omission as enumerated categories in the

---

20 Indeed, two of the enumerated categories among the Securities Acts' definitions of "security" contain the phrase "certificate of deposit." Neither category encompasses the instruments at issue here. "Certificate of deposit, for a security," added to the 1933 Act in 1934 and part of the original statutory language of the 1934 Act, refers to instruments issued by security holders' protective committees in the course of corporate reorganizations. *Marine Bank* v. *Weaver*, *supra*, 455 U.S. at 557 n.5. This narrow use of the phrase underscores Congress's intent not to cover certificates of deposit generally. *Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co.* v. *Fingland*, 615 F.2d 465, 468 (7th Cir. 1980) (had Congress wanted to, "Congress could have ex-

definition of security necessarily must be viewed as a conscious Congressional choice.

More money was held in passbook accounts and certificates of deposit in 1933 than in any other category of instruments except stocks and bonds.[21] Indeed, as noted above, the Glass-Steagall Act reflects that not only was Congress aware of the existence of "passbook" accounts and "certificate[s] of deposit", but that it understood that these depository instruments were fundamentally different from securities. 12 U.S.C. § 378(a). It defies belief that the same Congress that enacted the Glass-Steagall Act using the very terms "passbook" and "certificate of deposit" would have omitted passbook accounts and certificates of deposit from the Securities Act's definition of "security" had it intended that term to encompass such instruments.

Indeed, there is no indication whatever in the legislative history of the Securities Acts that Congress intended thereby to regulate the ordinary deposit and passbook activities of banking and financial institutions under the Securities Acts.[22]

---

pressly included all certificates of deposit by eliminating 'for a security' and thus could have included certificates representing currency deposits as well as security deposits"); *Burrus, Cootes and Burrus* v. *MacKethan*, 537 F.2d 1262, 1265 (4th Cir.), *withdrawn as moot*, 545 F.2d 1388 (4th Cir. 1976), *cert. denied*, 434 U.S. 826 (1977) ("Section 3(a)(10) in referring to a 'certificate of deposit, for a security' has a negative pregnant: impliedly it excludes a certificate of deposit issued for currency or payable in currency"). The second use of the phrase, added in 1982, referring to any "put, call," etc. on a certificate of deposit again evidences the striking omission of reference to CDs in themselves as securities. *See* Jacobs, *The Meaning of "Security" Under Rule 10b-5*, N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 211, 331 (1984).

21 Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States* at 253, 992, 1058 (1975); as of June 1933, more than 39 million depositors held savings accounts and certificates of deposit totalling $21,424,226,000.00. *New York Times*, Dec. 1, 1933, p. 30, col. 8.

22 The legislative history of the exemptions for bank or S&L "securities" emphasizes the point that there was no intention to include passbook accounts or certificates of deposit within the reach of the term securities—even for the purpose of exempting them. Thus, in a discussion of the provisions exempting bank securities from the coverage of the Securities Act of

The Securities Acts were drafted, discussed and enacted with full awareness of the terms of the Glass-Steagall Act; the legislative history of both acts shows that Congress intended that securities and banking activities be regulated separately and differently.[23]

Congress intended that the securities and banking industries be treated as separate compartments since many saw the involvement between the two industries as the source of the financial problems Congress sought to address. *Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System* v. *Investment Company Institute*, 450 U.S. 46, 61-62 (1981) (legislative goal of separating securities business from banking business was result of perception that intermingling of commercial and investment banking had contributed to rash of bank failures). With this background, the striking omission of common terms such as "certificate of deposit" and "passbook" from the Securities Acts' definitions demonstrates with clarity the dual-track Congressional approach. Instruments like passbook accounts and CDs were not to be subject to the federal securities laws but were to be separated from the securities industry and controlled by whatever legislation was to be put in place to deal directly and specifically with banks, trust companies and other bank-like financial institutions. The Tenth Circuit's approach wholly fails to come to grips with the statutory language and history and in so doing fails to honor this Court's express concern that the language of the

---

1933, a draftsman of the Act was asked what securities banks issued. His response: "I do not suppose a national bank would be putting out anything in addition to its capital stock." No reference was made to passbooks, certificates of deposit or the like although it was common knowledge that they were employing these instruments. *Federal Securities Act: Hearing on H.R. 4314 Before House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce*, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1933) (testimony of Huston Thompson).

23 Various definitions (*e.g.*, "bank") in the 1934 Act reflect "a purposeful decision on [Congress'] part that the SEC should not have oversight jurisdiction with respect to banks, because banks were already subject to a complex scheme of administrative regulation at the federal and state level." *American Bankers Ass'n* v. *SEC*, 804 F.2d 739, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

securities statutes be given effect.[24] To rectify this departure from this Court's decisions—a departure with broad consequences for institutions with billions of dollars in assets (*see* Points I and II, *supra*)—the decision below should be reviewed.

IV.

This Case Provides the Opportunity to Resolve Questions as to the Status of Notes of Less Than Nine Months Duration Left Open by This Court in *Reves*

The Securities Exchange Act (under which plaintiffs sue) does not apply to notes with "a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988). In *Reves* this Court ruled that demand deposits fall outside this exception because "demand *could* be made many years or decades into the future." *Reves*, *supra*, 110 S. Ct. at 955 (emphasis in original). In so ruling, however, the Court noted that "the result might be different if the design of the transaction suggested that both parties contemplated that demand would be made within the statutory period, [but] that is not the case before us." *Id.*

While the *Reves* majority indicated only that a "different" result might be forthcoming in cases of notes with fixed maturities of less than nine months, the four dissenters seemed to leave little doubt that they would apply the plain language of the exception: "there is no justification for looking beyond the plain terms of § 3(a)(10). . . ." *Reves*, *supra*, 110 S. Ct. at 960 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Taken together, the majority and dissent suggest that some substantial reason must exist to ignore the literal language of the statute.

---

24 Of course, the label annexed to an instrument does not end the inquiry and a label may not be used to disguise the real character of an instrument. *Cf. Marine Bank*, *supra*, 455 U.S. at 560, n.11. Here, however, an examination of the instruments and the "context" surrounding them reveals that the name used is reflective of the very kinds of instruments that, as shown above, Congress intended to exclude from coverage.

In its supplemental opinion, however, the court below merely "reaffirm[ed]" its previous holdings in this case and in *Zabriskie* v. *Lewis*, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974), that "the section 78c(a)(10) exception for short-term notes is limited to prime quality negotiable commercial paper of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general public." (900 F.2d at 1489; App. 7a-8a) The court below cited nothing in the legislative history to support this limitation; and it is entirely unclear how it divined that—notwithstanding a straightforward statement in the statute directly to the contrary—"Congress neither intended to include all notes with maturities greater than nine months nor to exclude all notes with maturities less than nine months." (879 F.2d at 778; App. 20a)

There is, to be sure, a great deal of pre-*Reves* case law in the lower federal courts along the lines of the Tenth Circuit's holdings on this point. But if, as we submit, the conclusion of the court below is at odds with the surest evidence of Congressional intent—the statute itself—a more substantive reexamination of the question was warranted, particularly in light of this Court's opinions in *Reves*. Instead, the court below rejected out of hand the application of the nine-month exception to those instruments which appeared to it to fall within the exception's literal terms.

In so doing, the court below ignored the demonstration in Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in *Reves*[25] that nothing in the Securities Acts or their legislative history even begins to support the transformation of the straightforward time limitation of the nine-month exception into one concerning only "prime quality negotiable commercial paper."

> "The legislative history of the 1934 Act—under which this case arises—contains nothing which would support a restrictive reading of the exemption in question. Nor does the legislative history of § 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act support the asserted limited construction of the exemp-

---

25 The majority opinion, while noting the contention of the petitioner in that case that the exception should not be applied literally, did not decide this question. 110 S. Ct. at 955.

> tion in § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act. Though the two most pertinent sources of congressional commentary on § 3(a)(3)—H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1933) and S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1933)—do suggest an intent to limit § 3(a)(3)'s exemption to short-term commercial paper, the references in those reports to commercial paper simply did not survive in the language of the enactment. . . .
>
> * * *
>
> "Although I do not doubt that both the 1933 and 1934 Act exemptions encompass short-term commercial paper, the expansive language in the statutory provisions is strong evidence that, in the end, Congress meant for commercial paper merely to be a subset of a larger class of exempted short-term instruments." *Reves*, *supra*, 110 S. Ct. at 958-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Assuming *arguendo* that the short-term passbook account and thrift certificates are notes, they (and the 91-day promissory note not addressed by the court below in its supplemental opinion) would appear to be literally excluded from the coverage of the Securities Exchange Act. This case presents an opportunity to assess the question of statutory interpretation left open in *Reves*, namely whether some factors require that this literal language be overridden by other concerns.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Dated: New York, New York
August 31, 1990

Respectfully submitted,

Of Counsel:

Leonard P. Novello
General Counsel
Anthony J. Costantini
Associate General Counsel
KPMG PEAT MARWICK
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10153

*Dean I. Ringel
David Wagner
Adam Liptak
CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL
(a partnership including
professional corporations)
80 Pine Street
New York, New York 10005
(212) 701-3000

Deryl L. Gotcher
Roy C. Breedlove
Graydon Dean Luthey, Jr.
JONES, GIVENS, GOTCHER
& BOGAN
A Professional Corporation
3800 First National Tower
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

*Counsel of Record

Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 87-1486
87-1490

FILED April 10, 1990

ROBERT L. HOECKER, *Clerk*

W. DAVID HOLLOWAY, M.D.; LISA HOLLOWAY; CHARLES WOODARD; LINDA WOODARD; MAXINE BLACK, individually and as Trustee for James T. Black and Shellie Black; PORTER-STRAIT INSTRUMENT CO., INC., an Oklahoma corporation; JEREMY K. BUSH; SHIRLEY BUSH; UNITED RESOURCES BUILDING COMPANY, INC., an Oklahoma corporation; HUGH HOLLOWELL; MARSHALL H. UDDEN; MARY F. UDDEN; HOWARD R. CADWELL; DORIS G. CADWELL; WILLIAM L. AKERS; NORITA L. AKERS; CAL ACREE; BETTY K. ACREE; ROBERT JOHN WALPOLE; BOBBEE C. RAY, individually and as Trustee for James F. Haning, II and Angela Jean Haning Revocable Trust and Victoria Nininger; JOY A. DONOVAN, as Trustee for James M. Donovan and John A. Donovan; R.H. ARNOLD; MARVELLE MCDANIEL; MARTHA HESTER ARNOLD; CLAUDETTE HOWE; FRED E. MILLER; VERA MILLER; BEVERLY JOYCE MILLER; ANN MCLOUD; JOYCE MCCLURE; CHARLOTTE A. BROAD, individually and as Trustee for Russell M. Gawf and Megan D. Gawf; JOHN E. BROAD; JOHN W. BROAD; DEWAYNE BROAD, for themselves and as representative parties of class,

Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants,

v.

PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & CO., a partnership; SUNBELT BANK & TRUST COMPANY, former Republic Bank & Trust Co., a State Bank Association; WESLEY R. MCKINNEY, individually; PHILLIPS BRECKINRIDGE, Administrator of the Estate of Glenn F. Prichard, Deceased; RBI OF OKLAHOMA, INC., a Delaware corporation; R.R. BASTIAN, III; HAL W. OSWALT; HAROLD J. BORN; WILLIAM J. DOYLE, JR.; HORACE H. PORTER, M.D.; WILLIAM W. RAMSEY; EDWARD B. WILCOX; ALTUS E. WILDER, III; G. LARRY YOUNG; ORVILLE J. BERTALOT; TED C. BODLEY; KEITH E. MCNEAL, EDWARD L. TAYLOR; CHARLES G. WRAY; ANSIL LUDWICK, JR.; PAUL W. ANDERSON, JR.; G. RICHARD DEGEN; BROWN J. AKIN, JR.; ROBERT C. BATES; RICHARD G. BELL; BOB C. LAMIRAND; DOUGLAS W. DIXON; RODNEY MILLER; DAN W. ALLRED; TIMOTHY J. SULLIVAN; DWIGHT A. PILGRAM; ROGER H. LAUBACH; JAMES D. ESSIG; MARTHA J. CRAVENS; WILMA F. WOOD; CHARLES SCHUSTERMAN; RICHARD WILLIFORD; REPUBLIC BANCORPORATION, INC., also known as Sunbelt Bancorporation, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation,

Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 84-C-814-EU)

Lawrence H. Eiger (Michael B. Hyman and Steven A. Kanner, of Much, Shelist, Freed, Denenberg, Ament & Eiger, P.C., of Chicago, Illinois; Steven E. Smith, of Steven E. Smith & Associates, of Tulsa, Oklahoma; Charles O. Hanson, Richard K. Holmes, and Stewart E. Field, of Hanson, Holmes, Field & Snider, of Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Professor Joseph C. Long, of the University of Oklahoma, College of Law, Norman, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), of Much,

Shelist, Freed, Denenberg, Ament & Eiger, P.C., of Chicago, Illinois, for the Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

L.K. Smith (Kimberly A. Lambert, of Boone, Smith, Davis & Hurst, of Tulsa, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), of Boone, Smith, Davis & Hurst, of Tulsa, Oklahoma, for all the Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees except Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.

Graydon Dean Luthey, Jr. (Deryl L. Gotcher and Roy C. Breedlove, of Jones, Givens, Gotcher, Bogan & Hilborne, a Professional Corporation, of Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Anthony J. Costantini, Associate General Counsel, of Peat, Marwick, Main & Co., of New York, New York, with him on the briefs), of Jones, Givens, Gotcher, Bogan & Hilborne, a Professional Corporation, of Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.

Daniel L. Goelzer, General Counsel, Jacob H. Stillman, Associate General Counsel, Rosalind C. Cohen, Assistant General Counsel, and Batya Roth, Attorney, of the Securities and Exchange Commission, of Washington, D.C., *amicus curiae.*

Before McKAY, BARRETT, and TACHA, *Circuit Judges.*

TACHA, *Circuit Judge.*

On March 5, 1990, the Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari in *Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.*, 879 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1989), vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of *Reves v. Ernst & Young*, No. 88-1480 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1990). After re-examining *Holloway*, we adhere to the judgment entered therein. The facts of this case are described in our first *Holloway* opinion and will not be repeated here. *See Holloway*, 879 F.2d at 774-75.

I.

In *Holloway* we developed a two-part approach based on a "investment versus commercial" test for determining when a note is a security. Part one focused on whether the instrument at issue was within the statutory definition of a security, 15 U.S.C. sections 78c(a)(10) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934) and 77b(1) (Securities Act of 1933) (collectively "the Acts"). *See Holloway*, 879 F.2d at 775-83. Part two examined whether other federal regulation governing the transaction rendered the protection of federal securities laws unnecessary. *See Holloway*, 879 F.2d at 783-88. Although the *Reves* approach differs from our two-part test in *Holloway*, we find that our outcome in *Holloway* remains unchanged after *Reves*.

A.

Reves expressly rejected applying the test developed for "investment contracts," *see SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.*, 328 U.S. 293 (1946), to "notes." *See Reves*, slip op. at 7. Instead, the Court adopted a two step "family resemblance" test to determine when a "note" is a "security" within the coverage of the Acts.

> [I]n determining whether an instrument denominated a "note" is a "security," courts are to apply the version of the "family resemblance" test that we have articulated here: a note is presumed to be a "security," and that presumption may be rebutted only by a showing that the note bears a strong resemblance (in terms of the four factors we have identified) to one of the enumerated categories of instrument[s that are not "securities" based on a judicially crafted list of exceptions]. If an instrument is not sufficiently similar to an item on the list, the decision whether another category should be added [to the list of "notes" that are not "securities"] is to be made by examining the same factors.

Id. at 10.

The four *Reves* factors used to rebut the note's presumed status as a security are: (1) an examination of the transaction to assess the motivations which would prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into it; (2) the plan of distribution of the instrument; (3) the reasonable expectations of the investing public; and (4) whether some factor such as the existence of another regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering the protection of federal securities laws unnecessary. *See id.* at 8-10. We use these factors in step one of the *Reves* test to determine whether the note at issue bears a strong family resemblance to a category of "nonsecurities" on the judicially created list of exceptions. If the note does not resemble an existing category of nonsecurities, we proceed to step two of the *Reves* test and use these factors to determine whether we should create a new exception for the note at issue.

Applying *Reves* to the instruments in this case, we presume that the instruments are securities. Under *Reves* step one, we find that the instruments at issue do not resemble any category on the judicially recognized list of nonsecurities. *See Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co.*, 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 1984); *Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co.*, 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir. 1976). *Reves* step two dictates that we next examine the instruments in light of the four guideline factors to decide whether these instruments should be added to the judicial list of nonsecurities.

We essentially performed the *Reves* analysis of whether a new category of nonsecurities should be created for these instruments in our original *Holloway* opinion. *See Holloway*, 879 F.2d at 775-88. In *Holloway* we relied on eight factors cited favorably in *Zabriskie v. Lewis*, 507 F.2d 546, 551 n.9 (10th Cir. 1974), as indicia of a security. *Reves*'s four-factor approach supercedes our *Zabriskie* eight factor analysis. However, most, though not all, of the facts we analyzed under the *Zabriskie* factors are incorporated into the *Reves*

factors.[1] Thus, our ultimate decision in *Holloway* remains unchanged under *Reves*.

B.

Reves did not address whether federal courts may consider state regulation of a note when evaluating whether the presumption that the note is a "security" has been rebutted. However, in applying the fourth *Reves* factor the Supreme Court's emphasis clearly was on federal regulation:

---

1 *Zabriskie* factor one, use of proceeds to buy specific assets or services rather than general financing, is an objective indicator of *Reves* factor one, the motivations prompting a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into the transaction. *Zabriskie* factor two, risk to the initial investment, remains relevant to the extent that *Reves* factor four considers the existence of other regulatory schemes that significantly reduce the risk of the investment. The third *Zabriskie* factor, whether the note gives certain rights to the payee, is no longer applicable under the *Reves* guideline factors. *Zabriskie* factor four, repayment contingent on profit or production, is one of many circumstances we must consider under *Reves* factor one. The fifth and sixth *Zabriskie* factors, a large number of notes or payees and a large dollar amount, are incorporated in *Reves* factor two, the plan of distribution for the instrument. *Reves* overrules *Zabriskie* factor seven, which characterized demand notes as "commerical" and therefore as nonsecurities. The *Reves* court found unpersuasive the "commercial" characteristic of a security because such instant liquidity is inconsistent with the risks ordinarily associated with a security. *See Reves*, slip op. at 12. Finally, the eighth *Zabriskie* factor, the parties' characterization of the note and the transaction, a subjective perspective, may shed some light on *Reves*' objective factors one and three, the motivations of a reasonable seller and buyer and the reasonable expectations of the investing public.

The major analytical difference between *Reves* and *Holloway* lies in the treatment of other federal regulatory schemes. Our analysis in *Holloway* provided that even if the instrument otherwise qualified as a security under the "investment versus commercial" test, other federal regulation governing the transaction might still remove the instrument from the protection of the federal securities laws. *See Holloway*, 879 F.2d at 783. *Reves* alters our original *Holloway* analysis in that we now view the existence of another regulatory scheme which significantly reduces the risk of the instrument as one of four factors used to determine whether the instrument is or should be categorized as a nonsecurity. *See Reves*, slip op. at 9-10. The change in emphasis does not affect the outcome in this case.

> Finally, we find no risk-reducing factor to suggest that these instruments are not in fact securities. The notes are uncollateralized and uninsured. Moreover, unlike the certificates of deposit in *Marine Bank*, which were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and subject to substantial regulation under the federal banking laws, and unlike the pension plan in *Teamsters v. Daniel*, which was comprehensively regulated under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, *the notes here would escape federal regulation entirely if the Acts were held not to apply.*

Reves, slip op. 11-12 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Moreover, *Reves* rejected state law on when a demand note "matures" in favor of a federal rule designed to further the remedial purposes of the Acts. *See id.* at 14-16. By analogy, state regulation of the transaction should not be a factor governing application of the remedial federal securities laws. We therefore reaffirm our holding in *Holloway* that under the supremacy clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, our focus must be on *federal* regulation; state regulatory schemes cannot displace the Acts. *See Holloway*, 879 F.2d at 783-86.

II.

Even if an issuer cannot rebut the presumption that a note is a security under the family resemblance test, the note may still be excluded from the coverage of the Acts if it "has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months." *See* 15 U.S.C. section 78c(a)(10). *Reves* held that under federal law the "maturity" of a demand note falls outside of the section 78c(a)(10) exception for short-term notes. *See Reves*, slip op. at 15-16. Therefore, section 78c(a)(10) does not exclude those debt instruments in *Holloway* which are payable on demand from the coverage of the Acts. As for the remaining instruments at issue which have a thirty-day notice requirement prior to redemption, we reaffirm our holdings in *Zabriskie* and *Holloway* that the section 78c(a)(10) exception for short-term notes is limited to prime

quality negotiable commercial paper of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general public. *See Holloway*, 879 F.2d at 778; *Zabriskie*, 507 F.2d at 550.[2] Because none of the thirty day redemption instruments at issue in *Holloway* qualify as "prime quality negotiable paper," section 78c(a)(10) does not exclude these instruments from the federal securities laws.

III.

We reaffirm our judgment in *Holloway*. We REVERSE the summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to the RTS instruments and REMAND to enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. We AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs as to the RFC instruments. We REVERSE the summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff as to the RBI note and REMAND for further consideration of the context of the underlying transaction consistent with *Reves* and this opinion.

2 The *Reves* court did not decide whether the 15 U.S.C. section 78c(a)(10) exception for short-term notes excludes *all* notes with a maturity date of nine months or less at the time of issuance, or only excludes "commercial paper—short-term, high quality instruments issued to fund current operations and sold only to highly sophisticated investors," *Reves*, slip op. at 13. *See id.* at 12-14.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 89-532

PEAT MARWICK MAIN & CO.,

Petitioner,

v.

W. DAVID HOLLOWAY, *et al.*

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

THIS CAUSE having been submitted on the petition for writ of certiorari and response thereto,

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the above court in this cause is vacated with costs, and that this cause is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit for further consideration in light of *Reves v. Ernst & Young*, 494 U.S. ____ (1990).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitioner, Peat Marwick Main & Co., recover from W. David Holloway, et al., Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) for its costs herein expended.

March 5, 1990

Clerk's costs: $200.00

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 87-1486, 87-1490

FILED July 11, 1989

W. DAVID HOLLOWAY, M.D.; LISA HOLLOWAY; CHARLES WOODARD; LINDA WOODARD; MAXINE BLACK, individually and as Trustee for James T. Black and Shellie Black; PORTER-STRAIT INSTRUMENT CO., INC., an Oklahoma corporation; JEREMY K. BUSH; SHIRLEY BUSH; UNITED RESOURCES BUILDING COMPANY, INC., an Oklahoma corporation; HUGH HOLLOWELL; MARSHALL H. UDDEN; MARY F. UDDEN; HOWARD R. CADWELL; DORIS G. CADWELL; WILLIAM L. AKERS; NORITA L. AKERS; CAL ACREE; BETTY K. ACREE; ROBERT JOHN WALPOLE; BOBBEE C. RAY, individually and as Trustee for James F. Haning, II and Angela Jean Haning kevocable Trust and Victoria Nininger; JOY A. DONOVAN, as Trustee for James M. Donovan and John A. Donovan; R.H. ARNOLD; MARVELLE MCDANIEL; MARTHA HESTER ARNOLD; CLAUDETTE HOWE; FRED E. MILLER; VERA MILLER; BEVERLY JOYCE MILLER; ANN MCLOUD; JOYCE MCCLURE; CHARLOTTE A. BROAD, individually and as Trustee for Russell M. Gawf and Megan D. Gawf; JOHN E. BROAD; JOHN W. BROAD; DEWAYNE BROAD, for themselves and as representative parties of class,

Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants,

v.

PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & CO., a partnership; SUNBELT BANK & TRUST COMPANY, formerly Republic Bank &

Trust Co., a State Bank Association; WESLEY R. MCKINNEY, individually; PHILLIPS BRECKINRIDGE, Administrator of the Estate of Glenn F. Prichard, Deceased; RBI OF OKLAHOMA, INC., a Delaware corporation; R.R. BASTIAN, III; HAL W. OSWALT; HAROLD J. BORN; WILLIAM J. DOYLE, JR.; HORACE H. PORTER, M.D.; WILLIAM W. RAMSEY; EDWARD B. WILCOX; ALTUS E. WILDER, III; G. LARRY YOUNG; ORVILLE J. BERTALOT; TED C. BODLEY; KEITH E. MCNEAL; EDWARD L. TAYLOR; CHARLES G. WRAY; ANSIL LUDWICK, JR.; PAUL W. ANDERSON, JR.; G. RICHARD DEGEN; BROWN J. AKIN, JR.; ROBERT C. BATES; RICHARD G. BELL; BOB C. LAMIRAND; DOUGLAS W. DIXON; RODNEY MILLER; DAN W. ALLRED; TIMOTHY J. SULLIVAN; DWIGHT A. PILGRAM; ROGER H. LAUBACH; JAMES D. ESSIG; MARTHA J. CRAVENS; WILMA F. WOOD; CHARLES SCHUSTERMAN; RICHARD WILLIFORD; REPUBLIC BANCORPORATION, INC., also known as Sunbelt Bancorporation, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation,

Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 84-C-814-EU)

Lawrence H. Eiger (Michael B. Hyman and Steven A. Kanner, of Much, Shelist, Freed, Denenberg, Ament & Eiger, P.C., of Chicago, Illinois; Steven E. Smith, of Steven E. Smith & Associates, of Tulsa, Oklahoma; Charles O. Hanson, Richard K. Holmes, and Stewart E. Field, of Hanson, Holmes, Field & Snider, of Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Professor Joseph C. Long, of the University of Oklahoma, College of Law, Norman, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), of Much, Shelist, Freed, Denenberg, Ament & Eiger, P.C., of Chicago, Illinois, for the Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

L. K. Smith (Kimberly A. Lambert, of Boone, Smith, Davis & Hurst, of Tulsa, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), of Boone, Smith, Davis & Hurst, of Tulsa, Oklahoma, for all the Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees except Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.

Graydon Dean Luthey, Jr. (Deryl L. Gotcher and Roy C. Breedlove, of Jones, Givens, Gotcher, Bogan & Hilborne, a Professional Corporation, of Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Anthony J. Costantini, Associate General Counsel, of Peat, Marwick, Main & Co., of New York, New York, with him on the briefs), of Jones, Givens, Gotcher, Bogan & Hilborne, a Professional Corporation, of Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.

Daniel L. Goelzer, General Counsel, Jacob H. Stillman, Associate General Counsel, Rosalind C. Cohen, Assistant General Counsel, and Batya Roth, Attorney, of the Securities and Exchange Commission, of Washington, D.C., *amicus curiae*.

Before McKAY, BARRETT, and TACHA, *Circuit Judges*.

TACHA, *Circuit Judge*.

The issue presented in this interlocutory appeal is whether certain instruments issued by three Oklahoma entities—Republic Bancorporation, Inc. (RBI), and its two nonbank subsidiaries, Republic Trust & Savings (RTS), a trust company, and Republic Financial Corporation (RFC), a finance company—are securities within the meaning of the federal securities laws. We hold that the instruments issued by RFC and RTS are securities. However, because material issues of fact remain regarding RBI's issuance of a note, we remand to the district court for further consideration of whether that note is a security. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I.

Until 1984 RBI was a bank holding company regulated by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB). In addition to controlling RTS and RFC, RBI also controlled a state-chartered bank, Republic Bank & Trust Company (RBT). In 1984 RBI effectively divested RBT pursuant to an order from the FRB, thereby becoming a nonbank holding company that was outside the scope of federal banking regulation.[1] After divesting the bank, RBI continued to control RTS and RFC. Soon after the divestiture, RBI, RTS, and RFC all filed for bankruptcy.

The plaintiffs in this case invested money with RTS and RFC and received in return "thrift certificates" and "passbook savings certificates." In addition, RBI reissued to one of the plaintiffs a promissory note that had originally been issued by its subsidiary bank. The plaintiffs allege that through issuing these instruments, the issuing entities and their accounting firm sold, or aided and abetted the sale of, securities in violation of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.

The defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing that the instruments are not securities within the meaning of the federal securities laws and that therefore the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The district court converted the motions to dismiss to motions for partial summary judgment on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, and directed the parties to conduct discovery and submit briefs on the issue of government regulation of the three organizations.

After examining the regulatory structure applicable to each of the issuing entities and considering the broad definition of

---

1 This account of the divestiture has been somewhat simplified. The actual details are set forth in *In re Republic Trust & Savings Co.*, 59 Bankr. 606, 607-08 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986), *appeal denied*, *In re Republic Financial Corp.*, 77 Bankr. 282 (N.D. Okla. 1987). In 1984 RBI (old RBI) changed its name to Sunbelt Bancorporation, Inc., while a separate entity at that time known as Sunbelt Bancorporation, Inc. changed its name to Republic Bancorporation, Inc. (new RBI). *Id.* at 608. Old RBI transferred RTS and RFC to new RBI, while retaining ownership of the state-chartered bank. *Id.* "Neither old RBI nor new RBI held any significant ownership interest in each other." *Id.* For the purposes of this opinion, "RBI" simply refers at all times to the corporate parent of RTS and RFC.

securities under the federal securities laws, the district court held that the instruments issued by RTS were not securities, but that those instruments issued by RFC, and the note issued by RBI, were securities. The court therefore granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to the RTS instruments and the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to the RBI and RFC instruments. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants appealed.

II.

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must determine whether any genuine issue of material fact remains and, if not, whether the district court correctly applied the law. *Franks v. Nimmo*, 796 F.2d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1986). The district court correctly determined that only legal issues remain with regard to the instruments issued by RFC and RTS. Thus, we proceed to decide whether the court correctly determined whether those instruments, consisting of passbook savings certificates and thrift certificates, are securities. We employ a de novo standard of review for this question of law. *See Carey v. United States Postal Serv.*, 812 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir. 1987).

We first consider whether any of the instruments in question fall within the statutory definition of a security. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:

> (a) Definitions
>
> When used in this chapter, *unless the context otherwise requires*—
>
> . . . .
>
> (10) The term "security" means *any note*, stock, treasury stock, *bond*, *debenture*, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any

> interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; *but shall not include currency or any note*, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance *which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months*, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.

15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (emphasis added). The definition of "security" in the Securities Act of 1933 is slightly different in that it also includes the term "evidence of indebtedness." *See* 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1). Despite this difference, the Supreme Court has "consistently held that the definition of 'security' in the 1934 Act is essentially the same as the definition of 'security' in § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)." *Marine Bank v. Weaver*, 455 U.S. 551, 555 n.3 (1982); *see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman*, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975) (definition of security in 1933 and 1934 Acts are "virtually identical").

When determining whether an instrument falls within the scope of the definitional statute, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the definition of a security should be broadly construed because the federal securities laws are remedial legislation.[2] *Id.* at 847-48; *Tcherepnin v. Knight*, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); *SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.*, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963); *see also Marine Bank*, 455 U.S. at 555-56.

---

2 At least one commentator has remarked upon the broad interpretation of the securities laws by way of listing examples:

> What do the following have in common: scotch whiskey, self-improvement courses, cosmetics, earthworms, beavers, muskrats, rabbits, chinchillas, fishing boats, vacuum cleaners, cemetery lots, and fruit trees? The answer is that they have all been held to be securities within the meaning of federal or state securities statutes. T. Hazen, *The Law of Securities Regulation* § 1.5, at 14 (1985) (footnotes omitted).

> In providing [the definition of a security] Congress did not attempt to articulate the relevant economic criteria for [distinguishing] "securities" from "non-securities." [R]ather, it sought to define "the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within that definition the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security."

Forman, 421 U.S. at 847-48 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)); *see also Marine Bank*, 455 U.S. at 555-56.

The remedial purpose that Congress intended to accomplish through the securities laws is the protection of investors:

> The [1933 and 1934 Acts] were designed to provide investors with material information and to protect the investing public from the sale of worthless securities through misrepresentation. The legislation was intended to encourage "honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence" in the investment markets and to eliminate the "unethical and unsafe practices of bank and corporate officers."

Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230, 237 (2d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) (quoting Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congress (March 29, 1933), *reprinted in* 77 Cong. Rec. 937 (1933)). The federal securities laws are designed "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of *caveat emptor* and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry." *Capital Gains Research Bureau*, 375 U.S. at 186.

We apply the language of the definitional statutes to the instruments issued by RTS and RFC in light of the remedial purpose of the federal securities laws. The terms "passbook savings certificates" and "thrift certificates" do not expressly appear in either of the definitional statutes, but this does not prevent such instruments from being securities. We must con-

sider the substance of the instrument rather than the form. *Tcherepnin*, 389 U.S. at 336.

> [I]f any inquiry other than whether the instrument fits the statutory definition is appropriate, it would be whether the instrument and transaction fit the traditional characteristics of the defined term, or whether . . . the reasons and policies that gave rise to protection of securities under the 1933 and 1934 Acts are applicable.

Penturelli v. Spector, Cohen, Gadon & Rosen, 779 F.2d 160, 167 (3d Cir. 1985) (citation omitted); *accord Adena Exploration, Inc. v. Sylvan*, 860 F.2d 1242, 1248 (5th Cir. 1988).

Here, both the passbook savings certificates and thrift certificates are essentially debt instruments, representing a promise by the issuing entity to repay the principal amount, plus accrued interest at a specified rate, within a specified time period or on demand.[3] These instruments will therefore be analyzed under the "notes" or "evidence of indebtedness" categories of the statutory definition of "security."[4] *See Sanderson v. Roethenmund*, 682 F. Supp. 205, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that "international certificates of deposit" evidencing "a promise to pay a specified sum of principal and interest to the payee at a

---

3 Both RFC and RTS reserved the right to subject holders of passbook savings certificates and thrift certificates to additional conditions upon demand for repayment: 1) thirty days written notice could be required prior to redemption; and 2) redemptions of certificates in any given calendar month could be limited to fifty percent of the net cash flow of the preceding month.

4 Although federal law clearly governs whether such instruments are securities, *see Tcherepnin*, 389 U.S. at 337-38, our characterization of these instruments is also consistent with Oklahoma law, which permits a trust company, such as RTS, "[t]o issue debentures, notes, or other evidences of debt in the manner in which business corporations are authorized to do so." Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 6, § 1001(22) (West 1984). The instruments issued by RTS were not certificates of deposit, but certificates of indebtedness because RTS was not a bank and therefore lacked the power to accept deposits. *In re Republic Trust & Sav. Co.*, 59 Bankr. 606, 612-13 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986), *appeal denied, In re Republic Fin. Corp.*, 77 Bankr. 282 (N.D. Okla. 1987). We see no reason to treat the instruments issued by RFC, a finance company, any differently as it also is a nonbank institution under Oklahoma law. *See In re Republic Fin. Corp.*, 77 Bankr. 282, 284 (N.D. Okla. 1987).

specified time" were to be analyzed as "notes" for purposes of the 1933 and 1934 Acts); *cf. Bradford v. Moench*, 670 F. Supp. 920, 922, 932-33 (D. Utah 1987) (noting that functional analysis of instruments must be applied to determine if "thrift certificates" or "saving passbook or other accounts" of state-chartered financial institution are securities).

Merely identifying these instruments as "notes" or "evidence of indebtedness" does not end our analysis, however, because the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires," precedes the definition of "security" in the statute itself. Thus, Congress has specifically directed an analysis that goes beyond the literal application of the definitional section.[5]

The Supreme Court has recognized two general circumstances in which the context of the underlying transaction could override the literal language of the statute. First, when the category utilized in the definitional statute is sufficiently ambiguous to raise the question whether Congress would have intended to include all such instruments on the basis of the face of the instrument alone, the Court permits an inquiry into the factual circumstances underlying the transaction. *See Landreth*, 471 U.S. at 693-94; *see also Marine Bank*, 455 U.S. at 556, 560 n.11. This inquiry involves "what character the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the prospect." *SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.*, 320 U.S. 344, 352-53

---

5 Two circuit courts have held that the "context" language prefacing the definitional provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts refers only to the context in which a definitional term appears within the statute, and not to the context of the underlying transaction. *See American Bankers Ass'n v. SEC*, 804 F.2d 739,753-54 (D.C. Cir. 1986); *Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran*, 737 F.2d 320, 330-32 (3d Cir. 1984), *aff'd sub nom. Gould v. Ruefenacht*, 471 U.S. 701 (1985).

The Supreme Court has not yet explicitly rejected this position, but it certainly has inquired beyond the four corners of the statute in determining whether a particular financial instrument is a security. *See Marine Bank v. Weaver*, 455 U.S. 551, 556-59 (1982) (relying in part upon the "context" of federal regulation of banks in holding that certificates of deposit were not securities). Subsequent to *Marine Bank* the Court has continued to inquire into the "context" of the underlying transaction. *See Landreth Timber Co.*

(1943); *accord Marine Bank*, 455 U.S. at 556; *SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.*, 387 U.S. 202, 211 (1967).

Second, when the issuing entity is pervasively regulated by another federal regulatory scheme, the Court has inquired into whether such alternative federal regulation accomplishes the same purposes as the securities laws, thereby making the securities laws' protections for investors duplicative and unnecessary. *See Marine Bank*, 455 U.S. at 557-59; *International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel*, 439 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1979). Both of these "context" inquiries are potentially relevant to the instruments in this case, and we consider them in turn.

A.

The "note" and "evidence of indebtedness" categories are sufficiently ambiguous to merit an inquiry into the factual context of the issuance of such instruments. *See Zabriskie v. Lewis*,

---

v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687 (1985) ("context of the transaction involved here—the sale of stock in a corporation—is typical of the kind of context to which the [securities] Acts normally apply"). Although the Court held in *Landreth* that an inquiry into "the economic reality underlying the transactions" was not necessary in all cases involving the sale of "stock," *id.* at 690-91, it expressly left open the question "whether coverage of notes or other instruments may be provable" on the basis of their name and characteristics alone, *id.* at 693, 694. The Court explicitly stated that " 'stock' may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of 'security.' " *Id.* at 694. Furthermore, the Court specifically noted that " 'note' may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment context." *Id.*

The circuit courts in *American Bankers Association* and *O'Halloran* suggested that reliance upon the "context" clause was unnecessary to the Court's holding in *Marine Bank* because the legislative history and structure of the securities acts also supported the result. *American Bankers Ass'n*, 804 F.2d at 753-54 & n.23; *O'Halloran*, 737 F.2d at 331 n.29. Although we agree that the context of the underlying transaction cannot be used to contradict the intent of Congress as contained in the legislative history and structure of the Acts, we do not interpret *Landreth* or *Marine Bank* to restrict the scope of our consideration in this case to the statutory text or legislative history alone.

507 F.2d 546, 550-51 (10th Cir. 1974); *cf. Landreth*, 471 U.S. at 693-94 (declaring that earlier statement by Court equating " 'notes' . . . with 'stock' as categories . . . standardized enough to rest on their names" was to be characterized as "dictum"). The term "note" is "viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment context." *Id.* at 694 (citing *Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.*, 468 U.S. 137, 149-53 (1984)).

Accordingly, the literal language of the 1934 Act—"[a security includes] any note . . . but shall not include . . . any note . . . which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months," 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)—cannot be read literally to include or to exempt "any note" based on maturity alone. *See Zabriskie*, 507 F.2d at 550. In establishing the coverage of the securities laws, Congress neither intended to include all notes with maturities greater than nine months nor to exclude all notes with maturities less than nine months. *See id.* The exemption for short-term notes is limited to " 'prime quality negotiable [commercial] paper of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general public, that is, paper [issued] to facilitate well recognized types of current operational business requirements and of a type eligible for discounting by Federal Reserve banks.' " *Id.* (quoting Securities Act Release No. 4412, 26 Fed. Reg. 9158, 9159 (1961)); *see also United States v. Roylance*, 690 F.2d 164, 168-69 (10th Cir. 1982).

The maturity of a note is therefore not dispositive. Instead, the commercial or investment character of the underlying transaction determines whether an instrument is a security.

> [T]he [1934] Act covers all *investment* notes, no matter how short their maturity, because they are not encompassed by the "any note" language of the exemption. On the other hand, the Act does not cover any *commercial* notes, no matter how long their maturity, because they fall outside the "any note" definition of a security. . . . [T]he investment or commercial nature of a note entirely

> controls the applicability of the Act, depriving of all utility the exemption based on maturity-length.

McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 494-95 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis in original), *cert. denied*, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); *see Matek v. Murat*, 862 F.2d 720, 727 n.11 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Especially in the area of commercial notes, a literal reading of the securities acts may not be appropriate."); *Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank*, 844 F.2d 1193, 1199 n.4 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[I]t is simply too late in the day to successfully contend that the literal statutory definitions of themselves mean that it can always be reasonably argued that *any* note (or any for more than nine months) is a security no matter what the circumstances.") (emphasis in original).

This circuit has utilized the commercial/investment dichotomy in evaluating whether notes or similar debt instruments fall within the definition of security. *See McVay v. Western Plains Serv. Corp.*, 823 F.2d 1395, 1399 (10th Cir. 1987) (loan participations); *McGovern Plaza Joint Venture v. First of Denver Mortgage Investors*, 562 F.2d 645, 647 (10th Cir. 1977) (loan commitments); *Zabriskie*, 507 F.2d at 551 (promissory notes). The commercial/investment test

> is based on the purpose of the Act to protect investors, the "unless the context otherwise requires" language, and the practical considerations of subjecting commercial notes to the registration provisions of the Securities Act as well as fear of the resulting litigation flooding the federal courts if commercial notes were included. The test accords with the exalting of economic reality over form, and seeks to protect investors.

Id. (citation omitted).

In *Zabriskie*, the court cited with approval a number of factors that one commentator had suggested "could assist in the final determination that an investment note (a security) is or is not present." *Id.* at 551 n.9. The factors include:

> (1) use of proceeds to buy specific assets or services (commercial) rather than general financing (investment), (2) risk to initial investment, (3) giving certain rights to a

> payee (investment), (4) repayment contingent on profit or out of production (investment), (5) a large number of notes or payees (investment), (6) a large dollar amount (investment), (7) fixed time notes (equivocal) rather than demand notes (commercial), and (8) characterization by the parties themselves.

Id. Other federal courts have similarly utilized these factors. *See Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz*, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257-58 (9th Cir. 1976); *C.N.S. Enters. v. G. & G. Enters.*, 508 F.2d 1354, 1361-62 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); *McClure*, 497 F.2d at 493 & n.2. As we implicitly recognized in *Zabriskie*, 507 F.2d at 551-52, and as other courts have explicitly stated, "These criteria are helpful but each case appears to require its own decision based upon its own facts," *C.N.S. Enters.*, 508 F.2d at 1362; *see also Hunssinger v. Rockford Business Credits, Inc.*, 745 F.2d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 1984); *McClure*, 497 F.2d at 493 n.2. Not all factors, therefore, must point in the same direction in order for an instrument to be considered an investment.

Several factors are particularly important in this case. Foremost among them is the fact that RTS and RFC solicited the general public for investments in their passbook savings certificates and thrift certificates. After an extensive review of the cases in this area, the Fifth Circuit concluded that offering notes to a broad class of investors "usually indicated the investment overtones of the underlying transactions." *Id.* at 493-94; *see also Hunssinger*, 745 F.2d at 492 ("broad solicitation of members of the general public" and "sale to them of units of a larger offering are the hallmarks of an investment transaction"); *Zabriskie*, 507 F.2d at 551 n.9 ("large dollar amount" and "large number of notes or payees" cited as factors indicating a security). We agree.

According to the complaint, these instruments were offered and sold in various denominations[6] to the general public and

---

6 The complaint specifies the named plaintiffs' purchases of instruments in denominations ranging from approximately $100 to $100,000, with most purchases falling in the $1500 to $10,000 range.

were purchased by more than 10,000 investors. In circumstances similar to this case, the Seventh Circuit rejected an argument by a broker-dealer that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws did not apply to instruments which it had offered for sale to the general public. *Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.*, 463 F.2d 1075, 1079-80 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972). Nuveen, the broker-dealer, had purchased " 'short term open market' paper" issued by an entity "engaged in the business of making loans." *Id.* at 1079. The paper was offered to the general public and was bought by forty-two purchasers, most of whom invested less than $100,000. *Id.* at 1079 & n.14. When the issuing entity became insolvent, the purchasers brought suit against Nuveen. The Seventh Circuit held in that case that under the "economic reality" of the transaction, "it is reasonably clear that plaintiff and his class purchased the kind of 'security' in regard to which the securities acts were intended to offer protection against fraud, misrepresentation and nondisclosure. . . . We believe Congress intended to protect against fraud the purchasers of securities such as those involved here . . . ." *Id.* at 1079-80 (footnote omitted).

Although no broker was involved in this case, the court's reliance upon the public offering of notes in *Sanders* is persuasive here as well. The note holders in that case were certainly not commercial actors, such as banks, seeking to make commercial loans. They were investors seeking a passive return on their investment.

> When a prospective borrower approaches a bank for a loan and gives his note in consideration for it, the bank has purchased commercial paper. But a person who seeks to invest his money and receives a note in return for it has not purchased commercial paper in the usual sense. He has purchased a security investment.

Id. at 1080, *quoted in Zabriskie*, 507 F.2d at 551; *see also Hunssinger*, 745 F.2d at 492 (notes sold to passive investors held to be securities).

Under the circumstances in this case, the public offering aspect of the transaction indicates that an investment transaction has transpired. The need to effectuate the purpose of the

securities laws in protecting the "public from the sale of worthless securities through misrepresentation" is especially acute. *Gary Plastic*, 756 F.2d at 237. "In an investment situation, the issuer has superior access to and control of information material to the investment decision." *Kotz*, 532 F.2d at 1262 (Wright, J., concurring). The information advantage held by the issuer makes most investors dependent upon the honesty and goodwill of the issuer to disclose accurate, relevant information.

Commercial lenders, such as banks, are often able to overcome this information disadvantage.

> While banks are subjected to risks of misinformation, their ability to verify representations and take supervisory and corrective actions places them in a significantly different posture than the investors sought to be protected through the securities acts.
>
> . . . Rather than relying solely on semi-anonymous and secondhand market information, as do most investors, the commercial bank deals "face-to-face" with the promissor. The bank has a superior bargaining position and can compel wide-ranging disclosures and verification of issues material to its decision on the loan application.

Id. at 1261-62 (Wright, J., concurring).

In contrast, the typical members of the general public responding to a public offering, such as the investors in this case, individually lack the practical ability to obtain such disclosures and verifications to insure a sound investment decision. Furthermore, without the capacity to obtain such information on an ongoing basis after they have committed capital to the enterprise, such investors also effectively lack the ability to monitor the financial condition of the issuing entity or to implement protective or supervisory controls to protect their investment.[7] Such investors must depend upon the honesty and

---

7 Although a regulatory agency may intervene on behalf of such investors, the proper focus in making the initial determination whether a transaction is commercial or investment in character is upon the primary actors directly involved in the transaction.

goodwill of the issuing entity. The securities laws provide necessary protection for such investors when those affiliated with the issuing entity breach this trust. *See Matek*, 862 F.2d at 724-25 ("The securities acts protect those without inside access to information about an investment from overreaching or manipulation of their investments by insiders or promoters.").

Closely related to this protection rationale is the fact that here the instruments were issued as a vehicle for raising capital which was apparently used as general financing for RTS and RFC, and which involved the risk of total loss for the investors. This was not a secured lending transaction in which the creditor obtained collateral that would protect his investment in the event of default. Neither does the transaction appear to be a commercial unsecured loan in which the parties contemplated the risk and structured the agreement accordingly. *See, e.g., Kotz*, 532 F.2d at 1259.

The issuer's characterization of the instrument is also an appropriate consideration in determining whether a transaction is investment or commercial in nature. *See Zabriskie*, 507 F.2d at 551 n.9. The record shows that at least some of the offering materials used to induce purchases of instruments issued by RTS and RFC referred to the contributions by investors as "investments," expressly disclaiming that they were "deposits." Furthermore, RFC filed prospectuses with the Oklahoma Securities Commission, characterizing the instruments it issued as "securities."[8] Although the name given is not dispositive, neither is it wholly irrelevant. *Forman*, 421 U.S. at 850. The use of these terms could have lead purchasers "justifiably to assume that the federal securities laws apply." *Id.*

We recognize that not all of the factors cited in *Zabriskie* point toward finding a security in this case. Repayment of the

---

8 Instruments offered or sold to the general public on the representation that they are an attractive investment are generally deemed to be securities. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, courts should consider " 'the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the prospect. In the enforcement of an act such as [the Securities Act] it is not inappropriate that promoters' offerings be judged as being what they were represented to be.' " *SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.*, 387 U.S. 202, 211 (1967) (quoting *SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.*, 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943)).

instruments issued by RFC and RTS is not contingent on profit or production as contemplated by the *Zabriskie* factors, except in the broad sense that failure of the institution as a result of long-term unprofitability defeats repayment. This factor, however, is somewhat unreliable because it would disqualify any note with a fixed rate of interest. Such a result would clearly be contrary to the purposes of the Acts. *See Hunssinger*, 745 F.2d at 490-91.

The Supreme Court's statements concerning application of the *Howey* test, which also contains a profits element, underscore the unreliability of this factor. The *Howey* test—"whether the [investment] scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others"—was articulated by the Supreme Court to determine whether a putative security is an "investment contract," one of the general terms in the definitional statute. *SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.*, 328 U.S. 293, 298-99, 301 (1946). Although the Supreme Court has noted in dicta that the *Howey* test "embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security," *Forman*, 421 U.S. at 852, the Court has subsequently rejected the proposition that the *Howey* test is applicable to all securities:

> [W]e would note that the *Howey* economic reality test was designed to determine whether a particular instrument is an "investment contract," not whether it fits within *any* of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "security." Our cases are consistent with this view. Moreover, applying the *Howey* test to traditional stock and all other types of instruments listed in the statutory definition would make the Acts' enumeration of many types of instruments superfluous.

Landreth, 471 U.S. at 691-92 (footnote and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

At the time the Court was deciding *Forman*, it had not yet considered whether a debt instrument fell within the definitional statute. *Hunssinger*, 745 F.2d at 491; *Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co.*, 544 F.2d 1126, 1136 (2d Cir. 1976). In stating that the *Howey* test " 'embodies the essential

attributes that run through all the Court's decisions defining a security,' " *Hunssinger*, 745 F.2d at 491 (quoting *Forman*, 421 U.S. at 852), the Court had "merely identified a characteristic of its past decisions, all of which involved an unusual instrument not easily placed within the ambit of the other terms enumerated in the definitional sections of the securities acts." *Id.*; *see Landreth*, 471 U.S. at 689 n.4.

The Supreme Court's interpretation of the profits element of the *Howey* test as including either "capital appreciation" or "participation in earnings," *Forman*, 421 U.S. at 852; *see also Hunssinger*, 745 F.2d at 490, also creates significant difficulties when applied to debt instruments because fixed interest payments do not fall within either of these definitions. *Hunssinger*, 745 F.2d at 489-90. Applying the profits element of the *Howey* test to every instrument would frustrate the intent of Congress by making superfluous several terms in the definitional statute, such as "bond," "note," and "debenture," all of which typically involve fixed interest payments. *Id.* at 490-91. "[I]f the term 'profits' as used in [the *Howey*] test were not to encompass fixed interest payments, then a twenty-year corporate bond issued in a public offering would not be a security." *Id.* at 491; *see also Exchange Nat'l Bank*, 544 F.2d at 1136 (*Howey* test of "dubious value" in note context). Furthermore, the Court's decision in *Marine Bank*, which was issued subsequent to *Forman*, indicates that some circumstances exist in which certificates of deposit, which typically involve fixed interest payments, can be securities. *See Marine Bank*, 455 U.S. at 560 n.11.

Thus, the fact that repayment is not strictly contingent on profits is not dispositive in this case. Because we analyze the instruments here as "notes" or "evidences of indebtedness," we need not also determine whether they are "investment contracts" under *Howey*.[9]

---

9 We note that the Eighth Circuit has held that demand notes issued by a farmers' cooperative to its members must satisfy the *Howey* test to qualify as securities under the federal securities laws. *Arthur Young & Co. v.*

Similarly, the demand character of the passbook savings certificates is not dispositive. Although there is authority for the proposition that "a demand or short-term note is *almost ipso facto* not a security unless payment is dependent upon the success of a risky enterprise, or the parties contemplate indefinite extension of the note or perhaps conversion to stock," *Kotz*, 532 F.2d at 1257-58 (emphasis added), we refuse to make a talisman of this factor. As discussed above, the maturity of a note does not determine its commercial or investment character. *McClure*, 497 F.2d at 495; *SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp.*, 497 F.2d 516, 524-25 (5th Cir. 1974). We doubt that Congress intended to allow the issuing entity to circumvent the securities laws solely through utilizing a short-term or demand maturity. *See SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc.*, 751 F.2d 529, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1984).

Considering all of the relevant factors, we conclude that the passbook savings certificates and thrift certificates issued by RFC and RTS are investment, rather than commercial, instruments. The "context" of the factual circumstances underlying the issuance of these instruments does not require that they be excepted from the scope of the definitional statutes.

B.

Even if the instruments here potentially qualify as securities because of the factual circumstances underlying the transactions, the context of other federal regulation may still remove these instruments from the federal securities laws. *See Marine Bank*, 455 U.S. at 557-59; *Daniel*, 439 U.S. at 569-70. RFC and RTS have been subject to both federal and state regulation by various banking and regulatory agencies. Thus, we must consider whether the purposes of the federal securities laws have

---

Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 54 (8th. Cir. 1988), *petition for cert. filed*, 57 U.S.L.W. 3622 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1989) (No. 88-1480). The Seventh Circuit has recently followed *Reves* by similarly utilizing the *Howey* test. *See Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp.*, 866 F.2d 935, 941-42 (7th Cir. 1989). For the reasons discussed above, we reject this analysis.

been effectuated by the regulatory schemes applicable to RFC and RTS.

In *Marine Bank* the Supreme Court addressed the scope of protection afforded by the securities laws in the context of a regulated environment. The Court considered whether a certificate of deposit issued by a federally regulated bank fell within the scope of the securities laws, ultimately holding that it did not. *Marine Bank*, 455 U.S. at 559. The Court relied upon the policy of providing protection for investors in deciding that question, stating that

> [t]he definition of "security" in the 1934 Act provides that an instrument which seems to fall within the broad sweep of the Act is not to be considered a security if the context otherwise requires. It is *unnecessary* to subject issuers of bank certificates of deposit to liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are *abundantly protected* under the federal banking laws.

Id. at 558-59 (emphasis added). In the Court's view, such a bank certificate of deposit differed significantly from other long-term debt obligations because

> [t]his certificate of deposit was issued by a *federally regulated* bank which is *subject to the comprehensive set of regulations* governing the banking industry. Deposits in federally regulated banks are protected by the reserve, reporting, and inspection requirements of the federal banking laws; advertising relating to the interest paid on deposits is also regulated. In addition, deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Id. at 558 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The Court stated that "appropriate weight" must be given to "the important fact that the purchaser of a certificate of deposit is *virtually guaranteed payment in full*, whereas the holder of an ordinary longterm debt obligation assumes the risk of the borrower's insolvency." *Id.* (emphasis added).

The Court held that the certificate of deposit issued by the federally regulated bank in that case was not a security because

of the presence of comprehensive regulation of the banking industry that "abundantly protected" the holders of such certificates of deposit. *Id.* at 559. The Court left open the possibility, however, that in some circumstances a certificate of deposit could be a security, which would entitle the holder to the protection of the securities laws.

> It does not follow that a certificate of deposit or business agreement between transacting parties invariably falls outside the definition of a "security" as defined by the federal statutes. Each transaction must be analyzed and evaluated on the basis of the content of the instruments in question, the purposes intended to be served, and the factual setting as a whole.

Id. at 560 n.11;[10] *see also Bradford*, 670 F. Supp. at 933 n.24 (stating that Court's reference to business agreement between transacting parties "could include a passbook type of arrangement").

Likewise, in *Daniel*, the Supreme Court rejected a claim that certain pension plans are securities, 439 U.S. at 559, 566, noting that "the enactment of ERISA . . . put the matter to rest," *id.* at 569. "The existence of this comprehensive legislation governing the use and terms of employee pension plans severely undercuts all arguments for extending the Securities Acts to noncontributory, compulsory pension plans. Congress believed that it was filling a regulatory void when it enacted ERISA . . . ." *Id.* at 569-70. In addition, the Court noted that in light of ERISA, extension of the federal securities laws into this area serves no general purpose. *Id.* at 570. The Court stated that "[w]hatever benefits employees might derive from the effect of the Securities Acts are now provided in more definite form through ERISA." *Id.*

---

10 Although the definition of a security in the 1933 and 1934 Acts was amended after *Marine Bank* to include options on certificates of deposits, the legislative history is explicit that no change in the current law regarding the treatment of certificates of deposit was intended. H. Rep. No. 626, pt. I, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, *reprinted in* 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2780, 2788.

The crucial factor present in both of these decisions is the "context" of comprehensive *federal* regulation providing sufficient protection to the holders of such instruments to make unnecessary the protection of the federal securities laws. The Supreme Court was careful to note that comprehensive federal regulation was the basis of both *Marine Bank* and *Daniel. See Marine Bank*, 455 U.S. at 558 & n.7. We interpret *Marine Bank* in light of the supremacy clause to exclude the possibility that the "context" of state regulation is sufficient to displace the federal securities laws. A more expansive reading of the "context" clause would permit states to create their own exemptions to federal securities law coverage, which Congress clearly did not intend.

When Congress has created a comprehensive system of regulation applicable to securities, and important remedies based upon that system exist under federal law, the normal operation of the supremacy clause does not permit state regulation to preempt federal law. *See SEC v. National Sec., Inc.*, 393 U.S. 453, 463 (1969). Unless Congress specifically acts to reserve the regulation of securities to the states, the "paramount federal interest in protecting shareholders," *id.*, under the securities laws mandates that federal remedies be available for investors. Otherwise, we would "emasculate the securities laws by forbidding remedies which might prove to be essential." *Id.*

Congress clearly has the power to create an exemption from the securities laws or to reserve some regulatory powers exclusively to the states. *See, e.g.*, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d (exempting certain instruments or transactions); *id.* § 77r-1 (permitting state to preempt application of section 77r-1(a) by adopting more restrictive statute). As a general rule, however, Congress has provided for concurrent regulation of securities by both the federal government and the states. *Id.* §§ 77r, 78bb(a).

The Supreme Court's discussion in *SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. of America*, 359 U.S. 65 (1959), is instructive on Congress' intent in permitting concurrent securities regulation. At issue was whether "variable annuity" contracts, which had developed after Congress passed the exempting statute, were within the scope of the statutory exemption for any "insurance policy" or "annuity contract" that "was subject to

the supervision of the state 'insurance commissioner, bank commissioner, or any agency or officer performing like functions.' " *Id.* at 73-74 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8)). The Court held that the meaning of the terms of the federal statute was a federal question. *Id.* at 69. The state regulators' decisions regarding the definition of insurance or of annuity were "not decisive." *Id.* Justice Brennan's concurring opinion explains why this is so:

> [H]owever adequately State Securities Commissioners might regulate an investment, it was not for that reason to be freed from federal regulation. Concurrent regulation, then, was contemplated by the Acts as a quite generally prevailing matter. [It is not] rational to assume that Congress thought that *any* business whatsoever regulated by a specific class of officials, [such as] the State Insurance Commissioners, would be for that reason so perfectly conducted and regulated that all the protections of the Federal Acts would be unnecessary. This approach of personally selective deference to the state administrators is hardly to be attributed to Congress.

Id. at 75 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).

Accordingly, we find nothing in the securities acts to indicate that Congress intended the states to displace the protections of the federal securities laws in this case. Congress has not exercised its power to suspend "the normal operations of the Supremacy Clause" by permitting the states to have paramount regulatory power. *See National Sec.*, 393 U.S. at 463. On the contrary, the statutes direct that "state regulation may co-exist with that offered under the federal securities laws," *id.* at 461 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r, 78bb(a)), and that nothing in the statutes "shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any security or any person *insofar as it does not conflict* with the provisions [of the federal securities laws]," 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (emphasis added). The displacement of federal law through state regulation is therefore fundamentally inconsistent with the coexistence directed by Congress. Without specific direction to the contrary from Congress, the federal

courts do not have the power to trump the paramount federal interest in protecting investors by creating additional exemptions to securities law coverage through the "context" of state regulation.[11] *See National Sec.*, 393 U.S. at 468.

The interpretation of the interrelationship among the securities acts and other federal regulatory schemes promulgated by Congress, however, is clearly within the power of the federal courts, as the Supreme Court demonstrated in *Marine Bank*. We must therefore examine whether federal banking regulation applicable to RFC, RTS, and RBI is sufficient to satisfy the standard set forth in *Marine Bank*—whether the context of federal regulation abundantly protects investors, thereby making the protections of the federal securities laws unnecessary. *See Marine Bank*, 455 U.S. at 558-59.

As discussed above, an important purpose of the federal securities laws is to protect investors "from the sale of worthless securities through misrepresentation." *Gary Plastic*, 756

---

11 The Ninth Circuit has held that a certificate of deposit issued by a Mexican bank was not a security. *Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A.*, 739 F.2d 1458, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1984), *cert. denied*, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985); *accord West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A.*, 807 F.2d 820, 827 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 482 U.S. 906 (1987). In *Wolf* "it was conceded that the *Mexican government's regulation* of [the bank] provides its certificate holders the *same degree of protection* against insolvency as does the federal system in this country." *Wolf*, 739 F.2d at 1463 (emphasis added). Although the decision in *Wolf* denied recourse to investors under the federal securities laws based on regulation by the Mexican government, its result is distinguishable on the ground that investors in that case essentially had foreign exchange losses, and not losses caused by insolvency of the issuing bank. Each of the holders of Mexican certificates of deposit received the same amount of pesos as were deposited, and the losses were the result of the Mexican government's devaluation of the peso. To the extent that *Wolf* interprets *Marine Bank* to allow regulation by an entity other than the federal government to displace the protection of the federal securities laws, we disagree under the supremacy rationale stated above.

The Fourth Circuit has similarly held that certificates of deposit issued by state-chartered savings and loans were not securities because of the State of Maryland's comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the issuing entities. *Tafflin v. Levitt*, 865 F.2d 595, 598-99 (4th Cir. 1989), *cert. granted on unrelated issue*, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 2658 (May 30, 1989) (No. 88-1650). We similarly disagree with this analysis based upon the supremacy rationale discussed above.

F.2d at 237. Although information disclosure provisions contribute significantly toward providing this protection, *see SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.*, 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953), private remedies have also grown to play an important part of the protections afforded by federal law, *see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak*, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); *see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores*, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). We interpret *Marine Bank* to permit other federal regulation to displace the federal securities laws only through fulfilling the disclosure and remedial purposes of the securities laws by alternate means.

In the context of federal regulation of banks, the regulators may satisfy the standard required by *Marine Bank* through exercising certain powers on behalf of investors. In order to give substance to the information disclosure purposes of the securities laws, the regulators must possess investigative powers to verify information proffered by the issuer, to compel disclosure of information that is material to the initial investment decision, and to monitor the ongoing financial condition of the regulated entity. *See Marine Bank*, 455 U.S. at 558 & n.8 (noting reporting and inspection requirements and advertising regulations applicable to banks under federal law). Further, substantive limitations upon the lending and investment activities of banks also protect depositors. *See id.* (noting reserve requirements). Therefore, in lieu of full disclosure to investors of relevant, accurate information upon which to base an investment decision, investors are protected by another entity that acts on their behalf to monitor the issuing entity and to take corrective actions to protect their investments. The dependence upon this monitoring function is especially appropriate in an industry such as banking due to the confidential, nonpublic nature of many of the lending and investment activities of financial institutions.

The statutory framework of the federal securities laws also provides meaningful remedies for investors when the antifraud provisions of the laws have been violated. For example, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and SEC rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988), have been interpreted to authorize private damage actions for an investor to recover from any person who makes untrue state-

ments of material facts, or otherwise engages in any act to defraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. *See Gilbert v. Nixon*, 429 F.2d 348, 355 (10th Cir. 1970). *See generally* T. Hazen, *The Law of Securities Regulation* § 13.2 (1985). Thus, the purposes of the federal securities acts cannot be effectively carried out unless the alternate federal regulation provides for a meaningful remedy to investors. In *Marine Bank* the Supreme Court implicitly recognized the importance of meaningful remedies when it found "abundant protection" in part because of the "virtual guarantee of repayment in full." *Marine Bank*, 455 U.S. at 558-59. The presence of federal deposit insurance that had historically fully repaid holders of the type of instruments at issue in *Marine Bank* was evidence of a remedy analogous to that provided to individual investors under the federal securities laws. *See id.*

With this background in mind, we turn to analyze the regulatory structure applicable in this case. At the outset, we note that this analysis must be divided into two time periods—before and after RBI divested its bank subsidiary. During the time that RBI was a bank holding company, RBI and all of its subsidiaries, including nonbank subsidiaries such as RTS and RFC, were subject to some degree of federal regulation. After RBI divested RBT (its bank subsidiary), RBI was no longer a bank holding company because it held only nonbank subsidiaries. Therefore, RBI and its subsidiaries were no longer *federally* regulated under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850, 1971-1978.[12] Only state regulation by the Oklahoma Banking Department and the Oklahoma Securities Commission remained in effect.

---

12 The BHCA covers "any company which has control over any bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue of [the BHCA]." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a). After the divestiture of RBT, neither RBI nor its subsidiaries qualified as banks as defined in 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c). RTS was specifically held not to be a bank in *In re Republic Trust & Savings Co.*, 59 Bankr. 606, 612 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986), *appeal denied*, *In re Republic Financial Corp.*, 77 Bankr. 282 (N.D. Okla. 1987). After RBI divested its bank subsidiary, none of the remaining entities were members of the FDIC or the Federal Reserve System, and therefore they were not subject to federal regulation.

Based upon our holding that only federal regulation may be considered in the "context" analysis, no amount of state regulation is sufficient to satisfy the *Marine Bank* standard. Any instruments issued after divestiture of the bank, therefore, are not excluded from the definition of a security by virtue of the "context" of regulation. The district court erred in considering state regulation in its "context" analysis, and we therefore reverse the district court's holding that state regulation of RTS through the Oklahoma Banking Department satisfied *Marine Bank* and that the instruments issued by RTS were not securities on that account. Similarly, although the district court improperly considered state regulation of RTS by the Oklahoma Securities Commission, we nevertheless affirm the result that such regulation was insufficient to satisfy *Marine Bank*.

With regard to the instruments issued prior to divestiture, the district court considered both federal and state regulation of RFC, RBI, and RTS. Although the district court erred in considering the state regulation, we affirm the district court's holding that the federal regulation applicable to the issuing entities in this case was insufficient to satisfy *Marine Bank*.

Prior to divesting RBT, RBI was a bank holding company, and its subsidiaries RFC and RTS were therefore subject to federal regulation under the BHCA. The FRB is the regulatory body charged with administering the BHCA and the related regulations. The primary purpose of the FRB's administration of the BHCA, however, is to protect the stability and financial viability of subsidiary banks held by the holding companies. The FRB has stated its policy in regulating the corporate practices of bank holding companies:

> (a) *Bank holding company policy and operations.* (1) A bank holding company shall serve as a source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks and shall not con[d]uct its operations in an unsafe or unsound manner.
>
> (2) Whenever the Board believes an activity of a bank holding company or control of a nonbank subsidiary (other than a nonbank subsidiary of a bank) constitutes a serious risk to the financial safety, soundness, or stability

> of a subsidiary bank of the bank holding company and is inconsistent with sound banking principles or the purposes of the BHC Act or the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, as amended (12 U.S.C. 1818(b) *et seq.*), the Board may require the bank holding company to terminate the activity or to terminate control of the subsidiary, as provided in section 5(e) of the BHC Act.

12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (1988). Thus, if the holding company or its nonbank subsidiaries engage in activities that threaten the financial stability of the bank, the FRB has the power under the BHCA to order divestiture of nonbank entities, thereby protecting the bank's depositors.

The district court found that such federal regulation here did not "abundantly protect" the investors because it was aimed at protecting the *bank's depositors*, not investors in the bank holding company and the nonbank subsidiaries. We agree.

The protection afforded the investors in RTS and RFC as a result of federal regulation of RBI's nonbank subsidiaries was merely incidental to the protection of the bank's depositors. Although the investors in the nonbank entities benefited from the regulatory protection of the bank's depositors, their protection was dependent upon the coincidence of their interests with those of the bank's depositors. The nonbank investors' protection could disappear at any time, as demonstrated by the FRB's directive to RBI to divest the bank, leaving them exposed to substantial risk of loss, without a substantive remedy other than a claim in the assets of the insolvent company. This result is in direct contrast to the securities laws, which would provide continuous protection for such investors, and which provide potential remedies through the antifraud provisions. The investors in the nonbank subsidiaries also did not enjoy access to the important remedial benefit of federal deposit insurance, which *Marine Bank* determined to be an important part of the "virtual guarantee" necessary to displace the protection of the securities laws.

The indirect and potentially nonexistent protection provided by federal regulation in this case does not approach the level of "abundant protection" mandated by *Marine Bank*. Therefore,

the "context" of federal regulation of RBI and its nonbank subsidiaries, RFC and RTS, prior to RBI's divestiture of its bank subsidiary, was insufficient to exclude from the definition of a security any instruments issued by RFC and RTS prior to divestiture.

C.

In sum, "[u]nlike *Marine Bank*, federal securities fraud protection in this case is not a double-coating." *Gary Plastic*, 756 F.2d at 241. Rather, "absent the securities laws," the plaintiffs here did not have the abundant "protection against fraud and misrepresentation by the defendants in the marketplace" that is required by *Marine Bank*. *Id.* After considering the context of the underlying transactions, including the context of federal regulation, we conclude that the instruments issued by RTS and RFC are securities for the purposes of the federal securities laws.

III.

With regard to the note issued by RBI, we conclude that certain material facts necessary to decide whether it falls within the scope of the definitional statute are not established in the record. The only evidence submitted by the plaintiff on this issue is the note itself. The face of the note does not convey the context under which the note was issued, including whether the parties negotiated the terms specifically for this transaction, as opposed to an offer at fixed terms to the general public, and whether Cal Acree, the putative investor, was in the business of commercial lending. *Cf. Mace Neufeld Prods., Inc. v. Orion Pictures Corp.*, 860 F.2d 944, 946 (9th Cir. 1988) ("single unique agreement, 'negotiated one-on-one' between two parties," and not designed to be publicly offered or traded not "a security" (quoting *Marine Bank*, 455 U.S. at 559)). Therefore, we reverse the summary judgment award in favor of the plaintiff as to the RBI note and remand for consideration of the context of the underlying transaction consistent with this opinion.

IV.

We reverse the summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to the RTS instruments and remand to enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. We affirm the grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs as to the RFC instruments. We reverse the summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff as to the RBI note and remand for further consideration.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

No. 84-C-814-EU

FILED March 3, 1987

W. DAVID HOLLOWAY, M.D., *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & CO., a partnership, *et al.*,

Defendants.

AMENDED ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Based on the Orders of December 30, 1986 and February 4, 1987, and the Journal Entry of Partial Summary Judgment (the "Prior Orders"), wherein this Court granted partial summary judgment to certain Plaintiffs on the issue of the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court over claims involving the RBI and RFC instruments and granted summary judgment to Defendants on the issue of the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court over claims involving the RTS instruments, this Court is of the opinion, and finds, (i) there is no just reason for delay and that final judgment pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 54 (b) should be entered as to the claims of Plaintiffs who hold instruments of RTS; and (ii) an order of certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), should be entered as to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction as to the claims of Plaintiffs who hold instruments of RFC and RBI.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, pursuant to Rule 54(b), F.R.Civ.P., final judgment on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is hereby entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs who hold instruments of RTS, and all claims with regard to RTS instruments, of those

Plaintiffs are hereby dismissed and that there is no just reason for delay in entering final judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that partial summary judgment on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is hereby entered against Defendants and in favor of Plaintiffs who hold instruments of RBI and RFC.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this Order, and the Prior Orders involve a controlling issue of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, and that an immediate appeal from these Orders may materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the controlling issue of law, *i.e.*, whether the instruments of RBI and RFC are securities under the federal securities laws so as to invoke this Court's subject matter jurisdiction over a federal question, is hereby certified for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and the Prior Orders are amended to conform herewith.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this action is hereby stayed pending resolution of the certified question, if the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals grants the petition for permission to appeal certified question. The parties may, however, apply for a lift of the stay upon a showing that testimony of a witness may otherwise be lost because of illness, infirmity or absence from the United States.

DATED this 26th day of February, 1987.

/s/ LUTHER B. EUBANKS

Luther B. Eubanks
Senior United States District Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

/s/ KIMBERLY A. LAMBERT

L.K. Smith
Kimberly A. Lambert
BOONE, SMITH, DAVIS & HURST
500 Oneok Plaza
100 West Fifth Street
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103
(918) 587-0000

Attorneys for Defendant,
Charles Schusterman
and behalf of all Defendants except
Peat, Marwick & Mitchell

/s/ LAWRENCE H. EIGER

Lawrence H. Eiger
Howard M. Cohen
Michael B. Hyman
MUCH, SHELIST, FREED, DENENBERG,
AMENT & EIGER, P.C.
200 North LaSalle Street
Suite 2100
Chicago, Illinois 60603
(312) 346-3100

One of the attorneys on behalf of
Plaintiff

/s/ GRAYDON DEAN LUTHEY, JR.

Graydon Dean Luthey, Jr.
Roy C. Breedlove
JONES, GIVENS, GOTCHER, BOGAN &
HILBORNE
3800 First National Tower
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103
(918) 582-8200

Attorneys for Defendant
Peat, Marwick & Mitchell

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

No. 84-C-814-EU

FILED February 6, 1987

W. DAVID HOLLOWAY, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & CO., *et al.*,

Defendants.

ORDER

Defendants "request this court to enter a clarifying order stating whether, insofar as the instruments issued by RFC and RBI are concerned, the Economic Realities test was considered and applied in its Order or was held to be inapplicable, and, if inapplicable, the reasons therefor." Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Clarification of Order of December 30, 1986, at p. 3.

The court considered the commercial/investment test (called the Economic Realities test by defendants) in its Order of September 23, 1985, and directed the parties to conduct discovery on the "regulatory structure" issue. Implicit in that Order is the idea that if these debt instruments are not securities under the commercial/investment test, the case would have been dismissed at that point.

As stated in the Order of December 30, 1986, the facts are not in dispute. The instruments at issue are fixed-rate, short-term notes and "Thrift Certificates." "[T]he test is what character the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the prospect. [citations omitted.] The broad statutory

definition is preceded, however, by the statement that the terms mentioned are not to be considered securities if 'the context otherwise requires. . . .' Moreover, we are satisfied that Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud." *Marine Bank v. Weaver*, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982).

For purposes of clarification, the court finds that the instruments sued on here are securities given their context. These instruments were sold through solicitation of members of the general public. They had the characteristics of an investment rather than a commercial loan transaction because purchasers were individuals seeking a passive source of income. These instruments were very similar to certificates of deposit except they were not issued by a bank as discussed in the Order of December 30, 1986. The investors assumed the risk of the issuer's insolvency.

Considering the context of these instruments, the court finds these are investment securities rather than commercial promisary notes. *See Banowitz v. State Exchange Bank*, 600 F. Supp. 1466 (N.D. Ill. E.D. 1985).

The Clerk of Court is instructed to mail copies hereof to all counsel/parties of record.

ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1987.

/s/ LUTHER B. EUBANKS

Luther B. Eubanks
United States Senior District Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

No. 84-C-814-EU

FILED January 2, 1987

W. DAVID HOLLOWAY, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & CO., *et al.*,

Defendants.

ORDER

The court has for consideration the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. In an order filed September 23, 1985, the court converted defendants' motions to dismiss to motions for summary judgment and narrowed the issue for consideration to whether the regulatory structure surrounding Republic Trust and Savings ("RTS"), Republic Financial Corporation ("RFC") and the second Republic Bancorporation, Inc. ("RBI") was sufficient to preclude the application of securities laws to the instruments issued by those companies. Accordingly, the parties have conducted extensive discovery and provided supplemental briefs to assist the court with the initial question in this case of whether the instruments sued upon are securities.

These instruments do not fall into the statutory definitions found in 15 U.S.C. Section 77b(1) and 15 U.S.C. Section 78c(a)(10). In its order of September 23, 1985, this court recognized other tests [e.g. from *Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. W. J. Howey Co.*, 328 U.S. 293 (1946)] used to define a "security" but directed the parties to focus on the regulatory system

surrounding RBI, RTS & RFC. This approach is in accordance with *Marine Bank v. Weaver*, 455 U.S. 551 (1982). There, the Supreme Court held that a certificate of deposit issued by a federally regulated bank which is subject to the comprehensive regulations governing the banking industry is not a security. "It is unnecessary to subject issuers of bank certificates of deposit to liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under the federal banking laws." *Id.* at 559.

The Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have applied the same principle to certificates of deposit issued by Mexican banks in *Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A.*, 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984), *cert. denied*, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985) and *Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.*, 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985). Those circuit courts of appeal held that the *Marine Bank* opinion was not restricted to regulation by federal banking authorities and that it could be applied to regulation by Mexican authorities:

> We think that the Court found it significant that the issuing bank was regulated, and regulated adequately, not that it was the federal government that regulated it. Therefore, it was because repayment in full was "virtually guaranteed" and the certificate holders were "abundantly protected" that the certificates of deposit were outside the definition of "security" and the protection of the federal securities acts.

Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A., 739 F.2d 1458, 1462 (9th Cir. 1984).

FDIC insurance, or the lack thereof, is not the critical factor in determining the abundance of protection. The court in *Brockton Savings Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.*, 577 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Mass. 1983) stated, "The *Weaver* Court's reference to 'payment in full' was not to the insurance coverage but rather to the historical fact of FDIC reimbursement. . . ." *Id.* at 1285.

Mindful of the decisions in *Weaver*, *Wolf*, *Callejo*, and *Brockton*, this court addresses the extent of regulation of RBI, RTS and RFC in order to determine if these investors were abundantly protected at the time they purchased the instru-

ments at issue. A brief description of the facts is required. The first Republic Bancorporation, Inc. was a bank holding company with four subsidiaries, namely, Sunbelt Bank and Trust (formerly, Republic Bank and Trust), 1700 Sheridan Corporation, Republic Trust and Savings, and Republic Financial Corporation. In June, 1984, because of the dire financial condition of the non-banking subsidiaries, the Federal Reserve required the divestiture of Sunbelt Bank and Trust pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act ("BHCA"), 12 U.S.C. Section 1841 *et seq.* and Section 225.4(a) of the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. Section 225.4(a). On June 29, 1984, the divestiture transaction was completed. Thereafter, RBI was the parent of only RFC and RTS. Sunbelt Bank and Trust and 1700 Sheridan Corporation were subsidiaries of a new corporation, Sunbelt Bancorporation, Inc. Because RBI was not a bank holding company, the Federal Reserve had no regulatory power over it. Plaintiffs are suing on certificates of deposit (called "thrift certificates") and passbook savings accounts purchased issued by RTS and RFC and promissory notes issued by RBI.

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("FRB") and the Federal Reserve District Banks administer and enforce the provisions of the BHCA and related FRB regulations and practices. The FRB inspects bank holding companies and their non-bank subsidiaries; it has various enforcement powers, including the power to order activities of the holding company or its non-bank subsidiaries terminated. 12 U.S.C. Section 1844(c). The purpose of the FRB regulation is to preserve the financial stability of the bank. If the holding company or its non-bank subsidiaries engage in activites which endanger the financial soundness of the bank, the FRB's ultimate remedy is to order the divestiture by the bank; such was the situation and the resulting remedy for RBI. This court finds that although the FRB regulated RBI, RTS and RFC, that regulation alone did not "abundantly protect" the purchasers of those companies' debt instruments because it was aimed at protecting the bank depositors, not parties situated as plaintiffs are here.

In *Weaver*, *Wolf*, *Callejo* and *Brockton*, the plaintiffs had purchased certificates of deposit in banks. The courts in those

cases did not want to create an overlap of banking and securities regulations. This court believes no overlap is created if the debt instruments issued by the holding company and its non-bank subsidiaries are deemed securities and thus regulated by the SEC. However, the court's inquiry into the regulation of RBI, RTS and RFC does not stop with federal banking laws; it must also look to state regulation of those companies.

While the FRB treated RBI, RTS and RFC similarly, the state's regulation of them varied. RFC submitted prospectuses for its debt instruments, which are the basis of this litigation, to the Oklahoma Securities Commission ("OSC") and referred to them as securities. The OSC had the power to and did inspect the financial records of RFC. The OSC's enforcement powers included the ability to prohibit RFC from offering and/or selling its securities without adequate disclosure (by refusing to approve the prospectus under 71 O.S. Section 402) and to enjoin acts constituting a violation of the Oklahoma securities laws. 71 O.S. 406.[1] The OSC's regulation was clearly designed to protect the purchasers of RFC's debt instruments from purchasing securities without the benefit of full disclosure by the issuer.

Plaintiffs argue the OSC regulation was not designed to protect purchasers from RFC's insolvency. The *Weaver* "insolvency protection" test is an important one. As the Supreme Court stated, "The Court of Appeals failed to give appropriate weight to the important fact that the purchaser of a certificate of deposit is virtually guaranteed payment in full, whereas the holder of an ordinary long-term debt obligation assumes the risk of the borrower's insolvency." 455 U.S. 551, 558.[2] In *Wolf*, the Ninth Circuit wrote:

---

1 Both Sections 402 and 406 of Title 71 of the Oklahoma Statutes have been amended since the time RFC issued the debt instruments sued upon here.

2 The court notes the Supreme Court in *Weaver* emphasized the fact that nearly all depositors in failed banks had received payment in full, including amounts greater than the FDIC insurance limit; the *Weaver* opinion was handed down four months prior to the failure of Penn Square Bank. In all likelihood the FDIC's statistics on payment to uninsured depositors have changed since that time.

> Our decision, therefore, is compelled by the reasoning of Weaver that when a bank is sufficiently well regulated that there is virtually no risk that insolvency will prevent it from repaying the holder of one of its certificates of deposit in full, the certificate is not a security for purposes of the federal securities laws.

Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A., 739 F.2d 1458, 1463 (9th Cir. 1984). This court finds that because the OSC's regulation of RFC was designed to provide adequate disclosure to purchasers and not to protect them from the risk of insolvency, the regulation did not measure up to the abundant protection required by *Weaver*.

RTS was a state chartered trust company subject to regulation by the Oklahoma State Banking Department. One of the purposes of the Banking Department's regulatory power over trust companies is to protect people who deposit funds in them, according to Wayne Osborn, Oklahoma Deputy Banking Commissioner. Peat Marwick has provided voluminous materials to substantiate the fact the Oklahoma State Banking Department examined RTS. This court is satisfied by the evidence presented that RTS was examined by the Oklahoma Banking Department in a manner very similar to the examination of banks and that the regulation was designed to protect purchasers of thrift certificates and passbook savings accounts from insolvency of RTS. Accordingly, the plaintiffs suing on instruments issued by RTS were abundantly protected by the Oklahoma Banking Department's regulation. No amount of regulation can prevent insolvency, but at least the regulation must be designed to try to prevent insolvency; such was the situation for RTS.

Apparently, no state agency had authority to or did regulate RBI. Therefore, the purchasers of RBI notes were not abundantly protected by a comprehensive regulatory structure.

In summary, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; the regulatory structure issue is purely a matter of law. After studying the pertinent cases, the briefs and the accompanying documentary evidence and hearing the oral arguments of counsel, the court concludes on the regulatory structure issue, the purchasers of RBI notes and RFC thrift certificates and pass-

book savings accounts were not abundantly protected as is required by *Marine Bank v. Weaver*; purchasers of RTS thrift certificates and passbook savings accounts were abundantly protected. Accordingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to RTS instruments and denied as to RBI's and RFC's instruments; plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is granted as to RBI's and RFC's instruments and denied as to RTS's. Counsel will promptly settle decree.

The Clerk of Court is instructed to mail copies hereof to all counsel/parties of record.

ORDERED this 30th day of December, 1986.

/s/ LUTHER B. EUBANKS

Luther B. Eubanks
Senior United States District Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

No. 84-C-814-EU

FILED September 23, 1985

W. DAVID HOLLOWAY, M.D., *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & CO., a partnership, *et al.*,

Defendants.

ORDER

The Court has for consideration the Motion of Defendants to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6). Some of the Defendants' motions also seek, in the alternative, summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(b).

In their Amended Complaint Plaintiffs seek damages under the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, and for pendent relief based on common law fraud. Plaintiffs allege that they "are all depositors and holders of certificates, notes and other evidences of indebtedness of Republic Trust & Savings [RTS], an Oklahoma Trust, Republic Financial Corporation [RFC], an Oklahoma corporation and the second Republic Bancorporation, Inc. [RBI], an Oklahoma corporation"; that Plaintiffs' class action is brought "on behalf of themselves and all depositors and holders of [said] certificates, notes and other evidences of indebtedness"; that "[t]he named Defendants consist of the auditor, officers and members of the Board of Directors of the [bankrupt] Republic Companies and some of the non-bankrupt

Republic Companies";[1] that "Defendants have committed the wrongful acts complained of in the Northern District of Oklahoma, specifically in the City of Tulsa"; that each Defendant "is sued individually and as a co-conspirator and the liability of each arises from the fact that each has either engaged or is engaging in all or part of the unlawful acts as charged."

Plaintiffs further allege that RFC, RTS and RBI "were engaged in the offering and sale of securities to the public by the offering of 'six month money market thrift certificates', 'negotiable rate term thrift certificates', 'savings trust certificates', 'savings plans', promissory notes, savings accounts and were receiving deposits of money, forming joint funds for the purpose of making loans, and issuing forms of evidence of indebtedness which constituted the offering and sale of security as defined and interpreted by 15 U.S.C.S. § 77(b) and 15 U.S.C.S. § 78(c)"; that "[t]he securities offered and sold by [RFC, RTS and RBI] were not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as required by Section 5 of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C. § 77e(c)) and, therefore, were offered and sold by Defendants in violation of the Securities Acts"; that "Wesley R. McKinney [McKinney] and each of his Republic Companies, boards of directors, officers, employees and accountants, participated in a device, scheme and artifice to defraud and obtain money and property by means of untrue statements of material facts and omissions to state material facts"; that "said parties did engage in transactions, practices and courses of business which operated and would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the Plaintiffs, in the offering and sale of securities by the use of various means, and by the use of instruments of transportation and communication in interstate commerce, and by the use of the mails, both directly and indirectly"; that such communications included publications in the Tulsa World, Tulsa Tribune

1 RTS, RFC and RBI are sometimes referred to in the Amended Complaint as "bankrupt Republic Companies." The "non-bankrupt Republic Companies" are the Defendants Sunbelt Bank & Trust Company, formerly Republic Bank & Trust Co., a State Bank Association, and Republic Bancorporation, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation a/k/a Sunbelt Bancorporation, Inc.

and The Daily Oklahoma, and long distance intra and interstate telephone communications.

With respect to the Defendant, Peat, Marwick Mitchell & Co., Plaintiffs allege that it was employed by McKinney, individually, and as Chairman of the Board of Directors, Chief Executive Officer and controlling stockholder of the various Republic Companies during the year of 1982, "for the purpose of performing accounting and auditing services on behalf of [McKinney] and his Republic Companies"; that Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. "made public said contract of employment with the notification to the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Oklahoma Securities Commission and the Oklahoma Banking Commission"; that it knew the Republic Companies were engaged in the offering and sale of the Securities described above to the public, and knew that the Republic Companies "were receiving deposits of money, forming joint funds for the purpose of making loans, and issuing forms of evidence of indebtedness"; that in accepting said employment, "Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., accepted the applicable common law, and federal statutory duties, . . . dealing with the auditing of bank holding companies"; that it "owed a duty not only to [McKinney] and his Republic Companies, but also to each and every depositor, certificate and note holder, and holder of evidence of indebtedness of said Republic Companies."

Plaintiffs further allege that on the 27th day of January, 1984, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. "issued an unqualified audit report letter" with respect to each of the Republic Companies, except the second Republic Bancorporation, Inc., attaching to the letters "balance sheets, statements of income, statements of changes in shareholders' equity, statements of changes in financial position with accompanying notes to financial statement"; that the letters stated, *inter alia*, that "[i]n [its] opinion, the financial statements . . . present fairly the financial position of" each of the Republic Companies "at December 31, 1983 and 1982 and the results of [the companies] operations and the changes in [the companies] financial position for the years then ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principals applied on a consistent basis";

that the audit report letters of January 27, 1984 "continued in full force and effect until August 24, 1984, at which time the defendant, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. prepared letters to the Boards of Directors of the Republic Companies, the Federal Reserve Bank, the Oklahoma State Banking Department and the Oklahoma Securities Commission which stated:

> 'Accordingly, we advise you that our auditor's reports dated January 27, 1984, on the aforementioned financial statements should no longer be relied upon and such reports should not be associated with the financial statements referred to therein. Further, we advise you that we withdraw our consent dated May 25, 1984 to the inclusion of our auditor's report in the prospectus of Republic Financial Corporation dated March 31, 1984. We advise you to notify all persons who are known to be relying on or who are likely to rely on such financial statements and our auditor's reports thereon that such financial statements and reports should no longer be relied upon.' "

Plaintiffs further allege that Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. "did not notify, or attempt to notify, from the 27th day of January, 1984 to the 24th day of August, 1984, or thereafter, . . . any of the holders of securities of said Republic Companies of the true and correct financial condition of said Republic Companies"; that it "had a duty to notify and its failure to do so constituted a concealment of the true facts"; that "such concealment was done with the conscious intent to aid and abet the bankrupt Republic Companies in [their] fraud and violation of the Securities Laws of the United States"; that on September 24, 1984 the bankrupt Republic Companies closed their doors to the Plaintiffs and refused to permit withdrawal of funds from the bankrupt companies.

Plaintiffs further allege that the wording of the August 24, 1984 audit report letters "indicate: 1. that the holders of the securities of the Republic Companies were relying upon PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & CO.'S . . . auditors' reports; and 2. that under the applicable auditing standards, that the facts resulting in the withdrawal of said auditors' reports existed on or before December 31, 1983." Plaintiffs further allege that

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. breached statutory and common law duties by failing to "follow generally accepted auditing standards in its audits of the Republic Companies . . . penetrate into the internal affairs of each of the Republic Companies to determine their true and correct financial condition . . . identify and promptly report insider and related party loans of the Republic Companies . . . unauthorized cash and security removals from the Republic Companies . . . improperly valued assets of the Republic Companies . . . the insolvent condition of each of the Republic Companies as soon as it was discovered . . . non-performing and delinquent loans of the Republic Companies . . . [and] the deficiencies of the internal control systems of each of the Republic Companies. Plaintiffs further allege that Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. failed to "make a truly independent audit of the assets and liabilities of each of the Republic Companies," and failed to "use adequately trained personnel for the audits of the Republic Companies."

Plaintiffs further allege that the breach of said duties by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. "caused each of the named plaintiffs for themselves and as representative parties of a class, to be damaged by unknowingly depositing funds and property in the hands of the bankrupt Republic Companies during the period the . . . auditors reports were in effect, to their detriment and loss, which loss would not have occurred had said depositors, certificate and note holders, . . . known the true financial and insolvent condition of said companies."

With respect to the Defendant Sunbelt Bank & Trust Company (Sunbelt), formerly Republic Bank & Trust Co., a State Bank Association, Plaintiffs allege that it "and its officers and directors, knowingly and willfully operated said bank in conjunction with the holding companies, the first and second Republic Bancorporation, Inc., [RTS] and [RFC] in a concerted and willful designing manner that deceived Plaintiffs to purchase securities of bankrupt [Republic Companies]"; that "[s]ome of the acts of the Defendant directors of [Sunbelt] and [Sunbelt] itself was the use of [its] officers and staff at [its] offices . . . to counsel Plaintiffs on the purchase of securities from the [bankrupt Republic Companies]; [the] transfer of per-

sonnel between various Republic Companies and encouragement of customers/plaintiffs to follow personnel and to do business with various entities; false and misleading advertisement of Republic Companies as one cohesive group with total assets of in excess of $190,000,000.00 . . . and use of exact same logos among all Companies and deceptively similar names"; that "[Sunbelt] and its directors during 1983 through at least August, 1984, manipulated the loan portfolio of each of the Republic Companies, bankrupt and non-bankrupt, by moving good loans to [Sunbelt], and moving non-performing loans to the now bankrupt Republic Companies"; that "[a]ll of said acts were accomplished through the use of the United States mail, long distance telecommunications, and solicitation of Oklahoma, Texas and Arizona residents, as well as residents of other states"; that "[a]ll of said acts were relied on by Plaintiffs in purchasing securities from [bankrupt Republic Companies]" and caused Plaintiffs damages.

Plaintiffs further allege that "[o]n or about June 29, 1984, [Sunbelt] and its directors attempted to secretly divest itself from the other Republic Companies, except the first Republic Bancorporation, Inc."; that "[a]s early as December, 1983, [Sunbelt] filed applications for divestiture determination . . . which was denied by the Federal Reserve Board in June, 1984"; that "[b]ecause of the secret and covert action by [Sunbelt] and its directors to separate from Republic Companies Plaintiffs had no indication or notice of the breakup or attempted breakup of the '190 million dollar' family of Republic Companies"; that "[Sunbelt] and its directors and officers knew of the impending financial collapse of Republic Companies at the time of the attempted divestiture," and that "[t]hese omissions of such divestiture disclosure was a material fact to Plaintiffs in their decision to continue to purchase and hold securities of Republic Companies that filed bankruptcy less than three months after the attempted divestiture."

Plaintiffs further allege that "[e]ach of the defendants, working separately and in concert with each other, did conspire to defraud the Plaintiffs . . . using the tool of controlling ownership and controlling management of the Republic Companies"; that McKinney, "individually, and through the vehicle of the

McKinney Family Trusts which McKinney had absolute control over, dominated and controlled RBI of Oklahoma, Inc., which in turn owned [RBI] which in turn owned [RFC], [RTS] . . . and controlling interests in [Sunbelt]"; that "McKinney, as a result of dominance and control . . . also controlled the appointment and serving of all members of the Board of Directors, all officer and employees of the Republic Companies, and the selection, direction and activities of the auditing firm of Peat, Marwick & Mitchell Co."; that "McKinney had interlocking members of the Board of Directors, some of which were Defendants, Anderson, Degen, Wilder, Ozwalt, Akin, Ramsey and Prichard, all of which were on the Board of Directors of the first [RBI], [Sunbelt], [RFC], and [RTS]"; that "[t]o effectuate the conspiracy to defraud, the Republic Companies issued securities as evidence of the transactions"; that "[a]fter receipt of funds, the Republic Companies would assemble the funds into common pools, and would lend the funds, both with and without security"; that "[t]he Defendants would indiscriminately move assets and liabilities between the various Republic Companies"; that "at the time of the . . . fraudulent activities, the Defendants moved, transferred and shifted assets knowing, or should have known, that no repayment would be made, or that there was little likelihood of repayment"; that "a direct and active participant in the conspiracy to defraud was the accounting and auditing firm of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., in that annually, and on numerous other occasions [it] did prepare and disseminate a consolidated auditing report, reporting all the Republic Companies as a unit, with accompanying separate audit reports for each company of the Republic family";[2] that "[a]ll of the Defendants acting individually and in concert with one another, did directly and indirectly make false, fraudulent and material misrepresentations to the Plaintiffs, as a class of the financial condition of the bankrupt companies through the preparation, auditing and dissemination of statements pertaining to the financial condition of the bankrupt Republic Companies, knowing at the time that said statements were false and/or made recklessly without any knowledge of

2 The alleged acts and actions of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. are described above.

their truthfulness and as a positive assertion"; that "each of the Defendants made such material misrepresentations with the intention that the Plaintiffs as depositors, certificate and note holders of the bankrupt Republic Companies, would act upon said representation, and [Plaintiffs] did in fact act and rely upon said audited financial statements and representations by said Plaintiffs delivering funds to said bankrupt Republic Companies and receiving therefrom certain evidence of indebtedness which now have little to no value." Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages in the sum of $72,200,000.00 plus interest and punitive damages of $722,000,000.00.

MOTION OF DEFENDANT PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & CO. TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(1)

In support of its Motion to Dismiss, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. contend the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, in that Plaintiffs Amended Complaint fails to allege jurisdictional facts identifying a security based on the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, as amended; that in the alternative, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which the Court can grant relief against Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.; that Plaintiffs' fail to allege all of the elements required in either a security fraud or common law fraud action; that the elements which Plaintiffs do mention are not alleged with the specificity required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b); that in particular, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts showing any misstatements or omissions of material facts, scienter, reliance and damages; that Plaintiffs fail to allege the elements required in a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 77k, and that Plaintiffs also fail to allege an actionable private claim against Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 77q.

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. further assert that none of the banking instruments issued by the bankrupt Republic Companies are securities under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or the Securities Act of 1933; that none of the subject instruments meet the test announced by the Supreme Court in *SEC v. Howey Co.*, 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) which "test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money and a common enter-

prise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." (Brief of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. filed January 28, 1985 at 10).

With respect to the instruments issued by RTS, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. assert that "RTS is a depository institution regulated by the Oklahoma Department of Banking"; that "[i]t operates as a stock company"; that "[i]n exchange for the currency deposits it received, it gave the traditional banking-type instruments of passbook savings accounts and fixed-rate, fixed-term certificates of deposit"; that "[i]t used the currency deposits to make loans"; that "[t]he contractual obligation to return the currency deposited, along with the contracted amount of interest, was independent of the profitability of the loans RTS made," and that "Plaintiffs do not allege facts to the contrary." (*Id.* at 11-12).

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. further contend that "[t]hree courts which have examined passbook savings accounts have held that they are not securities within the definition of the 1934 Act."[3] (citing *Hamblett v. Board of Savings & Loan Associations of the State of Mississippi*, 472 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Miss. 1979), *Hendrickson v. Buchbinder*, 465 F. Supp. 1250 (S.D. Fla. 1979)), and *Burrus, Cootes & Burrus v. MacKethan* 537 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1976)). Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. notes that "[t]he reasoning of [*Burrus*] remains persuasive, although it was later withdrawn as moot"; that "[a]fter the withdrawal of the opinion numerous courts cited the original opinion with approval." (*Id.* at 16). (citing *Canadian Imperial Bank v. Fingland*, 615 F.2d 465, 468 n. 10 (7th Cir. 1980); *Hendrickson*, *supra* and *Hamblett*, *supra*).

With respect to the RTS certificates of deposit, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. contend that "[a]s in the case of the passbook savings account, the certificates of deposit, labeled Six Month Money Market Thrift Certificates and Negotiable

---

3 The Supreme Court has "consistently held that the definition of 'security' in the 1934 Act is essentially the same as the definition of 'security' in § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)." *Marine Bank v. Weaver*, 455 U.S. 551, 556, n. 3 (1982) (citing *United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman*, 421 U.S. 837, 847, n. 12 (1975)).

Rate Term Thrift Certificates, given by RTS are not securities under the 1933 and 1934 Acts''; that "plaintiffs do not explain the terms, conditions or circumstances of the RTS certificates of deposit''; that "[t]he only exhibits attached to the complaint establish the traditional banking-type nature of the RTS certificates of deposit and show that those certificates of deposit are not securities''; that "[n]umerous courts, including the Supreme Court, have held that the allegation of a certificate of deposit, without more, does not constitute a security and therefore does not give a federal court jurisdiction in a securities action." (citing *Marine Bank v. Weaver*, *supra*; *Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Fingland*, *supra*; *Bellah v. First National Bank of Hereford*, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974); *Brockton Savings Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.*, 577 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Mass. 1983)). (*Id.* at 17-21).

With respect to RFC, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. urge that for the same reasons asserted in connection with RTS, the passbook savings accounts and certificates of deposit issued by RFC "are not securities as defined by federal law." (*Id.* at 22-23).

As to RBI, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. state that "[t]he only facts stated by the Plaintiffs indicated that several weeks after Peat, Marwick resigned as auditors, plaintiff, Cal Acree received a 91-day note for $84,319.73 with interest at the rate of 11.875% per annum''; that "Peat, Marwick was no longer auditor at the time of the issuance of the note in question''; that "Peat, Marwick had also informed the Republic Companies that they should tell all persons whom the companies believed might be relying on the auditor reports and the financial statements that reliance on those documents was no longer appropriate''; that "15 U.S.C. Section 78(c)(10) excludes the 91-day note from the definition of a security," which "section provides in part: 'The term security . . . shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding 9 months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof, the maturity of which is likewise limited.' " (*Id.* at 23-24).

Additionally, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. asserts that "the 91-day note is not a security for purposes of the 1933

Act"; that "[t]he reasoning which excludes passbooks and certificates of deposit from the definition of a security likewise excludes this 91-day note from that definition." (*Id.* at 24).

In response, Plaintiffs contend that under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act "the term 'security' means any note, . . ."; that under the 1933 Act "the term 'security' means any . . . evidence of indebtedness," and that instruments issued by the bankrupt Republic Companies (Exhibits 1 through 28) "may be categorized as 'evidence of indebtedness' . . . [and] may also be categorized as 'notes' " under the Federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. (Plaintiffs' responsive brief filed February 28, 1985 at 2-3).

Plaintiffs further assert that "Defendants err in insisting that the securities Plaintiffs purchased must meet the elements of 'investment contract', as defined by the *Howey* test"; that in *United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman*, 421 U.S. 837, 847, n. 12 (1975), the Court held that Congress . . . sought to define the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within that definition the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a 'security'." (*Id.* at 3-4). Plaintiffs further note that in *Weaver* the "court indicates that a certificate of deposit is within the definition of the Securities Acts unless the context otherwise requires"; that "[t]he Court makes an exception in *Weaver* for a certificate of deposit issued by a *bank* [emphasis in original]"; that "[a]lthough RTS and RFC allied themselves as closely as possible with [Sunbelt], . . . they [and RBI] were not banks"; that "RBI, RTS and RFC were not subject to the comprehensive federal regulation the *Weaver* court found so important in reaching its conclusions." (*Id.* at 5). Plaintiffs quote the following language from *Weaver*:

> In our view, . . . there is an important difference between a bank certificate of deposit and other long-term debt obligations. This certificate of deposit was issued by a federally regulated bank which is subject to the comprehensive set of regulations governing the banking industry. [footnote omitted] Deposits in federally regulated banks are protected by the reserve, reporting, and inspection require-

> ments of the federal banking laws; advertising relating to the interest paid on deposits is also regulated. In addition, deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Since its formation in 1933, nearly all depositors in failing banks insured by the FDIC have received payment in full, even payment for the portions of their deposits above the amount insured.

455 U.S. 557, 558. (*Id.* at 5). Plaintiffs further note that "[f]ederal regulation also played a significant role in . . . *International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v. Daniel*, 439 U.S. 551 . . . (1979) . . . [where] [t]he court decided that [a non-contributory, compulsory] pension plan was not a security," holding that "[t]he existence of this comprehensive legislation [ERISA] governing the use and terms of employee pension plans severely undercuts all arguments for extending the Securities Acts to non-contributory, compulsory pension plans." 439 U.S. 569. The Court in *Daniel* further noted:

> Congress believed that it was filling a regulatory void when it enacted ERISA, a belief which the SEC actively encouraged. Not only is the extension of the Securities Acts by the court below unsupported by the language and history of those Acts, but in light of ERISA, it serves no general purpose. Whatever benefits employees might derive from the effect of the Securities Acts are now provided in more definite form through ERISA.

439 U.S. 569, 570. (*Id.* 5-6).

Plaintiffs urge that "[u]nderlying both the *Weaver* and *Daniel* decisions is the fact that the plaintiffs in those cases were protected by comprehensive and effective federal legislation other than the Securities laws"; that "Plaintiffs in this case have no effective regulatory protection other than the Securities laws, nor do they have the protection provided by insurance"; that "[r]egulation of RBI, RTS and RFC was so fragmented amongst the various state regulatory agencies that effective regulation of the whole as envisioned by the U. S. Supreme Court was impossible"; and that "[t]he bankruptcy filings of RBI, RTS, and RFC reinforce this point." (*Id.* at 6-7).

Plaintiffs further contend that the *Howey* test is inapplicable with respect to the instruments issued by the bankrupt Republic Companies; that "[i]n *Weaver*, the court mentions the *Howey* test but fails to use the elements thereof in reaching this decision"; that the post-*Weaver* cases, *Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico*, 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984) and *Hunssinger v. Rockford Business Credits, Inc.*, 745 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1984) also hold that the *Howey* test is not applicable as to certain debt instruments, and should not be applied with respect to the debt instruments issued by the bankrupt Republic Companies. (*Id.* at 7-12)

Plaintiffs further rely on *Banowitz v. State Exchange Bank*, 600 F. Supp. 1466 (N.D.Ill.E.D. 1985) where "officers and employees of the [State] Bank sold to the individual plaintiffs investment notes issued by SEFCO . . . an Indiana corporation incorporated . . . by certain owners of the Bank." *Id.* at 1468. "[T]he Bank shared common officers and directors . . . [and] SEFCO's business was conducted by employees of the Bank." *Ibid.* The Plaintiffs alleged that:

> . . . the bank caused SEFCO to take numerous loans to various officers and directors and related persons or businesses, without adequate documentation or collateral and at lower than market interest rates; the Bank caused SEFCO to pay various personal expenses of . . . Bank/SEFCO officers and directors; the Bank authorized the transfer of unduly risky or defaulted loans from the Bank to SEFCO; . . . officer and director defendants either authorized, permitted, or recklessly disregarded the above actions.
>
> . . .
>
> . . . the Amended Complaint . . . alleges that defendants violated Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Defendants contend that . . . the SEFCO investment notes are not "securities" within the meaning of the 1934 Act. This argument is based upon the exception, contained only in the 1934 Act, to the definition of a "security": "The term 'security' . . . shall not include . . . any note . . . which has a maturity at the

time of issuance of not exceeding nine months. . . ." [footnote omitted]. Because plaintiffs' notes matured in less than nine months, [footnote omitted] defendants claim that there can be no cause of action under Rule 10b-5.

The real issue here is whether the notes in this case are "commercial promissory notes" or "investment securities." In *Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.*, 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S.Ct. 443, 34 L.Ed.2d 302 (1972), the Seventh Circuit held that short term notes with maturities of less than nine months were "securities" protected by Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. The Seventh Circuit explained the meaning of the statutory exception as follows:

> . . . when Congress spoke of notes with a maturity not exceeding nine months, it meant commercial paper, not investment securities. When a prospective borrower approaches a bank for a loan and gives his note in consideration for it, the bank has purchased commercial paper. But a person who seeks to invest his money and receives a note in return for it has not purchased commercial paper in the usual sense. He has purchased a security investment.

Id. at 1080. The court further implied that where the purchasers of notes are individual members of the public, an inference is raised that the notes are investment securities. *Id.* at 1080 n. 18. . . . "The ultimate question is whether the plaintiffs are simply borrowers in a commercial transaction who are not protected by the 1934 Act or investors in a securities transaction who are protected."

. . .

. . . Both the analysis and the holding of the Supreme Court in *Marine Bank* refute the implication that a note with a maturity of less than nine months can in no circumstances be a "security" within the 1934 Act. Thus, *Marine Bank v. Weaver* supports the Seventh Circuit's focus on

the context of the transaction rather than on the literal meaning of the statutory words. [footnote omitted]

In this case, plaintiffs' allegations clearly demonstrate that plaintiffs did not borrow money from SEFCO in return for a commercial promissory note, but rather that they gave their money to the finance company in return for investment securities. [footnote omitted] This court therefore holds that the SEFCO investment notes purchased by plaintiffs are "securities" within the meaning of the 1934 Act and the protection of Rule 10b-5.

In discussing the different tests used by the courts to determine whether a particular debt instrument is a "security" under the 1933 and 1934 Federal Acts, the court in *Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico*, *supra*, stated:

The parties cite to us numerous "tests" used by this Court and others to define a "security" in other cases, *e.g.*, the "economic realities" test, *Securities & Exchange Commission v. W. J. Howey Co.*, 1946, 328 U.S. 293, 66 S. Ct. 1100, 90 L.Ed. 1244, and *United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman*, 1975, 421 U.S. 837, 95 S. Ct. 2051, 44 L.Ed.2d 621, the "risk capital" test, *Great Western Bank & Trust v. Katz*, 9 Cir., 1976, 532 F.2d 1252, *see Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth*, 9 Cir., 1984, 731 F.2d 1348, 1352; and the "commercial/investment" test, *Bellah v. First National Bank of Hereford*, 5 Cir., 1974, 495 F.2d 1109.

However, when the Supreme Court, in *Marine Bank v. Weaver* has so recently applied the definition to facts very similar to those in the case before us, we are bound by its reasoning there, to the exclusion of criteria articulated in other contexts.

. . . .

Plaintiffs in *Weaver* held a $50,000, six-year certificate of deposit issued by a federally regulated Pennsylvania bank. The certificate paid 7-1/2% interest although the bank could charge an interest penalty upon early withdrawal of the principal. The holders had pledged the cer-

tificate as security for a bank loan to a packing company. After the packing company failed and the bank prepared to claim the certificate of deposit, the holders sued, alleging, *inter alia*, that the bank had violated the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).

On appeal from the Third Circuit, the Court held that the certificate of deposit was not a security.

. . . .

The Court observed that while the holder of an ordinary long-term debt "assumes the risk of the borrower's insolvency," government banking regulations "virtually guaranteed" that the holder of a Marine Bank certificate of deposit would be repaid in full. *Ibid.* It concluded,

> The definition of "security" in the 1934 Act provides that an instrument which seems to fall within the broad sweep of the Act is not to be considered a security if the context otherwise requires. It is unnecessary to subject issuers of bank certificates of deposit to liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under the federal banking laws. We therefore hold that the certificate of deposit purchased by the Weavers is not a security.

Id. at 558-559, 102 S. Ct. at 1225. The Court added, however, "It does not follow that a certificate of deposit . . . invariably falls outside the definition of a 'security' as defined by the federal statutes. Each transaction must be analyzed and evaluated on the basis of the content of the instruments in question, the purposes intended to be served, and the factual setting as a whole." *Id.* at 560, n. 11, 102 S. Ct. at 1225 n. 11.

In its analysis of *Weaver*, the district court thought it crucial that Marine Bank was regulated by the United States government and held that because *federal* banking laws do not regulate Banamex, *Weaver* did not control. We do not read *Weaver* so narrowly. The Court referred there to "federally regulated bank" and "federal banking laws" because the case arose in that context. We think that

the Court found it significant that the issuing bank was regulated and regulated adequately, not that it was the federal government that regulated it. Therefore, it was because repayment in full was "virtually guaranteed" and the certificate holders were "abundantly protected" that the certificates of deposit were outside the definition of "security" and the protection of the federal securities acts.

. . . .

Our decision, therefore, is compelled by the reasoning of *Weaver* that when a bank is sufficiently well regulated that there is virtually no risk that insolvency will prevent it from repaying the holder of one of its certificates of deposit in full, the certificate is not a security for purposes of the federal securities laws.

There remains the matter of how such regulation is to be proved. The Supreme Court in *Weaver* was able to take judicial notice of the breadth and adequacy of the federal regulations protecting the holder of a certificate of deposit issued by Marine Bank. In a situation such as the case before us, where a foreign government's regulatory structure is implicated, the trial court must hear evidence on the degree of protection that structure offers a depositor against insolvency. Because the foreign bank in this situation has better access to such evidence than the certificate holder, the bank shall bear the burden of proving such regulation, as an affirmative defense to a securities law charge. If the adequacy of the regulatory structure is proved, a certificate of deposit issued in a customary banking transaction is not, under *Weaver*, a security.

739 F.2d at 1460-1463.

In *Wolf* the court noted that "[t]he Supreme Court in *Weaver* was able to take judicial notice of the breadth and adequacy of the federal regulations protecting the holder of a certificate of deposit issued by Marine Bank," and that "[i]n the case before [it], it was conceded that the Mexican government's regulation of Banamex provides its certificate holders the same degree of protection against insolvency as does the federal system in this country." 739 F.2d at 1463. The Court further sug-

gested that when there is a factual issue with respect to the particular "government's regulatory structure" in regard to the protection offered the certificate holders, "the trial court must hear evidence on the degree of protection that structure offers a depositor against insolvency." *Ibid.*

In their responsive brief Plaintiffs state that "Plaintiffs in this case have no effective regulatory protection other than the securities laws, nor do they have the protection provided by insurance," and that "[r]egulation of [RBI], RTS, and RFC was so fragmented amongst the various state regulatory agencies that effective regulation of the whole as envisioned by the U. S. Supreme Court was impossible." (Plaintiffs' responsive brief filed February 28, 1985 at 6-7). On the other hand, Defendants assert that "RFC, RBI and RTS were all regulated and examined by governmental entities . . . and fixed rates were paid"; that "RBI, RTS and RFC were regulated and examined by the Federal Reserve"; that RTS and RFC were additionally regulated and examined by the agencies of the State of Oklahoma"; and "[i]n RTS' case, the agency was the Oklahoma Department of Banking." (Reply brief of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. filed April 11, 1985 at 7).

It is the view of this Court that because of the need to consider evidence on the "regulatory structure" issue with respect to the RBI, RTS and RFC debt instruments, the motions to dismiss of those defendants who do not, in the alternative, seek summary judgment, should be converted to motions for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.

Therefore, the parties are granted until November 1, 1985 to complete discovery on the "regulatory structure" issue. Plaintiffs will file a supplementary brief by November 15, 1985 and the Defendants will file responses to Plaintiffs' supplemental brief by November 29, 1985.

MOTIONS OF DEFENDANTS TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. RULE 12(b)(6) FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM FOR EITHER SECURITIES FRAUD OR COMMON LAW FRAUD

In support of its Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), Defendant Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., contends that "Plaintiffs' attempt to state a claim for both federal securities fraud and common law fraud fails for two reasons"; that "[i]nitially, plaintiffs do not allege, even in conclusory form, all the elements necessary to properly plead fraud"; and "[a]dditionally, the few elements which plaintiffs do allege are not stated with the particularly required by Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(b)." (Brief of Defendant Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. filed January 28, 1985 at 25).

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. further contend that "plaintiffs have failed to allege several of the elements of fraud . . . fail to allege a misstatement or omission of any material fact . . . do not . . . identify the auditing standards not followed, the manner in which those standards were not followed or the resulting impact, if any, on the financial statements and auditor reports . . . do not identify any fact represented by Peat, Marwick as material . . . do not identify any fact which they claim Peat, Marwick misrepresented . . . do not allege that the purported errors or omissions of Peat, Marwick had any material effect on the auditor opinions which Peat, Marwick issued . . . do not identify what Peat, Marwick would have discovered if Peat, Marwick had conducted the audit in the manner plaintiffs desired, nor do plaintiffs state what effect, if any, those alleged audit failures of Peat, Marwick had on the financial statements or the auditor reports . . . fail to identify how Peat, Marwick used unqualified personnel and what effect, if any that use had on the auditor reports . . . although claiming the financial statements were inaccurate, fail to allege the facts showing what parts contained inaccuracies, the specific contents alleged to be inaccurate and the materiality of inaccuracies . . . fail to adequately allege scienter . . . fail to state facts indicating reliance . . . fail to allege actual damages caused by Peat, Marwick . . . [and] [i]n addition to their failure to allege

federal securities fraud, the plaintiffs have not alleged with requisite specificity Oklahoma common law fraud." (Brief of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. filed January 28, 1985 at 28-34).

Sunbelt Bank & Trust Company, Sunbelt Bancorporation, Inc., RBI of Oklahoma, Inc., and the individual defendants also complain about the lack of specificity. Sunbelt contends that "Plaintiffs' blanket assertions, unsupported by any specifics of alleged fraudulent activity . . . fails to meet the threshold requirements of Rule 9(b)"; that "[t]here is absolutely no indication as to which individual defendant is accused of which acts of alleged fraud and conspiracy," and that although "Plaintiffs allege various misrepresentations, [t]hey do not allege what statements were made, how they were made, where they were made, to whom they were made, when they were made, who made them, or what was misleading about them." (Sunbelt's Brief filed January 28, 1985 at 14). Sunbelt also contends that Plaintiffs complaint is insufficient as to its "Section 12 claims" in that "Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint Does Not Allege that Sunbelt Bank was a 'Seller' of Securities . . . Contains No Offer to Tender Securities . . . Fails to Set Forth Facts Demonstrating Compliance with the Applicable Statutes of Limitation," and that "There is No Section 17 Private Right of Action." (*Id.* at [ii]).

Because the contentions of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. and Sunbelt are typical of those made by the other Defendants in their various motions to dismiss, the Court will not set forth the contentions of each of the remaining Defendants.

The Defendants, Taylor, Born, Sullivan, and Allred have filed affidavits in support of their respective motions to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. No counter affidavits have been filed by Plaintiffs in response to those Defendants' affidavits.

Also, a number of the Defendants seek in the alternative to their motions to dismiss, an order of the Court requiring the Plaintiffs to file a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e).

Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act makes it unlawful "[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in

contravention of such rules and regulations as the commission may prescribe . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).

Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, promulgated pursuant to Section 10(b) provides:

> It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility or any national securities exchange
>
> (1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
>
> (2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
>
> (3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
>
> in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

The misrepresentations or omissions must be material. *Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States*, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54, 92 S. Ct. 1456, 31 L.Ed. 2d 741 (1972). Materiality is an element of common law fraud that is required by the express language of Rule 10b-5(2). In *Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.*, 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), *cert. denied*, 404 U.S. 918, 92 S. Ct. 546, 30 L.Ed. 2d 558 (1971), *rehearing denied*, 405 U.S. 918, 92 S. Ct. 943, 30 L.Ed. 2d 778 (1972), the Court held that "[m]isrepresented or omitted facts become material, hence actionable under 10b-5 when, considering the complaining parties as reasonable investors, the disclosure of the undisclosed facts or candid revelation of misleading facts would affect their trading judgment. . ." In the *Affiliated Ute* case, *supra*, at 153-54, the Supreme Court said: "Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable

investor might have considered them important in the making of his decision."

A defendant must have acted with some form of scienter beyond mere negligence. In *Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder*, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S. Ct. 1374, 47 L.Ed. 2d, 668 (1976), the Court defined scienter as "[a] mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." 425 U.S. 194, Footnote 12. In *Aaron v. SEC*, 446 U.S. 680, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 64 L.Ed. 2d 611 (1980), the Supreme Court expressly did not "address the question, reserved in Hochfelder, . . . whether, under some circumstances, scienter may also include reckless behavior." *Id.* at 686 n. 5. See also *Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean*, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981). In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. *Hochfelder*, *supra*, at 193-94 n.12.

In *Hackbart v. Holmes*, 675 F.2d 1114, 117-18 (10th Cir. 1982), the Court stated:

> At this time we expressly hold that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement. We do so for the same reasons given by the other circuits: first, because the Securities Acts are to be broadly construed to achieve their remedial goals, *Mansbach*, 598 F.2d at 1024 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)); second, because requiring the Plaintiff to show intent would be unduly burdensome, *Thompson*, 636 F.2d at 961 n.32; *Mansbach*, 598 F.2d at 1025; *Rolf*, 570 F.2d at 47; and third, because the Securities Acts were intended to proscribe actions akin to common law fraud, *see Hochfelder*, 425 U.S. at 212 n.32 (reviewing legislative history and finding that the SEC believed the rule would proscribe fraudulent behavior), and reckless behavior satisfies the scienter requirement of common-law fraud, *Mansbach*, 598 F.2d at 1024. For purposes or applying Rule 10b-5, the best definition of reckless behavior is conduct that is "an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the Defendant or is so obvious that

> the actor must have been aware of it." *Sundstrand Corp.*, 553 F.2d at 1045 (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976).

In *Franke v. Midwestern Okl. Dev. Authority*, 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okl. 1976), *vacated on other grounds*, *Cronin v. Midwestern Okl. Dev. Authority*, 619 F.2d 856 (1980), the trial court stated:

> In the context of an omissions case, reckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even unexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the Defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.

Accord, *e.g.*, *McLean v. Alexander*, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3rd Cir. 1979); *Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben*, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir. 1979); *Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp.*, *supra*, 553 F.2d 1033; *Securities & Exchange Com'n v. Southwest Coal*, 624 F.2d 1312, 1321 n.17 (5th Cir. 1980).

There must be a causal connection between the claimed violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and the injuries allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs. *Affiliated Ute*, *supra*, 406 U.S. at 154.

In *Titan Groups, Inc. v. Gaggen*, 513 F.2d 234, 238 (2nd Cir. 1975), *cert. denied*, 423 U.S. 840, the Court said "[t]he parallel elements of materiality and reliance both serve to restrict the potentially limitless thrust of Rule 10b-5 to those situations in which there exists a causation in fact between the act and the injury.

With respect to "a duty to disclose", the Court in *Woods* stated:

> Plaintiffs contend that the bank is primarily liable because it had a duty to disclose material misrepresentations and omissions directly to the bondholders. If true, silence or inaction could lead to a finding of Rule 10b-5 liability. *Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc.*, 502 F.2d 731, 739-40 (10th Cir. 1974). The trustee bank maintains that it

> had no duty of disclosure to the bond purchasers. *Resource Investors v. Natural Resources Inv. Corp.*, 457 F. Supp. 194, 200 (E.D.Mich.1978). However, the Tenth Circuit recently reversed a trial court's entry of summary judgment for a trustee bank on this issue. *Cronin, supra.* The court indicated that *participation in the issuance of the bonds could result in a duty of disclosure to all buyers.* (emphasis added)

489 F. Supp at 1278.

The court further stated:

> . . ."[t]he Bank may be subject to primary liability for Rule 10b-5 violations if it owed a direct duty to the public. *Cronin v. Midwestern Oklahoma Development Authority* [619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980)] The bank could also be found secondarily liable under an aiding and abetting theory if it has sufficient knowledge of and participation in the rule 10b-5 scheme. *Ibid*

As to the aider-abettor situation, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, with many other circuits, has recognized liability of alleged aiders and abettors under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, See *Kerbs v. Fall River Industries, Inc.*, 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974) [pre-*Hochfelder*] and *Cronin v. Midwestern Okl. Dev. Authority*, 619 F.2d 856, 862 (10th Cir. 1980) [post-*Hochfelder*]. However, the Supreme Court of the United States, in *Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder*, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S. Ct. 1374, 47 L.Ed. 2d 668, n.7 (1976), *rehearing den.*, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S. Ct. 2194 (1976), declined to determine whether civil liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate under § 10b and Rule 10b-5.

To support an aiding and abetting claim it must be alleged that (i) an independent wrong existed; (ii) the aider and abettor rendered substantial assistance to the primary wrongdoer; and (iii) the aider and abettor had the requisite scienter. *Woods v. Homes & Structures of Pittsburg, Kansas*, 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1278 (D. Kans. 1980); *Troyer v. Karcagi*, 476 F. Supp. 1142, 1151 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)

In *Woods*, the Kansas trial court stated in dealing with an aiding and abetting theory against F&M based on the issuance of industrial development bonds:

> . . . The elements of aiding and abetting in a Rule 10b-5 violation are: (1) proof of securities law violations; (2) proof that the alleged aider-abettor knew of the violations and of its role in the scheme; and (3) proof that the alleged aider-abettor knowingly and substantially assisted in the violation. [case citations omitted]. In relation to the knowledge requirements of aiding-abetting, we note the Fifth Circuit's statement in Woodward, supra, at 95: "The scienter requirement scales upward when activity is more remote; therefore the assistance rendered should be both substantial and knowing. A remote party must not only be aware of his role, but he should also know when and to what degree he is furthering the fraud;" The Fifth Circuit states further at 97:
>
> > "When it is impossible to find any duty of disclosure, an alleged aider-abettor should be found liable only if scienter of the high 'conscious intent' variety can be proved. Where some special duty of disclosure exists, then liability should be possible with a lesser degree of scienter."
>
> Plaintiffs and F&M agree that establishing recklessness might be sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement for aiding and abetting liability if the bank had a fiduciary duty to the bondholders. [case citations omitted]. Without proof that F&M had a duty of disclosure, the standard of scienter Plaintiffs will be required to meet will be one of conscious intent. Without a duty to disclose, imposition of secondary liability using a standard of recklessness or a "should have known" test would effectively mean liability for negligence. This would contravene the rule of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder . . . .

In considering a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, the Court must accept as true the material facts alleged in the Complaint. *Reynolds v. United States*, 643 F.2d 707, 708 (10th Cir. 1981).

As stated by the Court in *Bryan v. Stillwater Board of Realtors*, 578 F.2d 1319, 1321 (10th Cir. 1977),

> A rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted puts in issue the legal sufficiency of plaintiff's declaration by admitting all of the well pleaded facts in the plaintiff's pleadings, thereby taking the position that even if all of those allegations are true, still no relief is warranted. Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Rule 12, §§ 1355, 1356, 1357, pp. 587-617. The test most often applied to determine the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim is set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957):
>
> > . . . In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
> >
> > 355 U.S., at pp. 45, 46.
>
> *Accord*: Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1974); Gas-A-Car, Inc. v. American Petrofina, Inc., 484 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1973); Franklin v. Meredith, 386 F.2d 598 (10th Cir. 1967); Fed.Rule Civ. Proc., rule 8(a), 28 U.S.C.A.

Plaintiffs contend that they have satisfied the requirements of Rules 8(a) and 9(b). (citing, *inter alia*, *In Re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Secur. Litigation*, 467 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Tex. 1979); *Re Home-Stake Production Co. Secur. Litigation*, 76 F.R.D. 337 (N.D. Ok. 1975); *Banowitz v. The State Exchange Bank*, *supra*). In *Banowitz* the Court stated that:

> The Seventh Circuit has interpreted Rule 9(b) liberally, stating that it must be read in conjunction with the notice pleading standard of Rule 8. *Tomera v. Galt*, 511 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.1975). The Court in *Tomera* held that Rule 9(b)

> was satisfied by a "brief sketch of how the fraudulent scheme operated, when and where it occurred, and the participants." *Id.* at 509.
>
> . . .
>
> Defendants also contend . . . that where, as here, multiple defendants are involved, the complaint must provide reasonable notice of the part each defendant allegedly played in the scheme. *Lincoln National Bank v. Lampe*, 414 F. Supp. 1270, 1278 (N.D. Ill.1976); *Adair*, 526 F. Supp. at 744. That rule is modified, however, where the multiple defendants are all corporate insiders. Numerous courts have held that the conduct of such individuals need not be specified and the fraudulent acts complained of need not be attributed to certain persons if the complaint sufficiently describes the fraudulent acts and provides the individuals with sufficient information to answer the allegations. *See, e.g., Pellman v. Cinerama, Inc.*, 503 F. Supp. 107, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (and cases cited therein).

Id. at 1469.

In substance, the thrust of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is that the bankrupt Republic Companies, RFC, RTS and RBI were engaged in the offering and sale of securities to the public during the years 1982, 1983 and 1984; that Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co was employed during those years by McKinney and his Republic Companies and knew that the Republic Companies were engaged in the offering and sale of the debt instruments which Plaintiffs contend are securities under the 1933 and 1934 Acts; that during those years all of the defendants participated in a scheme to defraud plaintiffs through the sale of securities offered by the bankrupt Republic Companies, which offerings contained false and fraudulent information as to the ownership, assets, liabilities and net worth of the bankrupt and non-bankrupt Republic Companies; that the officers and directors of the various bankrupt and non-bankrupt Republic Companies aided and abetted and conspired with certain Defendants by committing certain acts as outlined above including, *inter alia*, the manipulation of loan portfolios of the bankrupt and

non-bankrupt companies, the moving of good loans to Republic Bank, the moving of non-performing loans to the now bankrupt Republic Companies, and the moving of assets and liabilities between the various Republic Companies for the purpose of deceiving potential lenders of funds to the Republic Companies.

Defendants' contentions that Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to meet the pleading requirements of Rules 8(a) and 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that such pleading deficiencies require that the complaint be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) are without merit and Defendants' motions to dismiss on those grounds are denied. *See Bryan v. Stillwater Board of Realtors, supra*, where the court states "that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." 578 F.2d 1319, 1321 (quoting *Conley v. Gibson, supra*, 355 U.S. at pp. 45, 46).

Since the Court has converted all of the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss into Motions for Summary Judgment and has granted the parties until November 1, 1985 to conduct discovery on the "regulatory structure" issue, the Defendants should have sufficient time to submit interrogatories to Plaintiffs to obtain the specific information that they contend they need in order to answer the Amended Complaint as urged in their Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss.

The Plaintiffs should also file affidavits and/or other evidence in response to the affidavits which have been filed by some individual Defendants in support of their motions for summary judgment.

DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AS TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM UNDER SECTION 17(A) OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)

In the Order filed by this Court in *Westland Energy 1981-1 Ltd. v. Bank of Commerce and Trust Company*, No. 83-C-1025-B (N.D. Ok. December 10, 1984), this Court found "the

majority view of the circuit courts which have considered the § 17(a) private right of action issue to be persuasive, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's decision in [*Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston*, 459 U.S. 375 (1983)], and held that a private right of action is permitted under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act.

MOTIONS OF DEFENDANTS PEAT, MARWICK MITCHELL & CO. AND SUNBELT BANK & TRUST CO. TO STRIKE OR DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

The issues raised by Defendants' Motions to Strike or Dismiss Plaintiffs' Class Action Allegations and Plaintiffs' response thereto will be held in abeyance pending the Court's ruling on the Motions for Summary Judgment.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the parties proceed with discovery as outlined herein. Discovery should be limited at this time, however, to those issues raised by Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. Upon the completion of discovery and the filing of additional briefs, the Court will then rule upon all motions for summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of September, 1985.

/s/ LUTHER B. EUBANKS
United States District Judge

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 87-1486
87-1490

W. DAVID HOLLOWAY, M.D.; LISA HOLLOWAY; CHARLES WOODARD; LINDA WOODARD; MAXINE BLACK, individually and as Trustee for James T. Black and Shellie Black; PORTER-STRAIT INSTRUMENT CO., INC., an Oklahoma corporation; JEREMY K. BUSH; SHIRLEY BUSH; UNITED RESOURCES BUILDING COMPANY, INC., an Oklahoma corporation; HUGH HOLLOWELL; MARSHALL H. UDDEN; MARY F. UDDEN; HOWARD R. CADWELL; DORIS G. CADWELL; WILLIAM L. AKERS; NORITA L. AKERS; CAL ACREE; BETTY K. ACREE; ROBERT JOHN WALPOLE; BOBBEE C. RAY, individually and as Trustee for James F. Haning, II and Angela Jean Haning Revocable Trust and Victoria Nininger; JOY A. DONOVAN, as Trustee for James M. Donovan and John A. Donovan; R. H. ARNOLD; MARVELLE MCDANIEL; MARTHA HESTER ARNOLD; CLAUDETTE HOWE; FRED E. MILLER; VERA MILLER; BEVERLY JOYCE MILLER; ANN MCLOUD; JOYCE MCCLURE; CHARLOTTE A. BROAD, individually and as Trustee for Russell M. Gawf and Megan D. Gawf; JOHN E. BROAD; JOHN W. BROAD; DEWAYNE BROAD, for themselves and as representative parties of class,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & CO., a partnership; SUNBELT BANK & TRUST COMPANY, formerly Republic Bank & Trust Co., a State Bank Association; WESLEY R. MCKINNEY, individually; PHILLIPS BRECKINRIDGE, Administrator of the Estate of Glenn F. Prichard, Deceased; RBI OF OKLAHOMA, INC., a Delaware corporation; R. R. BASTIAN, III; HAL W. OSWALT; HAROLD J. BORN; WIL-

LIAM J. DOYLE, JR.; HORACE H. PORTER, M.D.; WILLIAM W. RAMSEY; EDWARD B. WILCOX; ALTUS E. WILDER, III; G. LARRY YOUNG; ORVILLE J. BERTALOT; TED C. BODLEY; KEITH E. MCNEAL, EDWARD L. TAYLOR; CHARLES G. WRAY; ANSIL LUDWICK, JR.; PAUL W. ANDERSON, JR.; G. RICHARD DEGEN; BROWN J. AKIN, JR.; ROBERT C. BATES; RICHARD G. BELL; BOB C. LAMIRAND; DOUGLAS W. DIXON; RODNEY MILLER; DAN W. ALLRED; TIMOTHY J. SULLIVAN; DWIGHT A. PILGRAM; ROGER H. LAUBACH; JAMES D. ESSIG; MARTHA J. CRAVENS; WILMA F. WOOD; CHARLES SCHUSTERMAN; RICHARD WILLIFORD; REPUBLIC BANCORPORATION, INC., also known as Sunbelt Bancorporation, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation,

Defendants-Appellants.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Amicus Curiae.

ORDER

Filed June 5, 1990

Before HOLLOWAY, *Chief Judge*, MCKAY, LOGAN, ANDERSON, TACHA, BALDOCK, BRORBY, EBEL, BARRETT, *Circuit Judges.*

This matter comes on for consideration of appellee/cross-appellant's motion for extension of time to file petition for rehearing and appellee/cross-appellant's suggestion for rehearing which the court treats as a petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc.

Upon consideration whereof, the motion for extension of time to file petition for rehearing is granted. The petition for rehearing is denied by the panel that rendered the decision.

In accordance with Rule 35(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the suggestion for rehearing en banc was transmitted to all of the judges of the court who are in regular active service. No member of the panel and no judge in regular active service on the court having requested that the court be polled on rehearing en banc, Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the suggestion for rehearing en banc is denied.

Entered for the Court

/s/ ROBERT L. HOECKER
Robert L. Hoecker, *Clerk*

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 87-1486
87-1490

W. DAVID HOLLOWAY, M.D.; LISA HOLLOWAY; CHARLES WOODARD; LINDA WOODARD; MAXINE BLACK, individually and as Trustee for James T. Black and Shellie Black; PORTER-STRAIT INSTRUMENT CO., INC., an Oklahoma corporation; JEREMY K. BUSH; SHIRLEY BUSH; UNITED RESOURCES BUILDING COMPANY, INC., an Oklahoma corporation; HUGH HOLLOWELL; MARSHALL H. UDDEN; MARY F. UDDEN; HOWARD R. CADWELL; DORIS G. CADWELL; WILLIAM L. AKERS; NORITA L. AKERS; CAL ACREE; BETTY K. ACREE; ROBERT JOHN WALPOLE; BOBBEE C. RAY, individually and as Trustee for James F. Haning, II and Angela Jean Haning Revocable Trust and Victoria Nininger; JOY A. DONOVAN, as Trustee for James M. Donovan and John A. Donovan; R. H. ARNOLD; MARVELLE MCDANIEL; MARTHA HESTER ARNOLD; CLAUDETTE HOWE; FRED E. MILLER; VERA MILLER; BEVERLY JOYCE MILLER; ANN MCLOUD; JOYCE MCCLURE; CHARLOTTE A. BROAD, individually and as Trustee for Russell M. Gawf and Megan D. Gawf; JOHN E. BROAD; JOHN W. BROAD; DEWAYNE BROAD, for themselves and as representative parties of class,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & CO., a partnership; SUNBELT BANK & TRUST COMPANY, formerly Republic Bank & Trust Co., a State Bank Association; WESLEY R. MCKINNEY, individually; PHILLIPS BRECKINRIDGE, Administrator of the Estate of Glenn F. Prichard, Deceased; RBI OF OKLAHOMA, INC., a Delaware corporation; R. R. BASTIAN, III; HAL W. OSWALT; HAROLD J. BORN; WIL-

LIAM J. DOYLE, JR.; HORACE H. PORTER, M.D.; WILLIAM W. RAMSEY; EDWARD B. WILCOX; ALTUS E. WILDER, III; G. LARRY YOUNG; ORVILLE J. BERTALOT; TED C. BODLEY; KEITH E. MCNEAL, EDWARD L. TAYLOR; CHARLES G. WRAY; ANSIL LUDWICK, JR.; PAUL W. ANDERSON, JR.; G. RICHARD DEGEN; BROWN J. AKIN, JR.; ROBERT C. BATES; RICHARD G. BELL; BOB C. LAMIRAND; DOUGLAS W. DIXON; RODNEY MILLER; DAN W. ALLRED; TIMOTHY J. SULLIVAN; DWIGHT A. PILGRAM; ROGER H. LAUBACH; JAMES D. ESSIG; MARTHA J. CRAVENS; WILMA F. WOOD; CHARLES SCHUSTERMAN; RICHARD WILLIFORD; REPUBLIC BANCORPORATION, INC., also known as Sunbelt Bancorporation, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation,

Defendant-Appellant.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Amicus Curiae.

ORDER

Filed April 11, 1990

Before MCKAY, BARRETT, and TACHA, *Circuit Judges.*

Pursuant to the March 5, 1990, order of the Supreme Court of the United States in Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. W. David Holloway (S.C. No. 89-532), vacating this court's judgment and remanding the case for further consideration in light of Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. ____ (1990), the court vacates its judgment entered July 11, 1989.

The court is filing a supplemental opinion. Judgment in accordance with the court's opinion and supplemental opinion is entered this date.

The mandate shall issue forthwith, and shall include costs in favor of Peat Marwick Main & Co., in the amount of $200, as awarded by the Supreme Court.

Entered for the Court

/s/ ROBERT L. HOECKER
Robert L. Hoecker, *Clerk*

Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988):

> "When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires—
>
> "(1) The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certification, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege of any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security', or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing."

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988):

> "When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires—
>
> * * *
>
> "(10) The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the

value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a 'security'; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited."

The Glass-Steagall Act § 21(a), 12 U.S.C. § 378(a) (1988), provides:

"(a) After the expiration of one year after June 16, 1933, it shall be unlawful—

"(1) For any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor: *Provided*, That the provisions of this paragraph shall not prohibit national banks or State banks or trust companies (whether or not members of the Federal Reserve System) or other financial institutions or private bankers from dealing in, underwriting, purchasing, and selling investment securities, or issuing securities, to the extent permitted to national banking associations by the provisions of section 24 of this title: *Provided further*, That nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as affecting in any way such right as any bank, banking association, savings bank, trust company, or other banking institution, may otherwise possess to

sell, without recourse or agreement to repurchase, obligations evidencing loans on real estate; or

"(2) For any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organization to engage, to any extent whatever with others than his or its officers, agents or employees, in the business of receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor, unless such person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organization (A) shall be incorporated under, and authorized to engage in such business by, the laws of the United States or of any State, Territory, or District, and subjected, by the laws of the United States, or of the State, Territory, or District wherein located, to examination and regulation, or (B) shall be permitted by the United States, any State, territory, or district to engage in such business and shall be subject by the laws of the United States, or such State, territory or district to examination and regulations or, (C) shall submit to periodic examination by the banking authority of the State, Territory, or District where such business is carried on and shall make and publish periodic reports of its condition, exhibiting in detail its resources and liabilities, such examination and reports to be made and published at the same times and in the same manner and under the same conditions as required by the law of such State, Territory, or District in the case of incorporated banking institutions engaged in such business in the same locality."

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Republic Financial Corporation
PASSBOOK SAVINGS CERTIFICATE

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that:

_____

_____

Full Name and Address

is the registered owner of this Republic Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Company) Passbook Savings Certificate and that the Company is indebted to the registered owner hereof in the amount shown by the last balance for this account together with interest thereon at the rate of _____% per annum compounded quarterly subject to the Uniform Rules Regulating this Certificate.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have caused this certificate to be executed by a duly authorized officer of the Company this ____ day of _____, 19___.

REPUBLIC FINANCIAL CORPORATION

_____ _____

Secretary *President*

UNIFORM RULES REGULATING THIS CERTIFICATE

(1) This certificate is issued as evidence that the person(s) whose name(s) appears hereon is the registered owner of this certificate and that the Company is indebted to the registered owner for the amount as shown by the last balance for this account together with interest thereon at the current stated rate of interest as is in effect at the time which is compounded quarterly.

(2) Interest will be credited to this account on March 31, June 30, September 30 and December 31 and will be credited to principal and earn interest from the date of credit.

(3) Withdrawals from and deposits to this account may be made at any time in person, by mail or by electronic funds transfer, where available.

(4) This certificate may be issued as payable to one or the other of two or more persons, in which event payment to the properly authorized person(s), or his duly appointed representative, shall discharge the Company from all liability to all owners hereunder.

(5) This certificate may be issued to a minor person in his own name and without regard to parent or guardian, and payments made hereunder shall discharge the Company from all liability hereunder to such owner, or his parent or guardian.

(6) The Company will furnish to the registered owner as of March 31, June 30, September 30 and December 31 a statement of this account which will reflect all deposits, withdrawals and interest credited during reporting date. This statement of account will be mailed to the registered owner to the last address of the registered owner as furnished to the Company. Any discrepancy in the statement of account should be promptly communicated to the Company within thirty (30) days of receipt of the statement of account by the registered owner. Failure to do so may relieve the Company from all liabilities in connection therewith.

(7) The Company reserves the right to modify the rules regulating this certificate and to change the stated rate of interest which will be paid hereon; provided that, however, it shall give the registered owner hereof notice of its intentions to modify such rules or to change the stated rate of interset in writing thirty (30) days in advance by mail addressed to the last address of the registered owner as furnished to the Company.

(8) The Company does not maintain a sinking fund for the retirement of this certificate. The amount due pursuant to this certificate is payable on demand; provided, however, that the Company may require thirty (30) days' written notice of intent to redeem amounts due hereunder and may limit redemptions in any one calendar month for all certificates issued by the Company to fifty percent (50%) of the net cash flow of the Company for the preceding calendar month, in which event certificates will be redeemed in such order in which they are presented for payment.

(9) The provisions herein constitute the full agreement between the registered owner and the Company without reference to any other instrument.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 00002

NAME Maxine Black or Linda Woodard
ADDRESS 506 High Street, Henryetta, Oklahoma 74437

N°. 945425

SIX MONTH MONEY MARKET THRIFT CERTIFICATE

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that for value received this certificate has this date been issued to Maxine Black or Linda Woodard for and in consideration of the sum of $Five thousand dollars and no/100 ($5,000.00) Dollars cash in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged. This certificate shall bear interest at 12% per annum, compounded, or payable quarterly, and shall be due and payable six months from date and shall be payable only upon surrender of this certificate. The Company reserves the right to redeem this certificate at any time after issue upon thirty (30) days written notice to the holder hereof of its intention to redeem. The holder of this certificate may redeem this certificate at any time after issue provided, however, that the Company may require thirty (30) days written notice to the Company of such intention to redeem and that the Company reserves the right to limit all redemptions of certificates in any calendar month to fifty percent (50%) of the net cash flow of the Company for the preceding calendar month; and further provided that a substantial early withdrawal interest penalty will apply. In

94a

the event of early withdrawal, this certificate will receive interest equal to the rate currently in effect for Passbook Savings Certificates less an amount equal to three months interest at such rate.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have caused this certificate to be executed by a duly authorized officer of the Company this 10th day of May, 1984.

REPUBLIC TRUST & SAVINGS

[ILLEGIBLE]
Asst. Secretary

THE CERTIFICATE ISSUED HEREBY IS NOT INSURED BY ANY AGENCY OF A FEDERAL OR STATE GOVERNMENT.

[ILLEGIBLE]
Vice President

954

No. 90-373

FILED
OCT 12 1990
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1990

KPMG Peat Marwick,

Petitioner,

v.

W. David Holloway, Cal Acree, Betty Acree, Norita Akers, William Akers, Martha Hester Arnold, R.H. Arnold, Maxine Black, Charlotte Broad, John E. Broad, John W. Broad, DeWayne Broad, Jeremy Bush, Doris Cadwell, Howard Cadwell, Joy Donovan, Lisa Holloway, Hugh Hollowell, Claudette Howe, Joyce McClure, Marville McDaniel, Ann McLoud, Beverly Miller, Fred Miller, Vera Miller, Porter-Strait Instrument Co., Inc., Bobbee Ray, Marshall Udden, Mary Udden, United Resources Building Company, Inc., Robert John Walpole, Charlie Woodard, Linda Woodard,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

*Michael Bruce Hyman
Deborah S. Bussert
Much Shelist Freed Denenberg
Ament & Eiger, P.C.
200 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 2100
Chicago, IL 60601-1095
(312) 346-3100

Steven E. Smith
Steven E. Smith & Associates
1201 Fourth National Bank
Tulsa, OK 74119
(918) 582-4107

Charles O. Hanson
Richard K. Holmes
Stewart E. Field
Hanson Holmes Field
& Snider
5918 East 31st Street
Tulsa, OK 74135
(918) 627-4400

Joseph C. Long
300 Timberdell Road
Norman, OK 73019
(405) 325-4699

*Counsel of Record

American Reprographics Management, Inc.™ (312) 332-ARMI

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly followed *Reves v. Ernst & Young,* 494 U.S. ____, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990), in holding that certain interest-bearing investment instruments are securities under the federal securities laws, where the instruments were uncollateralized, uninsured, and sold to the public by two Oklahoma finance companies, neither of which was subject to a comprehensive regulatory scheme designed to significantly reduce the risk of the investment instruments.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question Presented i

Table of Authorities iii

Counterstatement of Case 1

Summary of Argument 9

Reasons For Denying the Writ 10

I. Petitioner Misstates The Tenth Circuit's Holding Which Is Limited In Scope And Does Not Involve Banks Or Deposits 10

II. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion Conforms To This Court's Decisions In *Marine Bank* And *Reves* And Does Not Warrant Review 14

III. The Tenth Circuit Correctly Held That The Instruments Sold By RFC And RTS Are Securities 19

IV. This Is Not The Appropriate Case To Resolve Questions As To Notes of Nine Months Duration Or Less 22

Conclusion 26

APPENDIX

Example From Record Below of RFC Negotiable Rate Term Thrift Certificate 1a

Example From Record Below of RTS Negotiable Rate Term Thrift Certificate 3a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES *Page*

Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770 (D. C. Cir. 1981) 23n, 25

Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) 14

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) 14

Holloway v. Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co., 879 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1989), *vacated*, 110 S. Ct. 1314, *reaffirmed*, 900 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1990) 3, 10n, 11, 11n, 12, 14, 16, 17, 21

Holloway v. Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co., No. 84-C-814-EU (N.D. Okla. January 2, 1987) 8, 12

In re Republic Financial Corporation, 47 Bankr. 766 (N.D. Okla. 1985) 13

In re Republic Trust & Savings Co., 897 F.2d 1041 (10th Cir. 1990) 2, 20

In re Republic Trust & Savings Company, 59 Bankr. 606 (N.D. Okla. 1986) 11, 20n

Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) 12, 17, 19

McClure v. First National Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), *cert. denied*, 420 U.S. 930 (1975) 23n, 25

Oklahoma Bankers' Association v. Federal Reserve Board, 766 F.2d 1446 (10th Cir. 1985) 20n

Oppenheimer & Co. v. Young, 456 So. 2d 1175 (1984), *vacated on other grounds*, 470 U.S. 1078 (1985) 18

Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990) ..... i, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 22n, 23n

S.E.C. v. American Board of Trade, 751 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1984) 24, 25

CASES *Page*

S.E.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) 18

Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972) 22, 23n

Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 468 U.S. 137 (1984) 21

Singer v. Livoti, 741 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 22

Tafflin v. Levitt, 865 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1989), *aff'd on unrelated issue*, 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990) 14

Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) 18n

United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) 17

West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 482 U.S. 906 (1987) 14

Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A., 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984), *cert. denied*, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985) 14

Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974) 23n

Zeller v. Bogue Electric Manufacturing Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 414 U.S. 908 (1973) 23n

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

Benson Banc Shares, 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 1009 (1977) 14n

Republic Bancorporation, Inc., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 66 (1981) 7n

Suburban Bancorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 581 (1985) 14n

STATUTES

Bank Holding Company Act
12 U.S.C. §§1841 *et seq.* (1982 & Supp. V 1987) 2

12 U.S.C. §1841(c)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) 11n

Page

12 U.S.C. §1841 (i) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) 11n

12 U.S.C. §1844(e)(1) (1982) 7

Glass-Steagall Act
12 U.S.C. §378 (1988) 21

Oklahoma Banking Code of 1965, OKLA. STAT. tit. 6
§§101 *et seq.* (1983) 6n

§102(A) (1983) 5n

§208(4) (1983) 6n

§218(B) (1983) 6n

§302(b) (1983) 5

§310(B) (1983) 6

§§402 *et seq.* (1983) 11

§802 (1983) 6n

§809 (1983) 6n

§1001 (1983) 5, 11

§1004 (1983) 6

§1404 (1983) 6n

§1406 (1983) 6n

§1415(A) (1983) 6n

Oklahoma Securities Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 71
§§1 *et seq.* (1983) 3

Securities Act of 1933
15 U.S.C. §77(a)(3)(1988) 23

15 U.S.C. §§77(s) (1988) 18

Securities Exchange Act of 1934
15 U.S.C. §78(c)(6)(1988) 2n

Page

15 U.S.C. §78(c)(10) (1988) 22, 23

15 U.S.C. §78 bb(a) (1988) 18

United States Bankruptcy Code
11 U.S.C. §109(b) (1988) 12n

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Federal Securities Act: Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1933) 25n

H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 24, 25

H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 24

Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. 94 (1933)... 25n

REGULATION

Federal Reserve Board Regulation Y
12 C.F.R. §225.4(a) (1989) 7n, 17

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual at §403.0 (1982) 7

Guttman, *Article 3 Commercial Paper: An Updating of Well-Tried Concepts,* 11 How. L.J. 49, 51 n.23 (1965)..... 24n

5 Jacobs, *Litigation and Practice Under 10b-5,* §4, at p. 1-169-70 (2d ed. rev. 1989) 18

J. Long, *Blue Sky Law,* 12 Securities Law Series, §1.01, at p. 1-1 (1988) 18

L. Loss and E. Cowett, *Blue Sky Law* 30-5 (1958) 18

Page

Opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, No. 79-353 (December 31, 1979) 3, 20

Silkey and Pringle, *Trust Companies: Oklahoma's Own Variety of Non-Bank Banks*, 9 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 293 (1984) 13

No. 90-373

In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1990

KPMG Peat Marwick,

Petitioner,

v.

W. David Holloway, Cal Acree, Betty Acree, Norita Akers, William Akers, Martha Hester Arnold, R.H. Arnold, Maxine Black, Charlotte Broad, John E. Broad, John W. Broad, DeWayne Broad, Jeremy Bush, Doris Cadwell, Howard Cadwell, Joy Donovan, Lisa Holloway, Hugh Hollowell, Claudette Howe, Joyce McClure, Marville McDaniel, Ann McLoud, Beverly Miller, Fred Miller, Vera Miller, Porter-Strait Instrument Co., Inc., Bobbee Ray, Marshall Udden, Mary Udden, United Resources Building Company, Inc., Robert John Walpole, Charles Woodard, Linda Woodard,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondents respectfully request this Court to deny the petition for a writ of certiorari for the reasons set forth below.

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has now ruled twice that the investment certificates at issue here are securities under federal law. Not satisfied with the essential facts of the case, Petitioner tortures those facts to make it appear that the Tenth

Circuit's holding should be reviewed. Contrary to what Petitioner would have the Court believe, banks, savings and loans and the like are not involved in this case. Neither are passbook accounts or certificates of deposit. Rather, the case involves two Oklahoma finance companies, Republic Financial Corporation ("RFC") and Republic Trust & Savings ("RTS"), which sought protection under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in September, 1984. *In re Republic Trust & Savings Company,* 59 Bankr. 606, 608 (N.D. Okla. 1986). The finance companies were wholly-owned subsidiaries of a holding company named Republic Bancorporation, Inc. ("RBI-II"), the second entity to bear this name, which also declared bankruptcy. Respondents and members of the class they seek to represent invested over $62 million in various securities offered and sold to the general public over several years by RFC and RTS.

The first Republic Bancorporation, Inc. ("RBI-I") was a bank holding company that owned the stock of a state-chartered, FDIC-insured bank, Republic Bank & Trust Company ("Republic Bank").[1] Prior to June 1984, RBI-I also owned the stock of RFC and RTS and 1700 Corporation, a building premises company. As a bank holding company, RBI-I (unlike RBI-II) was subject to the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§1841 *et seq.* (1982 & Supp. V 1987) ("BHCA").

SECURITES ISSUED BY RFC AND RTS

Plaintiffs invested money with RFC, an Oklahoma corporation, and RTS, an Oklahoma trust company.[2] Both institutions operated as finance companies, and both were uninsured. The principal activity of RFC and RTS was the raising of money by the sale, primarily to unsophisticated individual investors, of interest-bearing investment notes with varying maturities. The securities bore various labels, such as:

---

[1] RBI-II was *not* a bank holding company and did *not* own stock in any bank. Moreover, neither RFC and RTS nor RBI-II come within the definition of "bank" contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (c) (6) (1988).

[2] Although "Trust" appeared in RTS's name, the use of the word is misleading. RTS did not manage or hold trusts or engage in traditional trust business.

Market Rate Savings Thrift Certificate;
Money Market Thrift Certificate;
Two-Year Term Thrift Certificate;
Passbook Savings Certificate;
Negotiable Rate Thrift Certificate; and
Negotiable Rate Term Thrift Certificate.

Most securities fell in the $1,500 to $10,000 range. *Holloway v. Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co.*, 879 F.2d 772, 780 n.6 (10th Cir. 1989), *vacated*, 110 S. Ct. 1314, *reaffirmed*, 900 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1990). The rates of interest offered were competitive with rates paid by other local financial institutions. The proceeds from the sale of the securities were used (1) to increase funds available for lending to customers; (2) to loan funds to their parent in the form of unsecured notes; (3) to redeem previously issued "certificates and other securities" (Exhibit J at 3 to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment); and (4) to make other investments.[3]

Oklahoma law deemed RFC's and RTS's investment certificates to be securities. Oklahoma Securities Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, §§1, *et seq.* (1983). *See also* Opinions of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, No. 79-353 (December 31, 1979) (Oklahoma Banking Department has statutory responsibility to supervise the issuance of securities in Oklahoma by state-chartered trust companies). RFC issued its investment certificates pursuant to prospectuses approved by the Oklahoma Securities Commission. RTS issued its investment certificates pursuant to offering circulars approved by the Oklahoma Banking Department.

Among other things, the prospectuses and offering circulars describe: (1) the certificates as investment notes offered to the public; (2) the legal authority under which they were issued; (3) the uninsured nature of the investment notes; (4) the use of the investment notes' proceeds; and (5) RFC's and RTS's directors and executive officers. The cover sheet of a prospectus contained the following notice in large type:

---

[3] A copy of an RFC prospectus and an RTS offering circular are contained in the Record below.

> THESE SECURITIES ARE OFFERED FOR SALE IN THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA UNDER A PERMIT GRANTED BY THE OKLAHOMA SECURITIES COMMISSION, BUT THIS PERMIT IS PERMISSIVE ONLY AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN APPROVAL, RECOMMENDATION OR ENDORSEMENT, AND IN NO SENSE IS TO BE REPRESENTED AS AN INDICATION OF THE INVESTMENT MERIT OF SUCH SECURITIES. ANY SUCH REPRESENTATION IS UNLAWFUL.
>
> THE SECURITIES OFFERED HEREBY ARE NOT INSURED BY THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (FDIC), FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN INSURANCE CORPORATION (FSLIC), NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION BOARD (NCUA) OR ANY COMPARABLE AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES OR STATE OF OKLAHOMA. (Emphasis added).

The prospectus also provides that "sale or distribution of the certificates. . . will be handled only by qualified *securities* agents of the company," and that "[n]o certificates are to be offered through underwriters or broker-dealers" (emphasis supplied).

In large type on the front cover of an RTS offering circular was this admonition:

> THESE CERTIFICATES ARE OFFERED FOR SALE IN THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA UNDER AUTHORITY OF TITLE 6) (1001(22), [sic] BUT THIS AUTHORIZATION IS PERMISSIVE ONLY AND THE APPROVAL OF THIS CIRCULAR BY THE BANK COMMISSIONER DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN APPROVAL, RECOMMENDATION OR ENDORSEMENT AND IN NO SENSE IS TO BE REPRESENTED AS AN INDICATION OF THE INVESTMENT MERIT OF SUCH CERTIFICATES.

> [The Oklahoma Banking Code] states that a trust company may issue **debentures, notes or other evidence of debt** in the manner in which business corporations are authorized to do so for any legal application of proceeds, but only to the extent of any amount equal to ten times its capital and surplus. The certificates issued hereby **are not deposits** and are not insured by any agency of the federal government. (Emphasis added.)[4]

RTS's activities, advertising, loans and debt instruments mimicked those of RFC.[5] Both solicited the public to purchase their various securities principally through newspaper advertisements, prospectuses and offering circulars.

Since RTS was not a bank,[6] it was not subject to the same regulation as a bank. Oklahoma law imposed only three basic requirements on trust companies: (a) capitalization of at least $300,000 (OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, §302(b) (1983)); (b) loans and issuance of indebtedness could not exceed ten times capital and surplus (OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, § 1001 (1983)); and (c) certain deposits had to be maintained against possible malfeasance claims

---

[4] The offering circular indicated a "minimum initial investment" required to purchase. The front cover alone contained the word "investment" three times.

[5] For instance, the appearance (which resembled a stock certificate) and wording of a typical certificate issued by RFC was almost identical to a certificate issued by RTS. Typical certificates are reproduced in the Appendix at 1a-3a.

[6] The Oklahoma Banking Code defines "bank" as "any bank authorized by the laws of the state to engage in the banking business." OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, §102(A) (1983).

(OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, § 1004 (1983)).[7] As an Oklahoma trust company, RTS was not required to obtain insurance, nor were any of its instruments insured by any agency of the state or federal government. On the other hand, all national and state banks operating in Oklahoma were required to maintain FDIC insurance. OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, §310(B) (1983).

ABSENCE OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF RFC AND RTS

No federal bank regulation protects purchasers of debt instruments issued by companies like RFC and RTS. Nothing in the amendments to the BHCA or its legislative history reflects any intent directly to control, supervise or regulate such non-bank entities. In fact, the BHCA is only concerned at all with

---

[7] Review of the Oklahoma Banking Code of 1965, OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, §§ 101 *et seq.* (1983), demonstrates that bank depositors at the time were offered protection which was not provided to holders of trust company securities. For example:

(a) §208(4) of the Banking Code provided public access to reports covering shortages of funds at banks. As to RTS this information was confidential.

(b) §218(B) required that a change in bank control be reported to the Banking Commissioner. No such provision existed for trust companies. This is especially relevant since the divestiture of RTS could not have occurred without the Commissioner's approval had RTS been a bank.

(c) §802 limited the maximum a bank could loan to a person or entity, thereby preventing an undue concentration of loans in a bank's portfolio, considered improper banking practice. No such restriction was imposed on RTS.

(d) §809 provided that a bank could not pledge its own assets for the benefit of a customer. This provision did not apply to RTS.

(e) §1404 provided that a managing officer of a bank could not borrow from the bank. This very important safeguard against insider loans and similar transactions did not apply to RTS, which permitted unbridled insider borrowing by its managing officers.

(f) §1406 prohibited a bank from receiving deposits when insolvent. The statute did not apply to RTS, which continued to receive money from investors while insolvent, without interference from the Oklahoma Banking Department.

(g) §1415 (A) provided the Commissioner with the power to obtain an injunction against a bank or bank officers for violation of the Banking Code. There was no provision to prohibit RTS or its officers from similar violations.

non-banks where they are owned by a bank holding company, and then only to ensure that those entities pose no threat to the financial stability of the bank.[8] Section 5(e) of the BHCA allows the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") to order a bank holding company to terminate its ownership or control of a non-bank subsidiary which "constitutes a serious risk to the financial safety, soundness, or stability of a bank holding company subsidiary bank. . ." 12 U.S.C. §1844(e)(l)(1982). Nothing in §5(e) or anywhere else in the BHCA refers to or provides for the protection of non-bank subsidiaries or the purchasers of their securities where the subsidiary bank's activities threaten the non-bank subsidiaries. The FRB's ultimate enforcement weapon is the ability to force a bank holding company or a bank to divest the non-bank entity.[9] Moreover, the primary reason for an examination of a subsidiary's financial condition is to protect against the "potentially damaging effect on the parent company or its bank subsidiary." Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual at §403.0 (1982).

For several years prior to 1984, the quality of the RFC and RTS loan portfolios had concerned the FRB in its review of RBI-I. Both RFC and RTS had made substantial insider loans to

---

[8] For example, RBI-I, the bank holding company which owned Republic Bank, RFC, and RTS, applied for Federal Reserve Board approval under §1843 (c) (8) of the BHCA to acquire the voting shares of Guarantee Trust Company, a failed trust company, and to engage in industrial loan activity through Guarantee Trust. The Board held:

> The Board has frequently indicated that it believes that bank holding companies should constitute a source of financial and managerial strength to their subsidiary banks. From the record relating to this application, it appears that applicant's assumption of 80% of Guarantee Trust's unsecured liabilities could adversely affect its ability to serve as a source of financial strength *to its subsidiary bank.* (emphasis added).

Because the acquisition of Guarantee Trust could adversely impact the stability of the subsidiary bank, the Board denied RBI-I's application. *Republic Bancorporation, Inc.* 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 66 (1981).

[9] Regulation Y of the BHCA specifically addresses the potential impact of non-bank entities on a bank holding company and the FRB's overriding interest in protecting banks. The regulation provides that a bank's holding company shall serve as a source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks and shall not conduct its operations in an unsafe or unsound manner. 12 C.F.R. §225.4(a) (1989).

their officers and directors, their relatives, and other entities controlled by their officers, directors or their relatives. These loans constituted a large portion of RFC's and RTS's assets. Partly for this reason, on October 27, 1982, the FRB issued a consent cease and desist order to RBI-I. The FRB's concerns were not satisfactorily addressed, and a year later, on October 26, 1983, in response to RBI-I's deteriorating financial condition, the FRB issued a more stringent consent cease and desist order against RBI-I. RBI-I failed to comply with this order.

At about the same time, RBI-I submitted a plan to the FRB calling for the divestiture of RBI-I's bank subsidiary, Republic Bank, to a new bank holding company. However, FRB approval was contingent on RBI-I raising $7 million in new capital for the new holding company. On or about June 4, 1984, the FRB notified the RBI-I Board that, because RBI-I had not raised the new capital, both RBI-I and its directors would be assessed civil money penalties until they complied with the October 26, 1983 cease and desist order.

On June 13, 1984, the FRB issued a termination notice compelling RBI-I to terminate both ownership and control of RFC and RTS. *See Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.*, No. 84-C-814-EU (N.D. Okla. January 2, 1987), *reproduced in* Petitioner's Appendix at 45a (hereinafter the "January 2, 1987 Order").

The FRB's termination notice stated in relevant part:

> The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "Board of Governors") has reasonable cause to believe that the continuation of Republic Bancorporation, Inc., Tulsa, Oklahoma ("Republic"), of its ownership and control of Republic Financial Corporation, Tulsa, Oklahoma ("Republic Financial"), and Republic Trust & Savings Corporation of Tulsa, Oklahoma ("Republic Trust"), nonbank subsidiaries of Republic, *constitutes a serious risk to the financial safety, soundness and stability of Republic's bank subsidiary,* the Republic Bank & Trust Company, Tulsa, Oklahoma (recently renamed the Sunbelt Bank & Trust Company) (the "Bank"), and is inconsistent with sound banking principles (emphasis added).

Doc. No. 369, Reply Mem. of Plaintiff in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

On June 29, 1984, the name of RBI-I was changed to Sunbelt Bank Corporation, Inc. With no notice of the name swap[10] given to holders of RFC or RTS securities, RBI-I secretly divested itself of RFC and RTS by transferring them to RBI-II, formerly known as Sunbelt Bank Corporation, Inc.[11] Both RFC and RTS continued to issue securities after the divestiture. RFC and RTS investors, along with the general public, discovered the divestiture on September 24, 1984, when RFC and RTS filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the federal bankruptcy code. This lawsuit, alleging, *inter alia,* securities fraud, was filed shortly thereafter.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case does not involve banks, savings and loans or thrifts, nor does it involve certificates of deposit or passbook savings accounts. It *does* involve finance companies selling uninsured investment notes to the general public. The Tenth Circuit correctly held that these instruments are securities for purposes of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.

The conflict among the Circuits, which Petitioner argues requires further review in this Court, is more illusory than real. Only one federal court of appeals' opinion is in direct conflict with that of the Tenth Circuit in this case. That court has not been able to reconsider its opinion in light of *Reves,* as has the Tenth Circuit. Granting the writ to review this alleged conflict would be premature until more courts have the opportunity to consider *Reves* in other factual settings.

Moreover, the Tenth Circuit correctly applied *Reves* and *Marine Bank* to the facts here, properly considering whether the

---

[10] The post-divestiture structure consisted of RBI-II, a holding company, with two non-bank subsidiaries, RFC and RTS, and without a bank subsidiary. On the other hand, RBI-I was a bank holding company, and had as its subsidiary Republic Bank. As part of the divestiture, many of the obligations owed to RFC and RTS by RBI-I were assumed by RBI-II, notwithstanding RBI-II's insolvency, and RBI-I was released from those obligations by RFC and RTS.

[11] The investors had no way of knowing that after divestiture RBI-II had become a separate non-bank holding company.

instruments sold by RFC and RTS are securities and whether some other comprehensive federal regulatory scheme makes the protection of the federal securities laws unnecessary. The opinion in no way unduly broadens federal jurisdiction, nor does it undermine any of this Court's prior decisions.

Finally, the writ should not be granted to consider how to interpret the exclusion from the federal securities laws of instruments with a maturity of nine months or less. That issue was not fully briefed and argued below and the Tenth Circuit did not fully consider it. Further, the Court's most recent opinion addressing this issue is less than one year old, and few lower federal courts have had the opportunity to interpret it. Thus, to again address the issue would be premature. Moreover, the interpretation of the exclusion unanimously adopted by the lower federal courts is faithful to both the plain meaning of the statute and its legislative history, and is so well-settled that it should only be changed, if at all, by Congress.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I.

PETITIONER MISSTATES THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING WHICH IS LIMITED IN SCOPE AND DOES NOT INVOLVE BANKS OR DEPOSITS

The case presented for the Court's consideration by Petitioner's brief is simply not *this* case.[12] Petitioner refers repeatedly to banks, savings and loans and thrifts (Pet. Brf. at 15, 18, 20, 23, 24), and to certificates of deposit and passbook accounts (Pet. Brf. at 3, 4, 11, 22, 23, 24), none of which is involved in this case.

The case at bar involves two Oklahoma finance companies, both of which were privately owned.[13] Neither company was a

---

[12] Only Peat Marwick seeks this Court's review. The remaining defendants, including the corporate officers and directors, have not joined the petition.

[13] This case also involves securities in the form of notes issued by RBI-I and later by RBI-II. As to these instruments, the record is incomplete and the Tenth Circuit remanded for further consideration in accordance with its opinion. *Holloway*, 879 F.2d at 788.

bank, savings and loan or thrift.[14] For much of the relevant period these entities were wholly-owned subsidiaries of a bank holding company. RTS was subject to certain state laws that were different and markedly less stringent than those applicable to state chartered banks, even though administered through the Oklahoma Banking Commission. RFC was subject to no state banking laws at all.

At the federal level, both institutions were reviewed by the FRB, but only to determine whether their existence threatened the bank subsidiary of the holding company.[15] Thus, all of Petitioner's arguments regarding the effect of this case on banks, savings and loans, thrifts and the like are completely misplaced.

Not only does Petitioner mischaracterize the nature of the institutions involved in this case, but Petitioner also recasts the nature of the instruments sold to the public. Contrary to Petitioner's suggestion, this case does not involve deposits, because, by law, neither RFC nor RTS could accept deposits. OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, §§402 *et seq.*, §§1001 *et seq.* (1983); *Holloway*, 879 F.2d at 777 n.4; *In Re Republic Trust & Savings Co.*, 59 Bankr. at 612-13. Rather, the instruments were investment notes of various maturities, which carried either a fixed or variable rate of return.[16]

---

[14] The Bank Holding Company Act defines "bank" as an institution which both accepts demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may withdraw by check or similar means, and is engaged in the business of making commercial loans. 12 U.S.C. §1841 (c) (1) (B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). It defines a thrift institution as (1) a domestic building and loan or savings and loan association, (2) a cooperative bank without capital stock organized and operated for mutual purposes and without profit, (3) any Federal savings bank, (4) certain State-chartered savings banks owned by a holding company, or (5) a mutual savings bank not having capital stock represented by shares. 12 U.S.C. §1841(i) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).

[15] The only reason the FRB was concerned with RFC and RTS at all was that, at the time, they were wholly owned subsidiaries of a bank holding company. Once ownership changed in June 1984, the FRB had no further jurisdiction over them. *Holloway*, 879 F.2d at 787

[16] A number of the certificates were redeemable on demand, subject to a 30-day notice provision and certain limitations on the total amount redeemed during any one period.

For these reasons, all of Petitioner's arguments regarding "the ordinary deposit and passbook activities of banking and financial institutions" are inapposite. (Pet. Brf. at 23.) As this Court's holding in *Marine Bank v. Weaver,* 455 U.S. 551 (1982), makes clear, the traditional commercial banking context is very different and requires an entirely different analysis.[17]

Petitioner also claims that "no one could characterize the institutions at issue as operating in an unregulated environment." (Pet. Brf. at 18.) Petitioner is wrong; both the Tenth Circuit and Respondents do so, as did the District Court in part. Even the District Court held that the RFC instruments were not sufficiently reviewed by federal banking authorities so as to remove them from the protection of the federal securities laws.

As both the District Court and the Tenth Circuit held, there was no federal regulation of RFC and RTS *that was designed to protect their investors. Holloway,* 879 F.2d at 787-88; January 2, 1987 Order. What little federal regulation existed was intended solely to protect the bank subsidiary of RBI-I. As the facts also clearly show, there was no prophylactic state regulation of either company. Petitioner notes, however, somewhat disingenuously, that "insurance aside," the certificates here were regulated in much the same manner as those in *Marine Bank.* (Pet. Brf. at 18.) Even if true, however, insurance was the single most important factor in the Court's decision in *Marine Bank.* Moreover, in that case, the issuer was directly regulated by the FRB. Here, RFC and RTS were reviewed by the FRB only to determine if their existence threatened the bank subsidiary, which the FRB did regulate.

Petitioner claims that the "profound consequences" of the Tenth Circuit's holding make it one which this Court should review. (Pet. Brf. at 15-16.) However, the institutions involved here are *sui generis.* Whether the instruments they sold to the public are securities must be evaluated in the specific factual context presented.

---

[17] The very fact that RFC and RTS are in bankruptcy demonstrates that they are not banks. Banks, savings and loans and thrifts are specifically excluded from the United States Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §109(b) (1979).

As already noted, banks, savings and loans, and thrifts are not affected by the holding, eliminating the vast majority of the institutions referred to by Petitioner. As to the remaining institutions, to the extent they are the same, the federal securities laws should apply. Cases like this one, where there is no pervasive, protective regulation, are precisely why the federal securities laws were enacted.

Institutions like RFC and RTS are often formed to avoid the comprehensive federal or state banking laws and regulations. Silkey and Pringle, *Trust Companies: Oklahoma's Own Variety of Non-Bank Banks,* 9 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 293 (1984). Indeed,

> RFC and RTS were almost identical twins, doing business in the same building, and operat[ing] their businesses in such a manner as to cause confusion to customers concerning the capacity in which each corporation functioned. Each corporation essentially covered for the other as to many business matters, even assuming the duties and responsibilities of the other to carry on business.

In re Republic Financial Corporation, 47 Bankr. 766, 770 (N.D. Okla. 1985). For such institutions, the rationale behind the *Marine Bank* exception is absent. For this reason, the Tenth Circuit was correct in holding that the instruments issued by RFC and RTS are securities and that their holders may seek a remedy under the federal securities laws. Without these remedies, investors are left with little recourse.

Contrary to Petitioner's argument, the holding below will in no way broaden federal jurisdiction beyond what Congress intended. (Pet. Brf. at 21.) Rather, the Tenth Circuit has applied the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws to unregulated, uninsured companies which sold securities to the general public. This is exactly as Congress intended the federal securities laws to be used, and as they have been applied for over fifty years.

Nor does the opinion create irreconcilable conflicts between the disclosure goals of the federal securities laws and confidentiality requirements of financial institutions. (Pet. Brf. at 20.)

The opinion does not even address the issue of disclosure by such entities as banks and savings and loans with regard to their lending and investment activities. Confidentiality may be maintained for these activities because investors are protected by the FRB acting on their behalf to monitor the issuers and take corrective action to protect their investments. *Holloway,* 879 F.2d at 786. Where companies like RFC and RTS are selling *securities* to the public, however, a wholly separate activity, full disclosure as required by the securities laws is investors' only protection.[18] As this Court has often held, a primary purpose of the federal securities laws is to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning sales of securities. *See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,* 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).

II.

THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION CONFORMS TO THIS COURT'S DECISIONS IN *MARINE BANK* AND *REVES* AND DOES NOT WARRANT REVIEW

Petitioner claims the writ should be granted because the Tenth Circuit's opinion regarding state regulation conflicts with decisions of other Circuits which have considered the issue. (Pet. Brf. at 19.) Petitioner also claims that the opinion raises important questions that justify granting the writ. On both counts, Petitioner is wrong.

In fact, only a single opinion is in direct conflict with the Tenth Circuit's holding here. Of all the cases Petitioner claims conflict with the Tenth Circuit, only *Tafflin v. Levitt,* 865 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1989), *aff'd on unrelated issue,* 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990), involved a state regulatory structure which included insurance designed to protect the public. The other cases Petitioner cites, *West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A.,* 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied,* 482 U.S. 906 (1987); *Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.,* 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); *Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A.,* 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984), *cert. denied,* 469 U.S. 1108 (1985), are factually distinguishable. All involved banks, certificates of

---

[18] The FRB has no jurisdiction over securities issued by bank holding companies or their nonbank subsidiaries. *Benson Banc Shares,* 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 1009 (1977); *Suburban Bancorp,* 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 581 (1985).

deposit (in Mexican pesos), and insurance against insolvency losses. Moreover, all involved foreign policy issues completely absent here, and none considered whether state banking regulation could ever satisfy *Marine Bank,* or if so, the extent of state regulation that would suffice.[19]

All of the cases Petitioner cites were decided before this Court's opinion in *Reves.* To the extent the cases conflict with *Reves,* they are no longer good law. Only the Tenth Circuit has had the opportunity to review its decision in light of *Reves.* Applying that decision to the facts before it, the Tenth Circuit determined that its prior holding was correct. Until other Circuit Courts have had a similar opportunity, it would be ill-advisedly premature for this Court to review this alleged conflict among the Circuits.

Moreover, the Tenth Circuit correctly applied *Reves.* In *Reves,* this Court adopted the "family resemblance test" for determining whether a note is or is not a security. The Court identified four factors which must be examined in making that determination. The fourth factor the Court identified is "whether some factor such as the existence of another regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary." *Reves,* 494 U.S. at ____, 110 S. Ct. at 952.

Applying the fourth factor in *Reves,* the Court stated:

> [W]e find no risk-reducing factor to suggest that these instruments are not in fact securities. The notes are uncollateralized and uninsured. Moreover, unlike the certificates of deposit in *Marine Bank,* supra, at 557-558, which were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and subject to substantial regulation under the federal banking laws, and unlike the pension plan in *Teamsters v. Daniel,* 439 U.S. 551, 569-570 (1979), which was comprehensively regulated under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 829, 29 U.S.C. sec. 1001 *et seq.,* the

---

[19] The Tenth Circuit did indicate that it disagreed with the reasoning of these cases.

> **notes here would escape federal regulation entirely if the Act were held not to apply.**

Id. at 953 (emphasis supplied).

Like the securities in *Reves*, the securities issued by RFC and RTS were uncollateralized and uninsured. Also like the securities in *Reves*, the RFC and RTS instruments would evade federal regulation entirely if the federal securities acts were held not to apply.

In applying *Reves* to the instant factual situation, the Tenth Circuit first "presume[d] that the instruments are securities." It then reviewed the judicially created list of nonsecurities and determined that the instruments at issue here do not resemble any of them. It next "examine[d] the instruments in light of the four guideline factors to decide whether [they] should be added to the judicial list of nonsecurities." *Holloway*, 900 F.2d at 1487.

The Tenth Circuit concluded that although the *Reves* four factor approach superseded its own eight factor analysis, most of the factors used in its previous approach were included in the *Reves* analysis. Most importantly, the result remained the same. *Id.* at 1488. The Court noted that the major analytical difference between *Reves* and its prior approach was in the treatment of other regulatory schemes. The Tenth Circuit held that under *Reves*, the existence of another regulatory scheme which significantly reduces the risk of the instrument is to be considered as one of the four factors, not as a separate consideration which might remove the instrument from the protection of the federal securities laws even if it otherwise qualified as a security. The Court also noted that in this case the change in emphasis did not change the result. *Id.* at 1488 n. 1.

The Tenth Circuit correctly observed that although *Reves* does not directly address the question whether federal courts may consider state regulation when evaluating whether a note is a security, the emphasis of the case was clearly on federal regulation. Moreover, the majority opinion rejected application of state law on the question of when a demand note matures, in favor of a federal rule "designed to further the remedial purposes of the Acts." *Id.* at 1488. Based on all this, the Court correctly reaffirmed its prior holding that only federal regulation may be considered. *Id.*

Although Petitioner states in passing that the securities issued here were subject to substantial federal regulation, in fact the opposite was true. (Pet. Brf. at 18 n. 18.)[20] As the Tenth Circuit noted in its opinion, prior to the divestiture, both RFC and RTS were subject to review by the FRB as subsidiaries of a bank holding company. The primary purpose of this review, however, was to protect the stability and financial viability of a bank. If the holding company or its nonbank subsidiaries engaged in activities that threatened the financial stability of the bank subsidiary, the FRB could order divestiture of the nonbank entities to protect the bank's depositors.[21]

Any protection afforded the investors in RFC and RTS as a result of the FRB review of the nonbank subsidiaries was manifestly incidental to the protection of the bank's depositors. RFC and RTS investors were thus wholly dependent on the coincidence of their interests with those of the bank's depositors. The Tenth Circuit agreed that this was not the "abundant protection" contemplated by *Marine Bank*, and was not sufficient to remove these instruments from the protection of the federal securities laws. *Id.* at 787-88; 12 C.F.R. §225.4(a)(1988).

Petitioner claims that the Tenth Circuit erred in refusing to consider state regulation in determining whether the RFC and RTS instruments are securities. In both *Marine Bank* and *Reves*, however, this Court focused on federal regulation. *Marine Bank*, 455 U.S. at 558-59; *Reves*, 494 U.S. at ___, 110 S. Ct. at 953. The Tenth Circuit's reasoning is entirely consistent with those holdings.[22]

Petitioner, however, citing *United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman*, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975), argues that the securities laws were only meant to cover instruments not otherwise

---

[20] Petitioner ignores the fact that the regulatory environment surrounding these entities changed after the divestiture, of which investors were unaware until the bankruptcy.

[21] This is exactly what happened in June 1984, when the FRB finally ordered RBI-II to divest itself of RFC and RTS. The bankruptcy followed shortly thereafter.

[22] In any event, this part of the Tenth Circuit's holding was not necessary to its conclusion that under the facts presented, the instruments were securities.

regulated. Incredibly, Petitioner argues that because the state of Oklahoma had certain regulatory responsibility, the federal securities laws should not apply here. This argument must fail.

At the time the federal securities laws were enacted, no comprehensive federal regulation of securities existed. *State* regulation, however, had long been in force. Indeed, by the time the 1934 Act was passed, every state except Nevada had some form of securities act. *Oppenheimer & Co. v. Young*, 456 So. 2d 1175, 1177 (1984), *vacated on other grounds*, 470 U.S. 1078 (1985). *See also* 5 Jacobs, *Litigation and Practice under 10b-5*, §4, at p. 1-169-70 (2d ed. rev. 1989). Congress enacted the federal securities laws because state securities regulation, with its limited jurisdiction, was inadequate to protect investors in a securities market which was increasingly national in scope. J. Long, *Blue Sky Law*, 12 Securities Law Series §1.01, at p. 1-1 (1989). *See also* L. Loss and E. Cowett, *Blue Sky Law* 30-5 (1958). Furthermore, both Section 18 of the 1933 Act and section 28 of the 1934 Act explicitly provide for concurrent federal and state regulation. 15 U.S.C. §§77(s); 78bb(a) (1988). Congress was obviously aware of the existing state regulation when it enacted the federal securities laws, but deemed it inadequate. Given this background, the Tenth Circuit was correct in looking only at whether a comprehensive set of federal regulations adequately protects investors.[23]

This Court has also recognized that the mere existence of some state regulation, even as extensive as the state regulation governing insurance, does not mean that the federal securities laws do not apply. *SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.*, 359 U.S. 65, 75 (1959)(variable annuity contracts are securities, subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, even though insurance companies and contracts are highly regulated by the states and are specifically exempt from the registration requirements of the federal securities laws).

Moreover, even if it is incorrect to completely discount state regulation in determining whether an instrument is subject to

---

[23] *Teamsters v. Daniel*, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), also supports the Tenth Circuit's reasoning. In that case, this Court held that a pension plan is not a security because *another federal statute*, ERISA, provides adequate protection to those covered by pension plans.

the federal securities laws, the state regulation in this case was negligible. RFC was supervised only by the Oklahoma Securities Commission. Not even Petitioner argues that this removes RFC's securities from the federal securities laws. Virtually all securities are regulated by both the federal securities laws and the securities laws of the states in which they are sold.

RTS was subject to a certain amount of review by the Oklahoma Banking Commission, but was uninsured by any fund. As discussed above, the state regulation that did exist was altogether deficient and perfunctory. For that reason, even if existing state regulation is considered here, it does not satisfy the *Marine Bank* requirement that such regulation abundantly protect the public from the risk of insolvency. *Marine Bank,* 455 U.S. at 558-59.

Petitioner claims that the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of *Reves* raises issues "previously thought resolved." (Pet. Brf. at 16.) Petitioner concludes that the treatment of federally regulated and insured bank certificates of deposit under the securities acts must now be considered susceptible to "modification and elaboration." Although no case is identified, Petitioner apparently refers to *Marine Bank*. Petitioner has either completely misread or intentionally mischaracterized the Tenth Circuit's opinion.

Petitioner's argument that somehow the Tenth Circuit's opinion calls into question settled law defies logic. As discussed above, the Tenth Circuit recognized that comprehensive federal regulation and insurance, such as existed in *Marine Bank*, must be analyzed under the fourth factor of *Reves* — the existence of another regulatory scheme which significantly reduces the risk of the instrument. The Tenth Circuit's holding in no way undermines *Marine Bank*.

III.

THE TENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE INSTRUMENTS SOLD BY RFC AND RTS ARE SECURITIES

Petitioner claims that the Tenth Circuit failed to consider the language of the statute in determining that the instruments sold to the public by RFC and RTS are securities. (Pet. Brf. at 21.) In so arguing, Petitioner repeatedly distorts the nature of

the instruments at issue. Unhappy with the real character of the certificates, Petitioner persists in erroneously referring to them as "passbook accounts" and "certificates of deposit." Based on this false premise, Petitioner then argues that because passbook accounts and certificates of deposit were well known to Congress in 1934, but were not specifically enumerated in the statute, Congress cannot have meant to include them in its definition of a security. Petitioner's argument belongs in another case. Neither passbook accounts nor certificates of deposit are involved here.[24]

As the Bankruptcy Court noted, because RTS was a trust company, not a bank,

> [it] was not authorized to, nor did it, accept demand deposits on which checks were drawn or permitted. "Deposits" of non-trust moneys with Republic Trust were therefore not deposits (that is, bailments) at all; but were loans made by the creditors of Republic Trust, which Republic Trust promised to repay and for which Republic Trust issued certificates, not of deposit, but of indebtedness.

In re Republic Trust & Savings Co., 59 Bankr. at 613. As an Oklahoma trust company, moreover, RTS was specifically permitted to issue securities. Opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, No. 79-353, December 31, 1979.

---

[24] Petitioner argues that because the certificates have been referred to as deposits in other contexts, that designation is controlling here. (Pet. Brf. at 5.) Many of the references Petitioner points to merely state that the certificates were "deposit-like." Petitioner acknowledges that the offering circulars and prospectuses specifically stated that the certificates offered were not deposits. Surely, that declaration should be dispositive. Moreover, under Oklahoma law, neither institution was legally able to accept "deposits." The Tenth Circuit itself recently described the instruments at issue as "debt instruments, representing a promise by the issuing entity to repay . . . akin to promissory notes . . ." *In re Republic Trust & Savings Company*, 897 F.2d 1041, 1043-44 (10th Cir. 1990).

The discussion in *Oklahoma Bankers' Assoc. v. Federal Reserve Board*, 766 F.2d 1446, 1448-50 (10th Cir. 1985), relied on by Petitioner, is not contrary. There, the Court was concerned with regulation of interstate banking by the Federal Reserve Board, certain definitional questions, and a wholly different institution.

RFC, of course, was a finance company, an ordinary corporation. To label the instruments it issued as either passbooks or certificates of deposit is to attempt to convert RFC into a bank. In fact, as Petitioner acknowledges, both RFC and RTS sold the certificates through prospectuses and offering circulars which characterized them *not* as deposits but as securities and investments. They should be taken at their word. *Reves,* 494 U.S. at ____, 110 S. Ct. at 953.

All of Petitioner's arguments that Congress did not intend to regulate the ordinary deposit and passbook activities of banks under the securities acts are irrelevant. The Tenth Circuit correctly analyzed the instruments issued by RFC and RTS as "evidences of indebtedness." *Holloway,* 879 F.2d at 782. It then correctly concluded that the regulation of these instruments was not such as would remove them from the protection of the federal securities laws, and that the *Reves* factors did not change the result. 900 F.2d at 1488. Both the procedure used and the result reached are correct on the facts here, and do not require this Court's review.

Petitioner claims that the Tenth Circuit's opinion is contrary to Congress' intent in enacting the Glass-Steagall Act to govern banks and the federal securities laws to govern the securities markets. (Pet. Brf. at 20.) Petitioner points to section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. §378, which it claims explicitly states that state regulation of an institution is sufficienct to remove the institution from the federal securities laws.

Petitioner misreads section 21. That section is very simple. It provides that (1) no institution which accepts demand deposits or the like may also deal in securities, except in certain limited ways, and (2) in order to accept demand deposits, the institution must be regulated by some federal or state banking authority. *See generally Securities Industry Assoc. v. Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System,* 468 U.S. 137, 148-149 (1984). Section 21 has nothing to do with what sort of alternative regulation makes the protection of the federal securities laws unnecessary. Section 21 can in no way be read to provide that regulation by a state or federal banking agency means that investments issued by that institution are exempt from the federal securities laws. Moreover, as discussed above, neither RFC nor RTS accepted demand deposits. Section 21 is simply irrelevant.

IV.

THIS IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE CASE TO RESOLVE QUESTIONS AS TO NOTES OF NINE MONTHS DURATION OR LESS

Petitioner argues that this Court should grant the writ to resolve a question left open in *Reves* - how to interpret 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(10), which provides that, "unless the context otherwise requires," the definition of security does not include notes "with a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months." Petitioner argues for a literal interpretation of the section, often known as the "commercial paper" exception, despite the fact that the lower federal courts and the SEC

> have been unanimous in rejecting a literal reading of that exclusion. They have instead concluded that "when Congress spoke of notes with a maturity not exceeding nine months, it meant commercial paper, not investment securities." *Reves*, 494 U.S. at ____, 110 S. Ct. at 955-56 (Stevens J., concurring), citing *Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.*, 463 F.2d 1075, 1080 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972).

Petitioner claims that taken together, the Court's opinions in *Reves* suggest that a "substantial reason" must exist to justify ignoring the statute's literal language. (Pet. Brf. at 25.) In fact, however, the majority in *Reves* was careful to express no opinion on the question. Instead, the Court held that even assuming the exception was not limited to commercial paper, the notes at issue in *Reves* were securities. *Id.* at 955. The Court thus carefully avoided expressing any opinion.[25]

This is not the proper case for the Court to decide this issue. Whether the exception for notes with a maturity of nine months or less should be literally applied was not argued below. Moreover, the opinion in *Reves* is just seven months old, and only a few courts have had the opportunity to consider *Reves'* discussion of the exception. *See, e.g., Singer v. Livoti*, 741 F. Supp. 1040

---

[25] The dissenting justices did argue for a literal interpretation of the exception. *Id.* at 957.

(S.D.N.Y. 1990). For this Court to revisit the issue so soon after *Reves,* in a case where it was at most a tangential issue below, would be inappropriate.

Despite having failed to raise the issue below, Petitioner argues that this Court should grant the writ. It claims that the Tenth Circuit's holding regarding the exception for notes of less than nine months maturity is without support. Petitioner admits, however, as it must, that the Tenth Circuit's holding simply follows the holding of every other court which has considered the issue. (Pet. Brf. at 26.)[26]

In fact, as every court has concluded, the settled interpretation of the commercial paper exception is faithful to the statutory language. Both the definitions in the 1933 and the 1934 Act apply "unless the context otherwise requires . . . " 15 U.S.C. §§77(a)(3); 78(c)(10) (1988). Using the context clause to exclude only short term commercial paper and not all short term securities is faithful to the plain meaning of the statute and legislative history, while still affording the flexibility that all courts and commentators have recognized is necessary to give effect to the overriding purposes of the securities laws.

The purpose of the securities laws is to ensure that persons who purchase financial instruments offered to the public as

---

[26] The reasoning behind this long line of decisions is well known. The analysis includes an examination of the statutory language itself, the purpose of the federal securities laws, their interpretation by the SEC and the legislative history of the relevant sections. *See, e.g., Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc.,* 669 F.2d 770 (D. C. Cir. 1981); *McClure v. First National Bank,* 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), *cert. denied,* 420 U.S. 930 (1975); *Zabriskie v. Lewis,* 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); *Zeller v. Bogue Electric Mfg. Corp.,* 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied,* 414 U.S. 908 (1973); *Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc.,* 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied,* 409 U.S. 1009 (1972).

Every one of these courts has reached the inescapable conclusion that the exception should not be read literally, but should be limited to commercial paper or similar instruments. Indeed, this case law is so well-settled that Justice Stevens concluded in his concurring opinion in *Reves* that

> [it] should not be disturbed unless and until Congress so decides.. . . . A departure from this reliable consensus would upset the justified expectations of both the legal and investment communities.

Reves at 956. These decisions should not be reviewed without giving the lower federal courts an opportunity to consider *Reves.*

investments are fully and accurately informed about the investment's relevant features, including its risks. At the time of their enactment, Congress was well aware that "the public in the past ha[d] sustained severe losses through practices neither ethical nor honest on the part of many persons and corporations selling securities." H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). For that reason, Congress insisted that sellers of securities must not conceal any important information from the buying public. *Id.* at 2. *See also* H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1934).

Invoking the context clause to limit the scope of the exclusion to transactions in commercial paper (or its close equivalent) will ensure that the exclusion is not used to frustrate or circumvent the purposes of the statute. It is inconceivable that Congress intended §3(a)(3) to exempt from registration a periodic public offering of an issuer's own notes to small investors simply because their maturity was less than nine months. *S.E.C. v. American Bd. of Trade,* 751 F.2d 529, 539 (2d Cir. 1984).

This approach is also consistent with the legislative history. Although little direct evidence exists as to why Congress included the term "any note" in the definition of a security, the historical context suggests that inclusion of this term reflected a desire to define "security" broadly enough to encompass a wide variety of financial instruments.[27] That Congress intended to provide protection to the public who buy notes as investments is particularly evident from the legislative history of the statutory exemption for notes and certain other debt instruments of less than nine months maturity; what is generally called commercial paper. Congress recognized that parties to such transactions in the commercial paper market, in which ordinary members of the investing public rarely participated, did not need the same

---

[27] "Note" was understood at that time, as it is today, to refer to a promise to pay, either on demand or at a fixed or determinable time in the future, a sum certain to order or bearer. This definition was used in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, first enacted in New York in 1897, which had been enacted in all states by 1924. *See* Guttman, *Article 3 Commercial Paper: An Updating of Well-Tried Concepts,* 11 How. L.J. 49, 51 n.23 (1965).

protection as the public at large. *See* H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1933).[28]

The legislative history of section 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act applies equally to the Exchange Act's exclusion in Section 3(1)(10). While there are no reported legislative comments regarding the Exchange Act's exclusion of short-term notes, in light of the virtually identical definitions of "security" in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, courts have routinely used the legislative history surrounding the Securities Act's exemption for short-term commercial notes to interpret the Exchange Act's exclusion. *See, e.g., S.E.C. v. American Board of Trade,* 751 F.2d at 538-40; *Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc.,* 669 F.2d at 775-77; *McClure v. First National Bank of Lubbock, Texas,* 497 F.2d at 493 n.1.

The decisions of all of the federal appellate courts and the SEC that the exclusion for notes with a maturity of nine months or less applies only to commercial paper are correct and should not be disturbed.

---

[28] The original draft of the bill that became the Securities Act contained no exemption for short-term commercial paper. Testimony and comments from members of the Federal Reserve Board, the Investment Bankers Association of America and others prompted Congress to reconsider. These statements indicated that a limited exemption from registration was warranted because these business financing instruments were generally sold only to a sophisticated class of professionals, not to the general public. See comments quoted in *Federal Securities Act: Hearing on H. R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,* 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1933); *Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,* 73d Cong. 1st Sess. 94 (1933).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request the Court to deny the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Dated: Chicago, Illinois
October 12, 1990

Respectfully submitted,

*MICHAEL BRUCE HYMAN
DEBORAH S. BUSSERT
MUCH SHELIST FREED DENENBERG AMENT & EIGER, P.C.
200 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 2100
Chicago, IL 60601-1095
(312) 346-3100

STEVEN E. SMITH
STEVEN E. SMITH & ASSOCIATES
1201 Fourth National Bank
Tulsa, OK 74119
(918) 582-4107

*Counsel of Record

CHARLES O. HANSON
RICHARD K. HOLMES
STEWART E. FIELD
HANSON HOLMES FIELD & SNIDER
5918 East 31st Street
Tulsa, OK 74135
(918) 627-4400

JOSEPH C. LONG
300 Timberdell Road
Norman, OK 73019
(405) 325-4699

Counsel for Respondents

APPENDIX

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Exhibit 8 to
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint

REPUBLIC FINANCIAL CORPORATION

NAME Jeremy K. or Shirley Bush Matures June 6, 1985
ADDRESS 5009 Deano Place, Route 8, Claremore, OK 74017

804755

NEGOTIABLE RATE TERMS THRIFT CERTIFICATE

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that for value received this certificate has this date been issued to JEREMY K OR SHIRLEY BUSH for and in consideration of the sum of $ ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS * * *(1,250.00)********** Dollars cash in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged. This certificate shall bear interest at 12.50% per annum, compounded or payable quarterly and shall be due and payable ONE year(s) from date and shall be payable only upon surrender of this certificate. The Company reserves the right to redeem this certificate at any time after issue upon thirty (30) days written notice to the holder hereof of its intention to redeem. The holder of this certificate may redeem this certificate at any time after issue provided, however, that the Company may require thirty (30) days written notice to the Company of such intention to redeem and that the Company reserves the right to limit all redemptions of certificates in any calendar month to fifty percent (50%) of the net cash flow of the Company for the preceeding calendar month; and further provided that a substantial early withdrawal interest penalty will apply. In the event of early withdrawal, this certificate will receive interest equal to the rate currently in effect for Passbook Savings Certificates less an amount equal to three months interest at such rate.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have caused this certificate to be executed by a duly authorized officer of the Company this 6th day of June, 1984.

REPUBLIC FINANCIAL CORPORATION

THE CERTIFICATE ISSUED HEREBY IS NOT INSURED BY ANY AGENCY OF A FEDERAL OR STATE GOVERNMENT

Secretary

Exhibit 20 to
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint



THIS IS TO CERTIFY that for value received this certificate has this date been issued to

R.H. Arnold or Marvel McDaniel

for and in consideration of the sum of $25,000.00

Dollars cash in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged. This certificate shall bear interest at 13.25% per annum, compounded or payable quarterly and shall be due and payable 1 year(s) from date and shall be payable only upon surrender of this certificate. The Company reserves the right to redeem this certificate at any time after issue upon thirty (30) days written notice to the holder hereof of its intention to redeem. The holder of this certificate may redeem this certificate at any time after issue provided, however, that the Company may require thirty (30) days written notice to the Company of such intention to redeem and that the Company reserves the right to limit all redemptions of certificates in any calendar month to fifty percent (50%) of the net cash flow of the Company for the preceding calendar month; and further provided that a substantial early withdrawal interest penalty will apply. In the event of early withdrawal, this certificate will receive interest equal to the rate currently in effect for Passbook Savings Certificates less an amount equal to three months at such rate..

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have caused this certificate to be executed by a duly authorized officer of the Company this 30 day of July, 1984

Teresa A. Budelli
Asst. Secretary

REPUBLIC TRUST AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
Vice President

No. 90-373

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
OCT 24 1990
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

KPMG PEAT MARWICK,

Petitioner,

—v.—

W. DAVID HOLLOWAY, *et al.*,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF PETITION

Of Counsel:

Leonard P. Novello
General Counsel
Anthony J. Costantini
Associate General Counsel
KPMG PEAT MARWICK
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10153

*Dean I. Ringel
David Wagner
Adam Liptak
CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL
(a partnership including
professional corporations)
80 Pine Street
New York, New York 10005
(212) 701-3000

Deryl L. Gotcher
Roy C. Breedlove
Graydon Dean Luthey, Jr.
JONES, GIVENS, GOTCHER
& BOGAN
A Professional Corporation
3800 First National Tower
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

* Counsel of Record

Counsel for Petitioner

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii

I. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING THAT STATE REGULATION IS WHOLLY IRRELEVANT TO DETERMINING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS TO THE INSTRUMENTS AT ISSUE IS RECOGNIZED TO BE IN CONFLICT WITH THE DECISIONS OF OTHER CIRCUIT COURTS AND WARRANTS REVIEW 2

II. THE DECISION BELOW DEPARTS FROM THIS COURT'S DECISIONS IN THAT IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT NEITHER THE LANGUAGE OF THE SECURITIES ACTS' DEFINITIONS NOR THEIR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SUPPORTS TREATING CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT OR PASSBOOK ACCOUNTS AS SECURITIES..... 4

III. THE QUESTION LEFT OPEN IN *REVES*, OF THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 1934 ACT EXCEPTION FOR NOTES WITH MATURITIES OF NINE MONTHS OR LESS, IS PRESENTED BY THIS CASE AND IS RIPE FOR REVIEW.. 7

CONCLUSION 10

Reference is made to Peat Marwick's statement pursuant to Rule 29.1 at page iii of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari ("Pet.").

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases PAGE

Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. *Crenshaw*, 486 U.S. 71 (1988) 8n

Hathorn v. *Lovorn*, 457 U.S. 255 (1982) 8n

Marine Bank v. *Weaver*, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) 2n, 3, 3n, 4

Reves v. *Ernst & Young*, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990) 2, 2n, 3, 3n, 7-8, 8n

SEC v. *Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. of America*, 359 U.S. 65 (1959) 3-4

Tafflin v. *Levitt*, 865 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1989), *aff'd on unrelated issue*, 110 S.Ct. 792 (1990) 2n

Youakim v. *Miller*, 425 U.S. 231 (1976) 8n

Statutes

Glass-Steagall Act
§ 21, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988) 4, 5n

McCarran-Ferguson Act
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011 *et seq.* (1988) 3

Okla. Stat. Ann.
Tit. 6, § 1001(A)(1) (West 1984) 6

Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988) 7-9

Other Authorities

Note, *Notes Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Argument for Plain Reading of the Nine Month Exception*, 1990 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 163 8-9

PAGE

Okla. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 79-353, 11 Op. Att'y Gen. Okla. 574 (Dec. 31, 1979)..... 6

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No. 90-373

KPMG PEAT MARWICK,

Petitioner,

—v.—

W. DAVID HOLLOWAY, *et al.*,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF PETITION

This reply brief responds to the principal new arguments advanced by respondents in the brief in opposition ("Br. Op.").

I.

THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING THAT STATE REGULATION IS WHOLLY IRRELEVANT TO DETERMINING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS TO THE INSTRUMENTS AT ISSUE IS RECOGNIZED TO BE IN CONFLICT WITH THE DECISIONS OF OTHER CIRCUIT COURTS AND WARRANTS REVIEW

Respondents concede that (i) at least one opinion of a federal court of appeals (the Fourth Circuit) is in "direct conflict" with the holding below that no amount of state regulation is sufficient to satisfy the *Marine Bank* v. *Weaver* (455 U.S. 551 (1982)) standard (Br. Op. at 9, 14);[1] (ii) the decision of the Tenth Circuit below is also in conflict on this point with the "reasoning" of decisions in other circuits (the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits) as well (Br. Op. at 15, n.19) and (iii) this Court's opinion in *Reves* v. *Ernst & Young* (110 S. Ct. 945 (1990)) does not compel the holding arrived at by the Tenth Circuit with respect to this issue (Br. Op. at 16). In light of this series of concessions, respondents' halfhearted suggestion that the acknowledged conflict among the circuits does not warrant resolution at this time by this Court is untenable.[2]

---

1 Respondents acknowledge (as did the Tenth Circuit) the direct conflict between the decision below and *Tafflin* v. *Levitt*, 865 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1989), *aff'd on unrelated issue*, 110 S.Ct. 792 (1990). In *Tafflin*, the Fourth Circuit held that notwithstanding the absence of federal regulation or federal deposit insurance the existence of a state regulatory system precluded treatment of the certificates of deposit before it as securities.

Respondents cannot bring themselves to defend fully the Tenth Circuit's holding as to the wholesale irrelevance of state regulation and suggest, without any explanation, that the holding was not necessary to the decision. *See, e.g.*, Br. Op. at 16-19, and especially n.22. Given the substantial state regulation applicable here and described in the Petition at 6-8, the holding as to the irrelevance of state regulation was plainly necessary to the result reached below.

2 Respondents acknowledge that the Tenth Circuit's reading of *Reves* revises *Marine Bank* in that the previously independently dispositive *Marine*

Respondents argue, in the alternative, that the holding was correct given this Court's decision in *SEC* v. *Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. of America*, 359 U.S. 65 (1959), since, they contend, that decision made clear that even extensive state regulation did not mean that "the federal securities laws do not apply" (Br. Op. at 18). But that case, dealing with explicit exemptions in the securities laws (and analogous provisions in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011 *et seq.* (1988)) for contracts of "insurance", turned on the meaning of that phrase in the federal statutes. Indeed, the Court emphasized its "reluctance to disturb the state regulatory schemes that are in actual effect, either by displacing them or superimposing federal requirements on transactions that are tailored to meet state requirements." 359 U.S. at 68. It was the Court's conclusion that the variable annuity contracts were not insurance contracts at all that provided the basis for decision. 359 U.S. at 70-73. This rationale hardly provides a basis for reading into the subsequently decided *Marine Bank* and *Reves* a "federal regulation only" limitation that even respondents implicitly recognize cannot be found in the Court's holdings (*see* Br. Op. at 17).

Apart from the fact that state regulation or state and federal regulation combined may lead to the conclusion that an instrument is not a security under the *Marine Bank* approach, it also appears that Congress plainly intended to exclude depository instruments from its definition of securities. This

---

Bank standard is now "to be considered as one of the four [*Reves*] factors, not as a separate consideration which might remove the instrument from the protection of the federal securities law even if it otherwise qualified as a security." Br. Op. at 16. Respondents resist the obvious implication of this reading (Br. Op. at 19). Under such a reading, however, the issue of whether a given bank certificate of deposit is a security, seemingly resolved by *Marine Bank*, would no longer be considered definitively resolved, but instead would be subject to the four factor analysis announced in *Reves* but never undertaken in *Marine Bank*.

The unsettling of what was thought previously resolved law only emphasizes the need for review of the basic issue of the role of regulation generally, and state regulation in particular, in determining whether instruments issued by financial institutions are securities.

intent is demonstrated in the plain language of the Securities Acts' definitions and is inherent in the distinctions set forth in the Glass-Steagall Act. As discussed in the Petition at 21-25 and at Point II, *infra*, this basic definitional question is one appropriate for resolution by this Court as well. The Congressional intent to exclude depository instruments and the distinct statutory framework applicable here, of course, also supply a wholly separate reason that *SEC* v. *Variable Annuity* provides no support for the decision below.

II.

THE DECISION BELOW DEPARTS FROM THIS COURT'S DECISIONS IN THAT IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT NEITHER THE LANGUAGE OF THE SECURITIES ACTS' DEFINITIONS NOR THEIR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SUPPORTS TREATING CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT OR PASSBOOK ACCOUNTS AS SECURITIES

The Petition presents the question of whether, in failing to include certificates of deposit, passbook accounts or similar instruments in the Securities Acts' definitional sections despite its familiarity with these terms, Congress intended to exclude such instruments from the coverage of the Acts. Respondents do not appear to contest that certificates of deposit and passbook accounts as such are excluded. Instead, even as they list, by name, examples of the instruments at issue here, including "Market Rate Savings Thrift Certificate," "Money Market Thrift Certificate" and "Passbook Savings Certificate" (Br. Op. at 3), all of which are strikingly similar to the excluded instruments, respondents appear to contend that Congress intended to regulate *these* instruments as securities. The label annexed to an instrument is not, of course, dispositive, *cf. Marine Bank*, *supra*, 455 U.S. at 560 n.11, but it would appear as an initial matter that the instruments at issue here, in their similarity to certificates of deposit, passbook accounts and other depository instruments,

are precisely the kinds of instruments Congress did not intend the Securities Acts to reach.

The Securities Acts, of course, do not define "certificate of deposit" or "passbook" accounts or the range of other similar instruments Congress did not intend to include in the definition of securities. A number of other authorities are helpful in divining Congressional intent in this matter, however. Among the most helpful is the Glass-Steagall Act, in which the very Congress that enacted the Securities Acts identified and described a variety of depository instruments plainly absent from the Securities Acts' definitional sections. The instruments at issue here, as discussed below and in the Petition at 5-6, 22-24, fall squarely within the Glass-Steagall description of depository instruments.[3]

Respondents, while acknowledging that the instruments at issue here are considered deposits in some contexts, Br. Op. at 20, n.24; *see also* Pet. at 5-6, turn to other, non-contemporaneous and non-analogous authorities to support their position that the instruments were not "deposits" and, they contend, therefore to be treated as ordinary debt instruments or notes rather than the special type of debt or note represented by certificates of deposit and the like. Respondents rely primarily on a line of cases interpreting the Bankruptcy Code's definitional requirements. Br. Op. at 11, 20. But to find similar instruments not to be "deposits" for the special purposes served by the Bankruptcy Code hardly leads to the conclusion that the instruments are not deposits or deposit-like for other purposes as the district court recognized in this case in likening these instruments to deposits (App. 44a, 47a). Nor does it avail respondents to argue that the institutions here are not "banks." As Glass-Steagall

---

3 Respondents' summary of Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988), a section which reflects the understanding of the Congress that enacted the Securities Acts, is a poor substitute for the statutory text (set forth at Appendix ("App.") to Petition at 87a-88a). Br. Op. at 21. For instance, Section 21 speaks not of "demand deposits," as respondents would have it, but of precisely what is at issue here—"deposits subject to check or repayment upon presentation of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor". 12 U.S.C. § 378(a).

itself reflects, Congress contemplated that many institutions would perform bank-like functions and recognized the clear distinction between such activities and the issuance of securities.

The balance of the citations offered by respondents for the proposition that the instruments are not deposits (and, as they reason, therefore *are* securities) are off the point and fail, in any event, to address the more fundamental question of whether Congress intended these instruments to be included within the definitions when it apparently intended certificates of deposit to be excluded. Thus, notwithstanding respondents' contrary suggestion (Br. Op. at 11), the Oklahoma Banking Code affirmatively empowers trust companies to accept a variety of deposits. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 6, § 1001(A)(1) (West 1984). Respondents cite an opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma which recognized the State Banking Commissioner's powers to include supervision of securities issued by trust companies (Br. Op. at 3, 20) to suggest that the instruments at issue here are therefore securities. But in the opinion in question, the Attorney General of Oklahoma opined that the Oklahoma Banking Department "has supervisory responsibility with respect to *banks and* trust companies issuing securities". No. 79-353, 11 Op. Att'y Gen. Okla. 574 (Dec. 31, 1979) (emphasis added). The opinion in no way suggests that the instruments in question are "securities" if issued by a trust company, but "deposits" if issued by a bank.

Significantly, respondents fail to address the fact that respondents' counsel themselves, presumably aware of the various materials they now cite, formed the view that the instruments at issue were "deposits" and that the plaintiffs were "depositors" and used these terms in the complaint in this very action. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 3.1, 3.2, 4.1. This itself suggests the appropriateness of treating the instruments as posing the same issues under the securities laws as do other instruments commonly regarded as deposits.[4]

---

4 Respondents' brief itself serves to emphasize the real distinctions between the regulation of depository instruments issued by banks and similar

III.

THE QUESTION LEFT OPEN IN *REVES*, OF THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 1934 ACT EXCEPTION FOR NOTES WITH MATURITIES OF NINE MONTHS OR LESS, IS PRESENTED BY THIS CASE AND IS RIPE FOR REVIEW

Respondents do not contest that this case squarely presents the issue of whether notes with maturities not exceeding nine months are securities for the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act. Instead, respondents state (without record citation or elaboration) that this issue "was not fully briefed and argued below and the Tenth Circuit did not fully consider it." Br. Op. at 10, 22, 23. This argument is entirely and demonstrably wrong.

The question of the applicability of the nine-month exception was considered and ruled on by the Tenth Circuit in its first decision. 879 F.2d at 778; App. 20a ("the literal language of the 1934 Act . . . cannot be read literally to include or to exempt 'any note' based on maturity alone"). *See also* Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants dated July 13, 1987 at 37, n.12 (respondents themselves argued below that notes are to be "subjected to the securities laws without regard to . . . maturity"). Peat Marwick addressed this issue in its first Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in this action (No. 89-532), dated September 29, 1989 (pp. 27-28). This Court granted the petition, vacated the judgment below and remanded the case for further consideration in light of *Reves* v. *Ernst & Young*, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990), a case in which the plurality expressly

---

financial institutions and regulation under a securities regime. Thus it emphasizes the series of cease and desist orders issued by the Federal Reserve Board in the course of its oversight in this matter (while simultaneously denigrating the significance of federal regulation). Br. Op. at 8-9, 11-12. Significantly, these orders were, when issued, confidential as a matter of Federal Reserve policy. Such emphasis on confidentiality, a hallmark of bank-type regulation, is flatly inconsistent with the disclosure goals of securities law. The Tenth Circuit's first decision recognized the differences between these policy goals (879 F.2d at 786; App. 34a) but ignored them in its holding.

declined to reach the question of the nine-month exception; five other members of the Court, however, addressed the issue.[5]

On remand, the Tenth Circuit again *ruled* on this issue in its supplemental opinion: "the section 78c(a)(10) exception for short-term notes is limited to prime quality negotiable commercial paper of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general public" and therefore "section 78c(a)(10) does not exclude [the instruments at issue] from the federal securities laws"[6] (900 F.2d at 1489; App. 7a-8a). (Respondents concede that this ruling constitutes a "holding" of the Tenth Circuit (Br. Op. at 23).) Peat Marwick timely filed a Petition for Rehearing, with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, explicitly addressing the nine-month exception, its treatment in the *Reves* opinions and its applicability to this case (pp. 12-15).[7] The Tenth Circuit thereafter denied rehearing. It is plain that the issue was directly resolved by the court below and was preserved for review by this Court.

To the extent respondents address the merits of the vexing substantive issue of the proper interpretation of the nine-month exception, their arguments only underscore the need for final resolution of an issue that at least five members of this Court were prepared to decide in *Reves*. Indeed, commentators have made just that point. *See* Note, *Notes Under*

---

5 Justice Stevens, concurring, concluded that the notes in question were securities notwithstanding the nine-month exception. 110 S. Ct. at 955-56. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by three other Justices, concluded that "there is no justification for looking beyond the plain terms" of the exception. 110 S. Ct. at 960 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

6 In twice explicitly ruling on the subject the Tenth Circuit preserved the issue for review even had Peat Marwick not, as set forth in the text, explicitly briefed the issue. *Youakim* v. *Miller*, 425 U.S. 231, 234 (1976) (per curiam).

7 The Tenth Circuit did not authorize post-remand briefing prior to the issuance of its supplemental opinion. The argument in question would have been properly preserved for review even had it appeared *only* in the Petition for Rehearing and had *not* been ruled on by the court below. *Bankers Life & Casualty Co.* v. *Crenshaw*, 486 U.S. 71, 77 (1988); *Hathorn* v. *Lovorn*, 457 U.S. 255, 262-65 (1982).

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Argument for a Plain Reading of the Nine Month Exception, 1990 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 163.

Respondents suggest that it is premature to resolve the question as to the meaning of the nine month exception identified but not resolved by this Court in *Reves*. A majority of the members of this Court have already expressed a view on this issue, an issue which has also been considered by most of the courts of appeals. The issue requires no further incubation and this case presents the proper vehicle for its resolution.

* * *

Respondents' own description of the instruments at issue suggests the variety of such instruments in terms of lengths of maturity (ranging from notes of an essentially demand character to instruments with three-month, six-month and longer maturities) and the distinct types of regulatory oversight exercised with respect to the different instruments. This Petition thus presents a suitable vehicle to resolve a number of questions concerning the definition of securities in a range of factual contexts. The resolution of these questions would be of substantial assistance to the financial community, regulators and the public.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set forth in the Petition, the petition for a writ of *certiorari* should be granted.

Dated: New York, New York
October 24, 1990

Respectfully submitted,

*Dean I. Ringel
David Wagner
Adam Liptak
CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL
(a partnership including
professional corporations)
80 Pine Street
New York, New York 10005
(212) 701-3000

Deryl L. Gotcher
Roy C. Breedlove
Graydon Dean Luthey, Jr.
JONES, GIVENS, GOTCHER
& BOGAN
A Professional Corporation
3800 First National Tower
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

Counsel for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

Leonard P. Novello
General Counsel
Anthony J. Costantini
Associate General Counsel
KPMG PEAT MARWICK
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10153

* Counsel of Record